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RESUMO
Explicar fenômenos mentais tem sido um desafio permanente tanto para filósofos quanto para
cientistas.  Esta  tese  oferece  razões  para  considerar  o  Enativismo,  especialmente  em suas
variantes  radicais,  como  uma  abordagem  que  enquadra  fenômenos  mentais  de  maneira
frutífera. Para enativistas, não somente o cérebro, como também o corpo inteiro, o ambiente e
sua história biológica, tanto no nível filogenético como ontogenético, além de aspectos sociais
e culturais, são necessários para a compreensão da cognição. Além de apresentar os principais
princípios  do  Enativismo  (capítulos  1  e  2),  argumento  que  as  maneiras  tradicionais  de
entender a fenomenalidade enfrentam deficiências que derivam de pressuposições filosóficas
errôneas.  Mais  especificamente,  as  dificuldades  profundas  em  explicar  cientificamente  a
fenomenalidade  surgem  de  expectativas  redutivistas  implícitas  na  pesquisa  filosófica  e
científica sobre a mente (capítulo 3) e de uma concepção distorcida de experiência (capítulo
4). Concluo indicando que uma visão inspirada pelo enativismo é não somente possível como,
de fato, uma abordagem promissora para a mente e a cognição.
Palavras-chave:  filosofia  da  mente,  filosofia  e  ciência  cognitiva,  consciência,  cognição,
naturalismo
ABSTRACT
Explaining  mental  phenomena  has  been  a  permanent  challenge  for  both  scientists  and
philosophers.  This  thesis  provides  reasons to  consider  Enactivism,  specially  in  its  radical
variants, as an approach able to fruitfully frame mental phenomena. For enactivists, not only
the  brain,  but  the  whole  body,  the  environment  and  the  biological  history,  both  in  the
phylogenetic and the ontogenetic levels, besides social and cultural aspects are necessary for
an  adequate  understanding  of  cognition.  In  addition  to  presenting  the  main  tenets  of
Enactivism  (chapters  1  and  2),  I  argue  that  the  standard  ways  according  to  which
phenomenality  has  been  traditionally  understood  face  shortcomings  which  derive  from
misleading philosophical assumptions. More specifically, the deep difficulties in scientifically
explaining  phenomenality  stem from implicit  reductive  expectations  in  philosophical  and
scientific research about the mind (chapter 3) and from a distorted conception of experience
(chapter 4). As a conclusion, I indicate that an enactivist inspired view for phenomenality is
not only possible, but in fact a promising approach for mind and cognition.
Keywords: philosophy of mind, philosophy and cognitive science, consciousness, cognition,
naturalism
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INTRODUCTION
The present thesis is the result of the project of providing an assessment of an
enactivist  view of  the  phenomenal  aspects  of  experience.  Phenomenality,  qualia,  the  raw
feeling, or the what is it like of undergoing an experience are all different ways that have been
used in the philosophical literature to refer to the properties of experience that make us feel
them  the  way  they  do.  Ordinary  experiences  specifically  feel  like  something  other  than
nothing: there are differences in the experiences of tasting a coffee or a beer, of listening to
music or to a car passing by, or seeing the blue sky or the green grass, and so on. There should
be  no  mystery  in  this  initial  way  of  putting  what  phenomenality  is.  Now,  the  vexing,
notoriously  hard  issue  is  how  to  accommodate  it  within  a  natural  scientific  framework,
usually referred to as “the hard problem of consciousness”. The path of trying to develop an
enactivist  understanding for phenomenality  led me not only to  a  deeper  understanding of
enactivism but also to discussions concerning the shortcomings of the available traditional,
strict,  naturalistic  approaches  and  of  the  way  experience  is  often  characterized  in  the
philosophical debate.
Issues concerning mind and cognition have been oscillating between reductionist
materialistic  and  non-reductive  materialistic  theories  (and  combinations  among  those).  A
frequent  form of  reasoning is  the following: because of  the peculiar  properties  of  mental
phenomena,  such  as  phenomenality  and  intentionality,  it  is  assumed  that  what  is  mental
cannot  be  wholly  accounted  within  scientific  explanations.  Nevertheless,  materialistically
oriented philosophers and, of course, scientists, keep on looking for the physical substract of
mental phenomena. Non-materialistic philosophers claim, however, that if a phenomena has
in fact  been explained  by scientific  accounts,  then it  is  not  mental  anymore,  for  what  is
properly mental is necessarily left out from a material explanation. Conversely, whatever is
actually materially explained cannot be mental (for example, take the influential arguments
from  Nagel  (1974),  Jackson  (1983),  Kripke  (1979),  Levine  (1983)  and  most  recently,
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Chalmers (1996, 2002), who highlighted similar difficulties). Both sides of the debate seem to
provide equally compelling arguments: at the same time that mentality seems in fact to exhibit
a peculiar behavior, as non-reductive, non-materialistic theorists argue, it seems odd that it
does not fit within our scientific understanding of the world. We seem to be stuck between the
materialistic and anti-materialistic positions that repeatedly led us to dead ends.
The  enactivist  framework  I  present  here  aims  to  untangle  some  of  the  hard
questions that have been posed concerning cognition in general  by recasting some deeply
entrenched  assumptions.  I  argue,  following  enactivist  insights,  that  the  issues  concerning
mind  are  framed  in  a  misleading  way,  and  that  is  the  reason  why  there  is  not  even  a
satisfactory characterization of what minds and mental phenomena are. It is indeed possible to
develop a scientific and naturalistic account for cognition, but in order to do that, we need
first to abandon the idea that there is a clear-cut divide between what is mental and what is
physical and that something (supposedly) in the brain bridges those two realms. It is clearer
now that,  by  framing  the  mind-body problem in  terms  of  the  “relation”  or  “connection”
between matter (or, more specifically, the brain) and mind, and other similar terms, we get
caught in explanatory traps. The point  to be explored in the following is  that  there is  no
connection whatsoever between mind and body, because there is no divide.
The naturalistic framework Enactivism offers might be useful to unravel at least
some of the problems concerning mind and body. Needless to say, even if it dissolves or does
away with  some issues,  others  will  immediately  appear.  So,  neither  Enactivism (nor  this
thesis) are supposed to be taken as the definitive answer for the difficult problems at issue
here. In an enactivist framework, it is through their bodies and by means of permanent and
ongoing  engagements  with  the  environment  that  living  beings  turn  out  to  be  properly
cognitive  beings.  The relations  of  bodies  and  environment  are  always  historical,  both  in
phylogenetic and in ontogenetic ways and, in many cases, including the paradigmatic human
case, also involve collective aspects, such as social and cultural ones. The fundamental tenet
of taking cognition to be constituted by their dynamic involvements with the environment by
means of patterns that are dependent on both the phylogenetical (the level of the species) and
the ontogenetical (at the level of a particular individual) biological history, with the aid of
social and cultural aspects entails important consequences. In other words, the neat separation
of what is exclusively mental (what happens in the head) from what is  not mental  (what
happens outside it) no longer exists.
Enactivism is a complex view, and besides taking the biological configuration of
bodies as fundamental for cognition, it also takes seriously the involvement of the subject
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with normative practices, which brings the need of a sort of pluralism concerning explanation.
Enactivism takes humanistic sciences, such as History, Anthropology and Philosophy itself in
an  equal  explanatory  foot  as  the  “natural”  sciences:  Physics,  Chemistry,  Neurobiology.
Without the resources human sciences bring, it is not possible to get a fully adequate grip on
experience. As it is discussed along the way, enactivist views might be truly transformative of
research about mind.
One of  the implications  of  no longer  having a definitive criterion  for  what  is
mental and/or properly cognitive, then characterizing cognition might change what are the
possible cognitive beings. As an example, take computers. By functioning in terms of discrete
representational states, computers, which are sometimes taken to be closer to being cognitive
(or intelligent) creatures than, say, bacteria, are not cognitive creatures at all, and are not even
close  to  be.  That  is  because  one  of  the  main  tenets  of  Enactivism  is  the  anti-
representationalism about basic cognition. Enactivists claim that there is no need nor scientific
legitimacy  in  taking  mental  representations  to  be  the  most  basic  explanatory  entity  in
explaining cognition. So, in an enactivist view, the activities bacteria perform in its interaction
with their environmental  niche,  even if  as basic as pursuing sugar,  are active,  and can be
considered, at least in a basic sense, as proto-cognitive creatures. Differently from computers,
bacteria are autonomous beings, who exhibit (some) agency and self-preservation goals. By
being properly living forms, in an essentially biological way that is constitutive of cognition,
bacteria and plants are closer to human beings than computers. Even if it seems strange and
far-fetched to accept bugs and flies to be creatures capable of (basic) cognition, this way of
taking cognition is helpful in dismissing questions that have long preoccupied philosophers:
are babies and non-human animals capable of any kind of cognition? The enactivist answer is
a  definite  and  straightforward  yes.  By emphasizing  the  basic  features  which  underlie  all
lifeforms,  such  as  an  existence  within  a  given  environmental  niche  and  a  specifically
biologically configured bodily material substract, it is the dynamic interchanging flow within
that  complex that  allows for and constitute the development of cognitive skills.  However,
accepting the proximity of plants and humans when it comes to cognition is still met with
resistance in many philosophical corners.
The reason for that resistance is more easily understood once we recall the salient
aspects  of  the historically  dominant  model  of  cognition.  Taking  the intellect  as  the most
paradigmatic and defining feature of cognitive beings has somehow distorted the view we
have about ourselves and other living beings. The computer metaphor for cognition has lent
intellectualism significant  success.  However,  the strategy to decompose cognitive activity,
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such as thinking, perceiving, understanding, remembering and imagining, to name a few, in a
mechanistic fashion, assuming cognition can be explained as computations on representations,
has stumbled upon significant limits.
The  association  of  computational  approaches  with  representational  theories  to
explain the states on which computations are performed seem to be a perfect fit in the attempt
to meet the materialistic worries that shape much of contemporary science.  The aim is to
explain all mental phenomena in terms only of the physical processes that happen in the brain.
The  fundamental  notion  is  that  of  mental representation.  A mental  representation  maps
aspects from the world into the organism’s brain, thereby providing a causal connection to the
world.  It  roughly  works  like  this:  the  sensory  organs  register  the  physical  information
contained in a stimulus.  The information is  progressively transformed by brain processes,
resulting in an abstract model of the world. Based on that virtual, representational model of
the  world,  the  organism engages  in  behavior.  Such  a  structure  is  sometimes  dubbed  the
sandwich view (Hurley, 2001), in which the sensory input and behavioral output are the bread
slices, and the filling is the proper cognitive processing of information. There would be, then,
a causal connection between mind and world which is perfectly legitimate from a scientific
perspective. That basic framework is the standard view in Cognitive Science, and is supposed
to  explain  the  peculiar  features  of  cognitive  activity,  namely,  intentionality  and
phenomenality.
Intentionality is the philosopher’s term for the fact that a mental state is about or
refers to something. The fact that mental states are intentional has been usually explained by
their putative representational nature. Roughly, a mental representation is an internal state that
represents aspects from the environment (or the overall state of the organism) as its contents.
However it is defined, in richer or cheaper ways, or in various degrees of complexity, a mental
representation is often taken as the means by which a subject is veridically connected to the
external world. Cognition is then understood as the result of mechanical operations on those
internal states.
That  is  the  standard  explanation  for  cognition,  exploited  by  the  majority  of
approaches in Cognitive Science, which assume mental representation and content as basic
explanatory entities. Despite its ubiquity – and the belief, stated by some, that there is no way
out of the representationalist paradigm (Clark and Toribio, 1994; Clark,  2015; Milkowski,
2015,  for  example)  –  there  are  serious  reasons  to  question  the  deeply  entrenched  story
sketched above. Despite its  ubiquity and variety,  the notions of mental representation and
content are problematic from a naturalistic point of view. As Haugeland (1990) points out, the
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question “is not to doubt or debunk, but to understand” the coexistence of intentionality and
physicalism  (Haugeland,  1990,  p.  385).  The  challenge  has  been  to  find  a  notion  of
intentionality that fits within a strict naturalistic view. Even though there have been many
attempts, the project of naturalizing intentionality has not been satisfactorily solved as well.
The  representationalist  framework  has  neither  helped  much  in  illuminating
phenomenality, as it was initially expected to. It is usually taken for granted that at least some
living beings are connected to the external world in ways which provide them with a specific
feeling of what it  is  like to undergo a specific relation to the world.  When that  happens,
mental states are phenomenally conscious. As indicated before, paradigmatic and relatively
uncontroversial examples include perceptual states in the different sensory modalities, even
thought that  characterization is  not  exhaustive.  Phenomenal  states  might  include not only
states  of  perceptual  experience,  but  also  “bodily  sensation,  mental  imagery,  emotional
experience, occurrent thought and more” (Chalmers, 2002, p. 248). In all those cases, “there is
something it is like” (Nagel, 1974) to be in a specific state: to see a red rose, the blue sky or
one’s desk, to hear a car’s noise or a symphony, to feel pain, pleasure or sadness. It has been
thought that those experiences exhibit special properties which confer them with qualitative
aspects, what has been traditionally called qualia. Qualia, that is, the idea that experience has
properties  that  make  them  ineffable,  intrinsic,  private  and  directly  or  immediately
apprehensible in consciousness (as summed up by Dennett, 1991) is a (misleading) way of
characterizing the nature of our experiences as if it were possible to abstract properties of
them that stand isolated from the embodied patterns of behavior, in yet another display of the
pervasiveness of intellectualism about mind.
Even  so,  it  is  typically  unusual  to  deny  that  conscious  experiences  and  their
phenomenal aspects exist as well as that physical processes at least in part underlie them.
However,  it  is  also  true  that,  while  scientific  developments  in  research  about  the  brain
impressively bloomed in the last century, and especially in the last 40 years or so, achieving
interesting and important results, it has not shed direct light into issues about phenomenality
and consciousness, and philosophers and scientists are still far from a satisfactory  scientific
understanding  of  those  phenomena.  To  maximize  the  contrasts  between  scientific
achievements  and  the  peculiar  features  of  cognition,  consider  problems  such  as  cell
replication or the structure of the atom: though the details might not yet be fully understood,
the basic framework is not alien to anyone familiar with scientific research tools and methods.
Consider also the situation of those topics a century ago: research has developed and there has
been undeniably significant progress. The situation in scientific and philosophical research
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about consciousness has been challenging in a different sense for longer than expected: at the
same  time  that  it  seems  obvious  that  phenomenal  consciousness  depends  on  physical
processes, it is not at all clear how to materialistically account for that relationship in a way
that preserves its phenomenal peculiarities. The problem is that even if a complete physical
theory turns out to be achieved, the question of why should at least some of those physical
processes (nowadays often assumed to be the ones that happen in the brain) be conscious
remains unexplained, that is, why these physical processes are actually felt by the subjects as
such. And this is so no matter how detailed a purely physical account of mental phenomena,
including the interactions among atoms and its particles, or even more basic entities to be yet
discovered, can be worked out.
According  to  Chalmers,  for  example,  to  take  one  recent  and  influential
formulation, there are two kinds of problems concerning consciousness, “easy” and “hard”
problems of consciousness. The former are more like “puzzles than mysteries” and concern
explaining the material basis of activities like the “ability to discriminate stimuli, or to report
information, or to monitor internal states, or to control behavior” (Chalmers, 2002, p. 247). In
principle, for these phenomena, “there is no obvious obstacle to an eventual explanation [...]
in neurobiological or computational terms”, that is, they could in principle be explained by the
standard research paradigms in cognitive science. The easy problems of consciousness, then,
are not “metaphysically baffling”, “since they can all be tackled by means of the standard
repertoire  of  cognitive  science  and  explained  in  terms  of  computational  or  neural
mechanisms” (Zahavi, 2005, p. 302). Explaining phenomenality, however, that is, why do at
least  some  of  those  physical  processes  that  happen  in  the  brain  are  accompanied  by  a
subjective feeling and how those physical processes give rise to consciousness constitute the
hard problem. For instance, how to explain the experience of seeing blue in terms of specific
physical states? There is nothing about a brain state that necessarily connects it with the very
experience  of  seeing  blue.  In  fact,  it  is  conceivable  that  there  are  brain  states  with  no
experience  at  all.  As  I  indicated  before,  the  only  consensual  assessment  concerning
phenomenal  consciousness  is  that  no available theory satisfactorily  explains  it  (Chalmers,
2018, p. 7).
Perhaps  tellingly,  Chalmers  puts  the  issue  in  terms  that  strongly  resemble  a
Kuhnian analysis for scientific development (Kuhn, 1962). Despite the difficulties of applying
Kuhn’s notion to the very philosophical issues, it is possible to identify at least some aspects
that  might  be  insightful.  Currently,  consciousness  can  be  regarded as  an  anomaly,  in  the
Kuhnian sense: a phenomenon that defies the explanations from the dominant paradigm. The
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difficult  situation in  philosophy of  mind  is  as  such  not  only  because  “we lack  empirical
information of the physical conditions of consciousness; it is that we lack a way of thinking
about consciousness that would enable us to say what this empirical information signifies, in
particular whether it tells us what consciousness is” (Nagel, 1993, p. 2). According to Kuhn’s
analysis of scientific development, one indication that a scientific revolution is on the horizon
consists in the resilience of a given phenomena to current standard scientific treatments. So, it
might be the case that a proper understanding of the phenomena depends on the reconceiving
of issues at play.
In fact, many revolutions have been repeatedly announced in cognitive science,
and a recent one that has gained significant attention lately, that I examine more thoroughly in
this thesis by highlighting its promising aspects, is the enactivist research framework. The
publication of  The Embodied Mind, by Varela, Thompson and Rosch, in 1991, served as an
articulation of the enactivist view influencing both philosophical and scientific research about
the mind. Its main claim is that “cognition has no ultimate foundation or ground beyond its
history  of  embodiment”  (Varela,  Thompson  and  Rosch,  1991,  p.  xx).  They  proceed  by
questioning the widespread representationalist assumption in cognitive science,  that is, the
standard claim “that cognition consists of the representation of a world that is independent of
our perceptual and cognitive capacities by a cognitive system that exists independently of the
world” (Varela et al., 1991, p. xx).
According to a general form of enactivism, taking the relationship between body
and environment of living organisms to be the ultimately basic grounding relation would lead
to a more adequate conception of mind and cognition. However, enactivism is not easily and
uniquely  characterized.  Enactivism,  in  fact,  at  least  for  the  moment,  denotes  “broad
frameworks  for  understanding  the  basic  nature  of  minds  and  how  they  become  more
elaborate”  (Hutto  and Myin,  2013,  p.  4)  rather  than a  unified doctrine.  Even  though the
different varieties share some of the basic commitments, those can be combined in such a way
that there is “a variety of distinct and overlapping “enactivisms”, the relations of which are
not always clear” (Ward, Silverman and Villalobos, 2017, p. 365). Still, minimal and shared
commitments can be identified already in Varela, Thompson and Rosch’s book and concern
mainly dynamic body-environmental couplings and antirepresentationalism about cognition:
“(1)  perception consists in perceptually guided action and (2) cognitive structures  emerge
from the recurrent sensorimotor patterns that allow action to be perceptually guided” (Varela
et al., 1991, p. 173).
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As briefly mentioned above, Enactivism is an anti-representationalist view. That
means that not only there are no mental representations as traditionally posited, but also the
main aim of cognitive and perceptual capacities of livings beings is not to represent the world
as  it  is.  Perception  and  action  are  deeply  connected  and,  in  fact,  one  guiding  line  of
Enactivism  is  the  codependence  and  mutual  determination  between  organisms  and
environment. Enactivists advance the claim that it is impossible to “separate our history of
actions – biological and social – from how the world appears to us” (Maturana and Varela,
1987,  p.  23).  Thompson,  Palacios  and  Varela  (1992)  provide  illustrating  examples,  for
example, the case of bee vision: due to the bees’ sensitivity to ultraviolet wavelengths, flowers
that reflect those wavelengths will be more conspicuous than others and then stand a better
chance of being selected at the same time that the availability of such flowers impacts on the
population  of  bees.  The  specificity  of  the  bees’ visual  system  not  only  determines  the
possibilities of action in the environment, but also, as they put it, largely contributes “to the
very  determination  of  that  environment”  (Thompson,  Palacios  and  Varela,  1992,  p.  20).
Organisms “enact”,  or  “bring forth”,  a  world,  in  dynamical  interrelations  that  depend on
various aspects, such as their biological history and configuration.
Ever since the publication of The Embodied Mind, there has been some prominent
varieties  of  enactivisms,  such  as  the  Autopoietic  Enactivism  (Thompson,  2004)  and
Sensorimotor Enactivism (O’Regan and Noë, 2001) and Radical Enactivism (Hutto and Myin,
2013, 2017, widely know as REC – Radical Enactivist Cognition). I do not mean to provide
an exegesis of the varieties of enactivisms and, then, I mainly focus on Hutto and Myin’s
REC.
Hutto  and  Myin  claim  REC  to  be  a  more  thorough  rejection  of  the
representationalist paradigm than other enactivist varieties. REC explores the difficulties of
providing  a  naturalistic  explanation  for  intentionality  in  terms  of  full-blown semantically
contentful representation, as standard approaches in Cognitive Science do. One of the main
points  of  Enactivism  is  the  proposal  of  distinguishing  two  structures  for  intentionality:
contentless and content-involving intentionality. The former preserves the essential aspect of
directedness  to  the  world,  but  without  the  commitment  to  the  presupposition  that
intentionality  always  involves  semantic  content.  Contentless  intentionality,  or  ur-
intentionality, is not representational. Ur-intentionality is target-based, that is, it is  about the
world, but it does not have conditions of satisfaction. Content-involving intentionality, in turn,
indeed exhibits the familiar semantic properties of reference and truth, but that needs to be
understood as a long-term sophisticated achievement developed throughout the organism’s
18
involvement  with  normative  and  shared  practices.  Examples  of  content-involving
intentionality are informative uses of language, such as in propositional language. One of the
points that Hutto and Myin (2013, 2017) emphasize is that this latter use should not be taken
as the paradigmatic case of intentionality, since it applies only to specific and limited cases
that happen, furthermore, in very specific contexts, such as in the human beings engagement
in communal, social practices.
For the moment, I just want to highlight that the basis of all cognitive capacities is
the active and dynamic engagement of organisms in the environment, that is frequently denied
by more standard accounts in cognitive science research, as they claim that representing is the
basic and more fundamental cognitive activity living beings perform.  REC rejects views of
mind  which  take  it  to  be  “some  kind  of  information-processing  device  that  responds
selectively to pregiven features of the environment” (Varela et al., 1991, p. 133), in which the
pregiven features of the environment figure as semantic contents of representations in basic
cognition. Basic, nonrepresentational forms of cognition are spread throughout the spectrum
of  living  beings  and  can  be  understood  in  terms  of  the  skillful  and  non-mechanistic
involvement with the environment. That is in line with a crucial (and often misunderstood)
enactivist  insight that  even very simple living beings might have a cognitive life,  though
basic1. REC argues that  “there is no reason to deny cognitive status to noncontentful world-
directed  activities  of  living  creatures,  including  ourselves,  that  are  capable  of  detecting,
flexibly tracking, and interacting with salient features of an environment in context-sensitive
ways” (Hutto and Myin, 2017, p. 78). REC aims to develop a nuanced account for cognition
and its distinction between contentless and content-involving activities tries to capture the
important  differences  there  are  between  “responding  to  and  keeping  track  of  covariant
information” and “making contentful claims and judgments that can be correct and incorrect”
(Hutto and Myin, 2017, p. x). So, REC displaces the usual distinction of what is cognitive and
what is not.
Given  REC’s  claims,  what  are  the  consequences  for  phenomenality?  Some
prominent  advocates  for  (sensorimotor)  enactivism  have  claimed  that  the  problems  of
1 Thompson (2007, p. 126), for example, says that “cognition is behavior in relation to meaning and norms
that the system itself enacts or brings forth on the basis of its autonomy”. In such a broad characterization of
cognition,  bacteria  could  be  considered  as  capable  of  cognition,  or intelligent.  Recently,  even plant
intelligence  has been seriously  debated (Calvo,  2016,  for  example).  The consequences of  such a  broad
conception of cognition are not completely clear, and possibly such claims needs to be refined. Obviously,
the intelligence of those creatures are not to be measured against human intelligence, for they are probably
very much unlike each other. In any case, in my view, Hutto and Myin (2013) provide distinctions that are
useful for understanding the variety of cognitive activities that various living beings perform, which depends
on their bodies and environmental niches.
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phenomenality  turn  out  to  be  an  illusion  (O'Regan  and  Noë,  2001,  p.  960)  and  that  the
(sensorimotor) enactivist account can bridge the explanatory gap between psychological and
physical processes (O’Regan and Noë, 2001, p. 962). Concerning visual experience, one of
the  most  discussed  modalities  of  experience,  an  enactivist  view  would  seem  to  involve
“adopting a different approach to the problem of visual experience” (O'Regan and Noë, 2001,
p. 940), according to which vision is “a way of acting, (…) a particular way of exploring the
environment” (O’Regan and Noë, 2001, p. 939). In the sensorimotor enactivist account, the
particular qualities of consciousness depend “not only on what is happening in my brain but
also on my history and my current position in and interaction with the wider world” (Noë,
2009, p. 9). However, those claims are not uncontroversial, for it is not clear that such an
approach is able to solve the explanatory gap, as expressed by critics of enactivism such as
Prinz’s (2006) puzzlement: “just as it’s hard to understand why brain states feel a certain way,
it’s hard to understand why brain states together with bits of the external environment would
feel a certain way” (Prinz, 2006, p. 17). Hutto and Myin (2013), in the proposal of REC,
claim that, in fact, just widening the supervenience basis to include not only brains but also
body and environment does not solve the hard problems associated with phenomenality. The
REC answer depends on its more general and critical view on the fundamental assumption of
mainstream  cognitive  science  that  all  cognition  is  dependent  on  semantically  contentful
representation, from which other forms of Enactivism, including Sensorimotor Enactivism,
fall  short.  REC claims that  indeed, the minimal supervenience basis for  phenomenality is
brain-bound, which can be,  prima facie, a surprisingly internalist position for enactivists to
hold. However, brain activation alone is not sufficient to account for the rich and complex
experiences  mature  human  beings  go  through  in  their  ordinary  lives.  The  richness  and
complexity are dependent on the ongoing involvement with the social and collective content-
constituting practices cognitive beings such as humans participate in. The mere existence of
brain activity, though necessary is not sufficient for content-involving capacities.
In a rough summary, issues about conscious experience and its peculiar features
that  is,  its  being  of  or  about something (intentionality),  its  having a particular  qualitative
feeling (phenomenality), and its being directly accessible only for one specific organism in its
first  person perspective (subjectivity) have been addressed by embodied cognitive science
more recently. The philosophical debate has long been dominated by the controversy between
dualistic  and  materialistic  perspectives  in  different  but  closely  related  matters  concerning
metaphysics,  epistemology  and  explanation.  Metaphysical  issues  concern  the  minimal
supervenience  for  mental  phenomena  (are  mental  phenomena  brain-bound  or  not,  for
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example), while epistemological and explanatory issues concern the possibilities of obtaining
a satisfactory account for mental phenomena (are natural or scientific reductive explanations
of  psychological  phenomena  possible?).  Enactivism,  arguably,  significantly  changes  the
landscape of the debate by questioning the fundamental assumption of cognition as a matter
of representing the world as opposed to enabling adaptive forms of interaction.
Hopefully, the effort put here will also shed light on an interesting related question
concerning the  meta-problem of consciousness:  “why we think phenomenal consciousness
poses  a  hard  problem,  or  in  other  terms,  the  problem  of  explaining  why  we  think
consciousness  is  hard  to  explain”  (Chalmers,  2018,  p.  6).  Beneath  the  more  explicit
commitments  to  materialism  or  dualism,  it  is  possible  to  identify  an  underlying  view
concerning our own understanding of human beings and their epistemological capacities. Very
often,  materialistic  positions  are  accompanied  by  the  rejection  of  the  existence  of  God,
spiritual entities or properties, and other “metaphysical” entities, as expressed by philosophers
such  as  Hempel  and  Carnap,  according  to  whom,  respectively,  “[Physicalism]  frequently
encounters  strong  opposition  arising  from  the  idea  that  such  analyses  violently  and
considerably reduce the richness of the life of mind or spirit” (Hempel, 1980/1935, p. 21) and
“now it is proposed that psychology, which has hitherto been robed in majesty as the theory of
spiritual events, be degraded to the status of a part of physics. Doubtless, many will consider
this  an  offensive  presumption”  (Carnap,  1932/2002,  p.  40).  Such  an  attitude  has  deeply
shaped  the  current  world  image  we  are  embedded  into.  In  opposition  to  that,  a  non-
materialistic attitude aims to preserve certain special features of human beings as “the last
ditch defense of  the inwardness and elusiveness of our  mind, a  bulwark against  creeping
mechanism”  (Dennett,  1991,  p.  386)  and  the  philosopher’s  task  in  understanding
consciousness, a “last bastion of specialness will be stormed by sciences” (Dennett, 1991, p.
386).2 Enactivists,  in  turn,  emphasize  the  deeply  biological  nature  of  cognition,  and  the
codependence between organisms and environment taken broadly. It is also possible, then, to
question the underlying “strong, often tacit and unquestioned, commitment to a realism or
objectivism/subjectivism about the way the world is, what we are, and how we come to know
the world” (Varela et al., 1991, p. 9).
So,  the  debate  concerning  phenomenality,  and  mentality  in  general,  does  not
concern  only  empirical  and  scientific  issues,  but  lies  at  the  very  heart  of  the  desire  of
comprehension  of  human  existence  and  its  place  in  nature.  In  sum,  the  existence  of
2 Dennett  himself  actually  positions  himself  against  that  attitude  and  the  quotations  are  used  just  for
illustration of the point.
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phenomenality (and intentionality) has prevented a more complete and satisfactory success of
virtually  all  the  available  approaches  in  science  and  philosophy  of  mind  that  have  been
hitherto offered, especially materialistic approaches (even though dualistic approaches fare no
better  and  have  problems of  their  own).  The aim of  the  thesis  is  to  develop reasons  for
thinking it is indeed possible to offer a fully naturalistic approach to cognition, including
phenomenality,  even  though it  involves  taking  social,  cultural  and  historical  aspects  as  a
legitimate  part  of  the  natural  sciences.  The  notion  of  “natural”  employed  in  scientific
explanations  is  too  often  overly  strict,  which  prevents  experience  to  be  more  adequately
understood. At the same time, the notion of “experience” is also too often distorted by the
mainstream intellectualism. So, it is necessary to reconceive both our criteria of naturalistic
explanation as well as the way we conceive of experience. Chapter 1 presents a brief history
of Enactivism and describes its main inspirations throughout recent philosophy. Chapter 2
discusses the shortcomings with representationalist theories of cognition. Chapter 3 discusses
what  a  broadly  naturalistically  acceptable  theory  should  look  like,  and  argues  that  strict
constraints  on  naturalism,  that  have  been  common  in  recent  history  of  philosophy  are
misleading. The point is that core commitments of naturalism, the homogeneity of reality and
the continuity of philosophy and the sciences, are compatible with a less demanding, non-
reductive form of materialism. Finally, Chapter 4 discusses how the view of experience that is
often employed in the literature is a consequence of intellectualist views about the mind.
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1. ENACTIVISM
Enactivist views have flourished during the last decades as approaches that aim to
understand cognition from within an integrated framework which takes into account not only
the brain, but also the rest of the body and the ontogenetic and phylogenetic history of its
relationship  to  the  environment.  The  rejection  of  representational  and  computational
approaches to cognition and the emphasis on the dynamic interplay of organisms in and with
their environmental niches are the key features of enactivist views. Cognition is constituted by
organismic  activities  that  encompass,  and  are  mutually  determined  by,  sensorimotor,
evolutionary and cultural factors. One way to refer to this framework is as ‘4E’ Cognition:
enactive,  embodied,  embedded and extended (Newen,  De Bruin and Gallagher,  2018,  for
example). The main idea is that  “cognition has no ultimate foundation or ground beyond its
history of embodiment” (Varela, Thompson and Rosch, 1991, p. xx).
The  foregoing  goes  against  traditional  and  mainstream  views  in  Cognitive
Science, which can be described as Representationalist, Computationalist and Neurocentrist.
Traditional views assume cognition to be the result of the brain processing of information
retrieved by sensory organs. The brain processing of the stimuli information generates as an
output a (virtual) internal model of the world which then guides the organisms’ behavior. In
these views, cognition necessarily depends on the existence of states which represent aspects
of  the  external  world  (or  internal  states  of  the  body).  Those  representational  states  are
contentful, that is, they represent the world to be in some or other way. Hence, they have
semantic properties: they can be true or false, accurate or not, and so on.
The  input-processing-output  structure  is  supposed  to  underlie  all  kinds  of
cognitive activities. So, from the moving of a finger to abstract reasoning, the informational
processing of  semantically contentful  representations  made by the brain is  precisely what
allows for cognitive activity to happen. For example, in order for me to reach the bottle in
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front of me, it is necessary that my brain processes a representational state it instantiates as
having the content “there is a bottle next to my computer” and many other representations,
such as the rest of the spatial arrangement and my desires and beliefs, and so on. Furthermore,
the relation of the representational states is inferential. This very general sketch is the classic
way of thinking about cognition (we see in chapter 2 that this model has been amended to
weaker  versions  but  not  thoroughly  abandoned).  Cognitive  science’s  fundamental
cornerstones  are  then  representationalism,  that  explains  how  cognitive  states  (thought,
perception, and imaginings, and so on) get their content, and computationalism, that explains
how the many representational mental states inferentially relate to each other. Finally, all the
relevant cognitive processes happen in the brain via activation of neurons.
Enactivism challenges this view. Since its articulation in the early 1990s (Varela,
Thompson and Rosch, 1991), with inspiration drawn from sources as diverse as Buddhism
and the phenomenological tradition, many researchers have worked within this framework.
Current  influential  philosophical  varieties  of  enactivism  include  Autopoietic  Enactivism
(Thompson,  2007),  Sensorimotor  Enactivism  (Noë,  2004,  2009)  and  Radical  Enactivism
(Hutto  and  Myin,  2013,  2017).  I  chose  to  focus  on  the  Radical  Enactivist  approach  to
Cognition, as mainly developed by Hutto and Myin (2013, 2017), because it provides a clear
statement of the philosophical commitments and consequences of an enactivist, thoroughly
naturalistic attempt to account for cognitive phenomena.
Hutto and Myin’s Radical Enactivism (henceforth REC) denies that all cognitive
activity can be defined in terms of, and is necessarily dependent on, the representation of the
environmental features encountered by organisms. REC rejects semantic mental content and
representation as the basic cornerstones of the explanation of cognition because, on their view,
those notions are incompatible with a thoroughly naturalistic view of cognition. REC claims it
is possible to fully account for cognition with no explanatory residue without the problematic
notions of mental content and representation. The key is to understand cognition “in terms of
thoroughly relational, interactive, dynamically engaged, word-relating activity – activity that
does  not  involve  any  kind  of  information  processing  or  manipulation  of  representational
contents” (Hutto and Myin, 2017, p. 56). Needless to say, how all these processes unfold and
furthermore yield paradigmatically intelligent behavior is a highly complex matter, involving
not only biological but also social and cultural aspects that depend on an interdisciplinary
effort to be worked out, as I discuss along the way.
Section 1 starts by providing a brief overview of the diverse origins of enactive
approaches to cognition. Section 2 focuses more specifically on Hutto and Myin’s REC tenets,
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thus setting the stage for enactivist criticisms of mainstream approaches in Cognitive Science
(which are then discussed in chapters 3 and 4). Enactivist views, especially in its more radical
variants as REC, can be considered to be somewhat counterintuitive. That, though, is, in my
assessment, at least in part due to the permanence and resilience of cherished assumptions that
have  underwritten  and  shaped  philosophical  debate  concerning  cognition  and  which  are
denounced by radical enactive views. Oftentimes, Enactivism is characterized in opposition to
the  more  traditional  frameworks  in  cognitive  science.  Even  though  that  can  be  helpful,
because Enactivism is still  far from orthodoxy and, hence, an unfamiliar account for most
readers, the aim of this chapter is to prime the reader to enactivist concerns and assumptions
which  will  be  decisive  later  on  for  the  prospect  of  developing  an  adequate  naturalistic
explanation of cognition. So, I have tried, in this chapter, to place the emphasis on Enactivism
itself.
1.1 A brief history of enactivism
Enactivism,  as  previously  indicated,  draws  inspiration  from  a  variety  of
philosophical  traditions  and  scientific  research  programs.  Some  of  the  inspirations  are
Ecological Psychology (Gibson, 1979), Dynamical Systems Theory (van Gelder, 1998; Beer,
2000)  and  Robotics  (Brooks,  1991).  Chemero  (2015)  also  includes  Situation  Semantics
(Barwise and Perry 1981, 1983). Still – many – others (Ward, Silverman and Villalobos, 2017;
Di  Paolo,  Cuffari  and de  Jaegher,  2018,  to  name a  few)  acknowledge the  importance  of
philosophers from the phenomenological tradition (such as Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty).3
Enactivism’s most influential articulation is due to Varela, Thompson and Rosch (1991), who
have also suggested (in a less known part of the book) how Buddhism can be a valuable
resource for an adequate understanding of the mind. This section briefly presents all those
elements in order to provide a general framework for enactivism.
To refer to any theory which takes intelligence as “the production, transformation
and manipulation of inner states that [represent] properties of the domain that the cognizer
3 Varela et al. (1991) also cite Gadamer’s hermeneutics as acknowledging the embodied nature of meaning
interpretation,  that  is,  as  inseparable  from  body,  language  and  social  history.  Pragmatist  philosophers
William  James  and  John  Dewey,  who  have  introduced  “space  and  action  as  constitutive  elements  of
cognition”, are one of the earliest articulations of enactivist concerns (Heras-Escribano, 2019, p. 5). Other
influences include the later work of Wittgenstein and Piaget’s Genetic Epistemology. As we can see, the
influences are wide and varied.
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was trying to deal with” (Ward et al., 2017, p. 365), that is, which assumes computationalism
and representationalism,  it  is  useful  to  use the label  Cognitivism.  Cognitivism assumes  a
mechanistic conception of mind. This is one of the main points of departure of enactivism
from the orthodoxy, insofar as enactivism conceives of cognition fundamentally as a dynamic
activity encompassing the body and the environment. Enactivism, as well as the approaches
that inspired it, are reactions to mechanistic accounts of mind. A mechanistic system takes as
basic the component parts and their relations in order to describe the phenomena at stake. In
the  cognitivist  approach,  the  fundamental  components  are  semantically  contentful
representational states, discrete internal states with informational content that represent the
world and which are processed by the brain. Computationalism and representationalism often
accompany each other: representationalism confers with semantic content upon the discrete
units  on  which  the  computational  rule-governed  manipulations  operate.  Furthermore,
contemporary views assume that all relevant cognitive processes happens in the brain. The
general  aim  of  Cognitive  Science  is  to  understand  how  the  brain  constructs  a  three-
dimensional model of the distal environment, to which the organism has a conscious access,
from the two-dimensional proximal inputs that are registered by the sensory organs. So, in
cognitivist views, a science of cognition begins
with a description of the information available on the retina and proceeds to detail
the algorithm that derives from this information a representation of shape, color or
kind. The algorithm will ‘fill in’ whatever the sparse inputs leave out, relying on rule
generalizations to compensate for the poverty of stimuli. These processing stages,
from which the final visual experience emerges, takes place in the brain (Shapiro,
2011, p. 164).
An ideal account of cognition would then feature a systematic association of the most basic
components  of  reality  (say,  the sub-particles  that  constitute the atoms)  with  the  semantic
contents of mental representations, employing scientifically respectable resources only, even
though  in  different  levels  of  a  scientific  hierarchy.  So,  it  should  be  possible,  at  least  in
principle,  to  describe states  such as  my desire  to  drink water  in  terms of  the most  basic
physical processes instantiated in my brain. This project is very challenging and, from the
enactivist point of view, untenable.
Gibson’s Ecological Approach to Visual Perception (1986 – originally published
in  1979  and  following  early  work  in  the  1950’s)  indicates  the  level  of  Ecology  (hence
Ecological Approach) as the adequate level for understanding natural vision (and not vision as
experimentally  studied  in  laboratories).  Gibson  complains  that  the  experimental  methods
employed  by  Physics,  Optics,  Anatomy and  Physiology  do  not  describe  the  facts  in  the
relevant way needed for the task of understanding natural vision. Even though those sciences
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can  achieve  stunning  success,  such  as  curing  eye  diseases  and  creating  holograms  (his
examples), their level of operation is not adequate for understanding the complex aspects of
the vision of a living being in a context. The level of description in those sciences does not
take the mutual involvement of environment and animal as peculiarly important. Rather, in the
experimental framework typical of experimental sciences, the animal is usually considered to
be not much more than a mere component of the natural  world,  just like rocks or plants,
though with an extreme high degree of complexity and specialization.
According to Gibson, traditional methods neglect the fact that “an environment is
an ambient for a living object in a different way from the way that a set  of objects is an
ambient for a physical object” (Gibson, 1979, p. 8). For example, an animal does not live in
space  and time as  conceived  by Physics.  In  the ecological  level  targeted  by  Gibson,  the
categories to be observed are those of permanence and change (Gibson, 1979, p. 12). The
processes observed at the ecological level can be said to have different properties than those
which  are  observed  and  controlled  experimentally  in  a  laboratory  (though  they  are  not
ultimately inconsistent with the latter).
The starting  point  of  the  Ecological  Approach  is  the  familiar  world  of  living
beings,  which  is  not  to  be  understood  as  the  perceptible  arrangement  of  more  basic
components. The basis of animal behavior is precisely the sort of phenomena which can be
observed by the naked eye. What happens, from an ecological perspective, when a block of
ice melts, is a process of disintegration. Nowhere in the process, as described in the level that
ecological  psychology  targets,  is  to  be  found  direct,  that  is,  visual,  evidence  for  the
conservation of principles of matter and energy, or conservation of anything, for that matter. A
visible object ceases to exist in its earlier form. So, the facts of the ecological approach are not
precisely  new and  unfamiliar. The experimental  methods often associated with science,  in
fact, seem to permanently attempt to reveal a hidden structure that is more basic and which
underlies the rest (Gibson, 1979, p. 23).4 However, the appropriate level for Psychology is not
the (naturally) invisible scales of neither the cosmic nor the atomic. In fact, the theoretical
notions of space and time, as employed by Physics, are actually derivative from an ecological
level.
Gibson  proposes  then,  the  level  of  ecology  to  explain  natural  vision.  Not
surprisingly,  Gibson  takes  experimental  methods  as  being  neither  useless  nor  mistaken.
4 Another interesting remark by Gibson is that the confusion of change and permanence in the two levels
(physical and ecological) might be a residue of the Ancient Greek atomic theory, according to which “what
persists  in  the  world  are  atoms  and  what  changes  in  the  world  is  the  position  of  atoms,  or  their
arrangements” (Gibson, 1979, p. 14).
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Rather, the point is that, vision in normal, daily contexts, outside an experimental laboratory,
is a different matter than merely registering and transforming sensory information in order to
generate an image of the environment, that is, an accurate internal and virtual model of the
external  world.  According  to  the  Ecological  approach,  perception  is  “primarily  for  the
guidance  of  action,  and  not  for  action-neutral  information  gathering.  We  perceive  the
environment in order to do things” (Chemero, 2015, p. 23). In other words, perception guides
behavior.  Perception  is  not  the  retrieval  or  registering  of  informational  stimuli  from  the
outside to the inside of an organism. Rather, perception is deeply dependent on the purposes
of the animal and ultimately leads to adaptive behavior.
Perception is, then, of affordances, which are “directly perceivable, environmental
opportunities  for  behavior”  (Chemero,  2015,  p.  23)  relative  to  a  specific  organism.  The
concept aims to capture the organism-environment reciprocity (Heras-Escribano, 2019, p. 18).
An example might help in its elucidation. Affordances are the possibilities that objects in the
environment allow for the actions of specific organisms. Depending on the material properties
of an object, say, its malleability or softness, stability or instability, and so on, an object, such
as a tree trunk, affords different behaviors for a human, a mouse or a dog. An affordance, that
is,  a  possibility  for  an  organism to  act,  is  also dependent  on the  bodily  configuration  of
organisms. The emphasis is on the co-definition and co-dependence of both environment and
perceiver. An interesting remark by Chemero, which was already acknowledged by Gibson, is
that affordances are “ontologically peculiar”. As quoted by Chemero (2015, p. 23):
an affordance is neither an objective property nor a subjective property; or it is both
if  you like.  An affordance cuts across the dichotomy of subjective-objective and
helps us to understand its inadequacy. It is equally a fact of the environment and a
fact of behavior. It is both physical and psychical, yet neither. An affordance points
both ways, to the environment and to the observer. (Gibson, 1979, p. 129)
That is a familiar issue for enactive approaches. In a sense, enactivist concerns are not clearly
captured by a standard ontology of properties and entities. For its emphasis on the ongoing
relations  between  bodies  and  environment,  it  is  likely  that  the  dynamicity  of  cognitive
activities cannot be adequately dealt with by the more static entities postulated by cognitivist
approaches, such as discrete mental representations with specifiable contents. By including
the ongoing interactions between body and environment, Enactivism starts to extend some of
the borders of cognition.
Dynamic Systems Theory (DST) can,  at  least  partially,  avoid these difficulties
because  it  is  able  to  describe  systems  that  are  continually  interacting  and  changing.
Mathematical  tools  such  as  differential  equations  can  be  used  to  model  the  behavior  of
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nondecomposable systems and can track how the whole system evolves as it changes over
time. The main assumption of a DST for cognition is that “cognitive agents are dynamical
systems” (van Gelder, 1998, p. 615), as opposed to cognitive agents as digital computers.
Dynamic Systems models are, arguably, closer to the psychological processes that actually
take place in cognitive agents. Not only for simple actions, such as coordinately moving one’s
fingers, but also in the case of complex decision processes, the resulting behavior “is best
thought of not as masterminded by a digital computer sending symbolic instructions at just the
right  time,  but  as an emergent  property of  a non-linear  dynamical  system self-organizing
around distabilities” (van Gelder, 1998, p. 616). Instead of the linear sense-think-act/input-
processing-output  structures  of  cognitivist  approaches,  dynamical  systems  emphasize  the
stabilization and coordination of patterns of behavior (Beer, 2000, p. 97).
Representation,  as  an  explanatory  notion,  is  still  compatible  with  Dynamical
Systems Theory.  Appealing to  the  tools  of  dynamical  systems to  treat  cognition does  not
automatically  exclude  an  explanatory  role  for  representation  (though  the  development  of
DSTs does force critical evaluations of traditional notions of computation and representation –
Beer, 2000, p. 97). As Chemero (2015, p. 26) notes, it is not even the case that most embodied
approaches in cognitive science are anti or non-representational. Most usually, what happens
is  a  weakening  of  the  notions  of  content  and  representation,  in  a  sort  of  moderate  or
conservative embodied approach, as in, for example, Clark’s version of Predictive Processing
(2001), which posits action-oriented representations (weak notions of representations, such as
in Predictive Processing, are discussed in chapter 2).
Nevertheless, one main concern of more radical versions of enactivism, such as
REC, is not that of weakening representations (by making them more embodied or treating
them  as  possessing  bodily  contents),  but  actually  doing  away  with  them.  In  terms  of
explanatory force, it is possible to argue that representations are not necessary. One of the
reasons is that the creation of representations by an organism demands what can be seen, from
a biological point of view, as a superfluous waste of energy. If the world is right there, it
would be redundant for a cognitive system to create a virtual model of its surroundings. As the
roboticist Brooks famously put, “the world is its own model” (Brooks, 1991). If it is possible
for creatures to directly access their environments quickly and reliably, why would there be
any need to reconstruct it internally – running the additional and dangerous risk of getting it
wrong, after all. Brooks developed and implemented a non-representational model in robots
that  performed  motor  and  behavioral  tasks,  such  as  collecting  empty  soda  cans  in  the
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laboratory,  very  successfully.5 To  understand  the  flexibility  of  the  many  activities  living
beings  perform outstandingly  better  than  the most  sophisticated machines,  such  as  motor
behavior, it is not necessary to employ representations.
Brooks  implemented  in  those  robots  the  idea  that  organisms  have  evolved  in
environments  and developed cognitive capacities  whose functions  were probably (at  least
initially or primarily) unlikely to be that of accurately representing an external world. The
sources of true intelligence are capacities such as “mobility, acute vision and the availability
to carry out survival related tasks in a dynamic environment” evolved throughout millions of
years  (Brooks,  1991,  p.  140).  In  Brooks’s  view,  representation  “is  the  wrong  unit  of
abstraction  in  building  the  bulkiest  parts  of  intelligent  systems”  and,  in  fact,  “explicit
representations and models of the world simply get in the way” in the understanding of simple
intelligence (Brooks, 1991, p. 139).
Brooks applied in practice some of the elements Dreyfus (1972) had long been
arguing for, based in the phenomenological tradition (using Heidegger’s and Merleau-Ponty’s
work).6 Dreyfus  argued  that  employing  the  combination  of  representationalism,
conceptualism,  formalism and logical  atomism in AI laboratories  was not  going  to  solve
fundamental problems already anticipated by phenomenology: how to represent significance
and relevance, what is known as the Frame Problem.
The Frame Problem is a technical issue in the field of Artificial Intelligence (AI),
whose more general epistemological implications were brought up by Dennett (1984), and can
be characterized as the problem of representing common sense knowledge in formal models.
The challenge is  that  of  “representing the effects of  an action in logic without having to
represent  explicitly  a  large  number  of  intuitively  obvious  non-effects”  (Shanahan,  2016).
Machines  built  in  terms  of  “explicitly  stored,  sentence-like  representation  of  the  world”
(Shanahan, 2016), that is, according to cognitivist tenets, invariably face the Frame Problem.7
Note that the problem does not concern the computer capacity of storing and encoding an
enormous amount of facts or information but, rather, the problem of the computer being able
5 Trivia: the Roomba vacuum cleaners were a development of Brooks’s robots.
6 The opening of Dreyfus’s paper (2008) tells the story of AI developers coming to his course on Heidegger
claiming  to  be  on  the  verge  of  succeeding  where  philosophers  had  failed,  namely,  in  understanding
intelligence. Dreyfus replies that, instead of dismissing philosophy of its importance, researchers were, in
fact,  turning  the  rationalist  philosophical  ideas  of  Hobbes,  Descartes,  Leibniz,  Kant,  Frege  and  early
Wittgenstein into a research program without even realizing it.
7 More  specifically,  Classical Cognitivism,  in  opposition  to  Connectionist Cognitivism.  Shanahan  (2016)
argues that the frame problem arises for connectionism as well. Chapter 2 discusses the differences (and
similarities, which make them both instances of cognitivism) between the two approaches. For the moment it
suffices  to  say  that  Classical  Cognitivism  posits  local  and  discrete  units  of  representations,  whereas
connectionist representations can be distributed in a network.
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to determine which are the relevant implications that hold between states and actions. A very
simple action, like making a snack, requires the instantiation of an overwhelming amount of
representations  and  rules.  Even  the  most  basic  facts  concerning  that  action  need  to  be
explicitly stated. More specifically, it is necessary to explicitly state not only all the relevant
relations, but also the irrelevant relations: that the opening of the kitchen door does not affect
the light switch nor the door of the cabinet; that when one holds a knife with the left hand, she
is not holding a glass with the left hand, that when the juice is in the glass it is no longer
inside the bottle and also that all the other glasses in the kitchen are not filled with juice and
that the other bottles in the refrigerator remain with the same quantity of juice in them. It
seems that to be able to perform such a simple action, it is necessary to know beforehand a
significant amount of things and how they relate to each other. A cognitivist account of mind,
in  which  the  world  is  taken  as  a  set  of  neutral,  discrete  and  semantically  neutral  facts
represented in atomistic states which can be algorithmically manipulated, faces the exact same
problem of the robot.
According to the phenomenological tradition, the frame problem does not arise for
human beings, because we are not at all like robots or machines. The solution sketched above,
of making an exhaustive list of facts and rules, has absolutely nothing to do with the actual
processes  that  happen  in  humans:  “our  sense  of  relevance  [is]  holistic  and  require[s]
involvement in ongoing activity” (Dreyfus, 1992, p. xi). Dreyfus’ (1972, 2008) application of
lessons from existential phenomenology to the context of AI confirmed the limits predicted
for empiricist and rationalist psychological accounts and the limits of computational modeling
for  minds.  Heidegger  and  Merleau-Ponty  were  among  the  early  pessimists  concerning  a
mechanical account for cognition.
Heidegger’s  (1962)  well  known  distinction  between  Zuhandenheit and
Vorhandenheit can be understood, respectively, as two sorts of possible attitudes or modes of
access  towards  the  world.  Zuhandenheit,  readiness-to-hand  or  availability,  concerns  the
ordinary involvement with the world in daily contexts. When in this mode, the subject is not
deliberately reflecting on things and their properties. Rather, things are used for projects, that
is, for pragmatically acting upon the world. The subject is not detached from its contextual
setting. Interestingly similar to Gibson’s affordances, things are for doing something: there are
things, say, chairs, that are for sitting; pens that are for writing, and so on. The world accessed
by the readiness-to-hand mode is not a world of objects and properties. In a sense developed
by Noë (2012, p. 8-ff), the world and its objects are not really present but, rather, invisible.
Only when an ordinary situation is somehow disrupted, the subject  is  capable of actually
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seeing the object itself. For example, when the chair breaks, the attention of the subject then
turns from its usefulness and availability to its properties, such as its heaviness. As a result of
the disruption, the things themselves – and the world – appear, so to speak. Only then, the
more abstract aspects of an object can be taken into deliberate thinking, in the Vorhandenheit
mode, that is, the present-at-hand mode. The latter can be characterized, roughly, as the origin
of a scientific, more disinterested mode of relating to the world. The most basic, and frequent,
attitude in (human) experience, and which originates other modes of access to the world, is
the former, involved and engaged readiness-to-hand. For Heidegger, then, it is fundamental to
acknowledge that a “thinker’s capacity to explicitly represent elements of her environment (as
in  a  propositional  attitude)  depends  on  a  prior  capacity  to  skillfully  interact  with  the
environment  in  ways  that  are  already  subjective  to  normative  constraints  [the  for  doing
something]” (Ward et al., 2017, p. 367).
Similarly,  Merleau-Ponty  (1964)  argues  that  “the  capacity  to  stand  in  a
meaningful  cognitive relationship to the environment depends on a suite of  capacities for
bodily interaction, with this dependence resulting in the particular details of our embodiment
making crucial contributions to the structure of thought and experience” (Ward et al., 2017, p.
367).  More  specifically,  the  relationship  between  body  and  space  is  a  form of  originary
relation. Taken to be pre-cognitive and pre-reflective, this relation can be understood as a sort
of motor or operative intentionality. As Merleau-Ponty puts it,
consciousness is originarily not an “I think that,” but rather an “I can” [so that…] to
move one’s body is to aim at the things through it, or to allow one’s body to respond
to  their  solicitation,  which  is  exerted  upon  the  body  without  any  representation
(Merleau-Ponty, 2012, 139-140).
Another point anticipated by Merleau-Ponty is the reconceiving of nature, instead
of an independent realm in relation to the perceiver, as, in fact, a “set of relations enacted in
action  and  perception”  (Gallagher,  2018,  p.  6).  As  Gallagher  (2018)  puts  it,  that  is  the
fundamental idea of enaction, that is, the bringing forth of a world by an embodied agent.
Merleau-Ponty indicates how experimental methods in science are fundamentally biased in
treating “everything as though it were an object-in-general – as though it meant nothing to us
and yet was predestined for our own use” (Merleau-Ponty, 1964, p. 290). He says that even
though he praises the scientific enterprise, by acknowledging it as being an “admirably active,
ingenious and bold way of thinking” (Merleau-Ponty, 1964, p. 290).
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Also included as inspiration for enactive cognitive science, is Barwise and Perry’s
work on Situation Semantics.8 According to Situation Semantics, the information available to
a cognitive agent is always partial. Cognitive beings are, then, always “spatially located (i.e.
situated) and so have only incomplete, locally available information at their disposal. Every
thinker and speaker is someone, who is somewhere, and who is aware of only certain things”
(Chemero,  2015,  p.  24).  Situation  Semantics  is  consistent  with  the  relational  emphasis
enactivism promotes, in its attempt to treat meaning without appeal to intermediary entities
such  as  mental  representations,  and investigate meaning  directly  in  the relations  between
cognitive beings and the information in their environments.
Finally, the work of Chilean biologists Maturana and Varela in the 1970’s, on the
notion of autopoiesis, is also important. Emerging from a scientific framework which lacked a
deep concerning with notions such as organisms, agents or persons as a whole, “autopoiesis is
the idea that a living system is one that is constantly constructing itself and by this activity
making itself distinct from its environment” (Di Paolo, 2018, p. 80). The autonomy and self-
organization of living beings is a fundamental basis for cognitive systems, and constitute also
the basis for a biological sort of intentionality. An autopoietic system is “the minimal living
organization – one that continuously produces the components that specify it, while at the
same time realizing it (the system) as a concrete unity in space and time” (Varela, 1992, p. 5).
According  to  this  criterion,  the  most  basic  living  systems  are  bacteria,  because  they  are
capable of producing “through a network of chemical processes, all the chemical components
which lead to the constitution of a distinct, bounded unit” (Varela, 1992, p. 5).
All  those  approaches  culminated  in  Varela,  Thompson  and  Rosch’s  “The
Embodied Mind” (1991), the paradigmatic articulation of enactivism, in which they expose
the often tacit cognitivist presuppositions that have guided cognitive science. One of them is
the cartesian anxiety (Varela et al., 1991, chapter 7), according to which either there is a fixed
ground for knowledge or we are doomed to chaos or nihilism.9 Interestingly, as they point out,
8 Barwise and Perry refer to Gibson themselves, taking him as providing the basis, as well as Putnam (1984),
for a different perspective on meaning – by “studying the coordinated perception and action of animals,
[Gibson] found much more information in the environment (and so less work to be done by the animal brain,
or mind) than the traditional view of perception admitted” (Barwise and Perry, 1983, p. ix). In the emerging
view, Ecological Realism, meaning is “located in the interaction of living things with their  environment
(Barwise and Perry, 1983, p. x). Also, they acknowledge that “the standard view of logic derived from Frege,
Russell, Tarski, and work in mathematical logic is completely inappropriate for many of the uses it had been
put by philosophers, linguists, computer scientists and others – full of ideas appropriate for mathematics
(even there we have our doubts) but inappropriate for more ordinary uses of language” (Barwise and Perry,
1983, p. x).
9 Varela et al. (1991) find in Buddhist traditions a middle way between realism and idealism. The mind, they
claim, has a tendency to grasp: “the grasping mind leads one to search for an absolute ground – for anything,
whether inner or outer, that might by virtue of its “own-being” be the support and foundation for everything
else. Then faced with its inability to find any such ultimate ground, the grasping mind recoils and clings to
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the opposition between mind and world, subject and object, is not a natural one, despite its
recent  ubiquity,  but  rather,  has  been  created  and  then  influentially  promoted  by  many
philosophical traditions.
The two extremes, one of the ideal of objective knowledge, on one side, and the
inherent  subjectivity  of  individuals,  on  the  other,  seem  to  find  a  compromise  in
representationalism, with the possibility of recovering (at least some of the) properties of the
independent  external  world  internally  and  in  necessary  dependence  from  a  subject.  So,
cognition is neither completely objective nor subjective, but is forever oscillating between
those two extremes. Representationalism, then, presupposes the existence of a pregiven world
with determinate and specifiable properties,  which are differently represented by different
organisms. Enactivists are not interested in such a sort of moderate embodiment, where the
different body configurations allow for the possibility of multiple perspectives, so to say. That
different organisms, such a bat and a whale, for example, perceive different things in virtue of
their different bodily configuration is a trivial claim.
For  enactivists,  the  point  is  that  organisms  and  environments  are  mutually
specified. An interesting example concerns the perception of colors in different species. The
human vision system is trichromatic, that is, humans possess three types of photo-receptors
cross-connected to three color channels. Even though trichromaticism is common and spread
among many species, other species are dichromatics (squirrels and rabbits), tetrachromatics
(pigeons, ducks and surface fish) and may be even pentachromatics (diurnal birds). Varela et
al. (1992) comment on the question: “what are the other colors that animals see?” and take it
to be a naive question, though understandable. It is not the case that a tetrachromatic organism
is going to be better than we are at seeing or discriminating colors, but rather, that their color
perception dimension is so different from ours that they are incommensurable: “there is no
way to map the distinctions available in four dimensions into the kinds of distinction available
in three dimensions without remainder” (Varela et al., 1992, p. 183).
To summarize, to understand cognition is to understand “how the perceiver can
guide his action in his local situation” (Varela et  al., 1991, p. 173), rather than supposing
cognition to be the creation of an internal virtual model of the external world. All the elements
described above converge to the central enactivist concern of rejecting cognitivism’s tenets:
representationalism, computationalism plus the neural assumption.10 Indeed, those aspects can
the absence of a ground by treating everything else as illusion” (Varela et al., 1991, p. 144). The effort is to
learn to let that tendency go, so that it  can be appreciated that “all phenomena are free of any absolute
ground” (Varela et al., 1991, p. 145).
10 I should note that obviously, the brain is part of cognitive systems, but its task is neither of representing nor
performing computations on representational  states.  See Chapter  4 for more on the role  of  the brain  in
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be  seen  as  intimately  connected:  the  cognitivist  position  implies  that  it  is  possible  to
understand cognition by isolating properties of the cognitive components and mechanisms,
which are mainly located in  the brain.  For that  goal,  in  fact,  neither the variety  of  body
configurations and biological histories of organisms nor the dynamicity of those processes,
factors that are emphasized by enactivists, make explanatory difference. Radical enactivism
take brain, body and environment as all equally contributing to cognition.
1.2 Content and representation
Although  nowadays  awareness  about  the  important  roles  that  body  and
environment play in cognition is rapidly growing, not always have the enactivist concerns
described in the earlier section been taken thoroughly. It is possible to maintain that body and
environment  play  important  roles  in  cognition  in  ways  that  are  compatible  with
representationalism and  computationalism (and  neurocentrism).  Let  us  see  how the  many
available approaches can be situated in the theoretical landscape, by taking representation and
content as points of reference.
For  present  purposes,  it  is  helpful  first  to  distinguish  between  two  senses  of
representation.11 Representations can be understood either as (i) the basic explanatory entity of
cognitive science, defined as a physical vehicle that carries semantic contents or (ii) the result
of the human cognitive capacity of taking one thing to mean, refer to or be about another. For
example,  a  map specifies  some properties  which  are  interpreted  as  being  about  a  spatial
location, words represent sentences in a language and so forth. Representation as physical
internal states that possesses semantic content is a basic notion in standard cognitive science.
The assumption of  cognitivist  views is  that  all  properly cognitive activity  (as opposed to
random or just reflex behavior) is necessarily dependent on the existence of representations as
entities: cognition depends on “information-bearing states inside the system. Such states, by
virtue of the semantic information they carry about the world,  qualify as representations”
(Thompson, 2007, p. 52).
One problem is that there is no agreement whatsoever on renderings of the notions
of mental representations and contents, which are available in a wide variety, within different
cognition in terms of a regulator.
11 The distinction is inspired by Varela et al. (1991, chapter 7).
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theories and approaches. In principle, any object that can be semantically evaluated according
to a determinate condition of satisfaction is representational. That includes the “philosophy’s
stock  in  trade  mentalia  –  thoughts,  concepts,  percepts,  ideas,  impressions,  notions,  rules,
schemas,  images,  phantasms,  etc  –  as  well  as  the  various  sorts  of  ‘subpersonal’
representations postulated by cognitive science” (Pitt, 2020). Subpersonal representations are
the  representations  which  are  not  consciously  available  to  the  subject,  such  as  neuronal
assemblies (given that they can be semantically evaluated). What constitutes conditions of
satisfaction for semantic evaluation might also vary: “consistency, truth, appropriateness and
accuracy” (Pitt, 2020), among others.
On  the  other  hand,  now  concerning  representation  as  a  capacity,  there  are
definitely many activities that depend on the (capacity of) representation of aspects of the
external world. Representation as a capacity of abstraction is perhaps the most emblematic
cognitive behavior humans can achieve and REC does not deny that basic fact. What REC
denies  is  that  the  capacity  of  representing  (and  other  capacities,  for  that  matter)  can  be
explained in terms of manipulations of representations understood in the first sense, that is, as
internal contentful representational states.
Nevertheless,  the  idea  that  contentful  representations  play  a  causal  and
explanatory role in cognition has been the central tenet of cognitive science. To follow Hutto
and  Myin’s  (2013)  labeling,  Content  Involving  Cognition  views  (CIC  views),  the  most
popular  views  in  Cognitive  Science,  necessarily  require  the  existence  of  contentful
representations as discrete inner entities with semantic properties. Under this heading, at one
extreme of the spectrum, we find unrestricted-CIC views, according to which not only highly
intellectual activities (like the use of language and math) but also more low-level activities
(such as activities of grasping and reaching – which humans and other animals share) are
performed through the manipulation of informational contents retrieved from the world and
represented in discrete inner states in the brain. Furthermore, cognition necessarily depends
on contentful  representations  which  are  always neural  and brain-bounded.  Ultimately,  the
components  and  mechanisms  which  constitute  cognition  can  be  isolated  and  treated
computationally. This view is nowadays considered to be somewhat outdated, but its influence
remains.
Some researchers have conceded that there are some sorts of activities that in fact
are more embodied than others. Usually what they have in mind are activities that involve
motor behavior, such as grasping and reaching, and they accept that Enactivism might be true
of them. So, could it be the case that enactivism is more suited to some cases but not others?
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Applying Enactivism only to some sorts of “low-level” behavior (mainly motor-behavior), but
not to more “high-level” cognition (thinking, planning, and so on) takes us to more moderate,
restricted  versions  of  CIC,  according  to  which  low-level  behavior  does  not  depend  on
representational content. But then, so this view goes on, this sort of behavior is more like a
mechanical  reaction  and  is  not  properly  cognitive:  “without  representation  there  is  no
cognitive (as distinct from behavioral, biological, or just plain physical) science in the first
place” (O’Brien and Opie,  2009, p.  54).  According to this view, whatever  deserves to  be
treated as cognition must be dependent on contentful representations.
Another conservative or compromising variety of enactivism acknowledges some
of the embodied aspects of mentality, but not in a way that is necessarily incompatible with
representational contents. In those accounts, representational states can spread throughout the
body,  being  then  either  not  necessarily  brain-bound,  or  representative  of  bodily  content.
Nevertheless, cognition, in these views, still depends on contentful representations. Clark’s
(2008,  2013)  action-oriented  representations,  for  example,  are  “weaker”  representations
which “represent things in a non-neutral way, as geared to an animal’s actions” (Chemero,
2015, p. 26). Even though the contents of representations are non-neutral and dependent on
the bodily configuration, the representations are indeed semantically contentful.
REC, in turn, claims that not only activities that explicitly involve representational
capacities, such as language use and math, are properly intelligent and cognitive. Intelligent
activity can take many forms. It includes being able to speak a foreign language and doing
Arithmetic,  or  playing  chess,  for  sure,  which  seem  to  be  more  naturally  dependent  on
explicitly representing aspects of a specific domain and applying rules to it.  Nevertheless,
intelligent activity also includes other behaviors, such as a young child reaching for a bottle of
milk, which don’t need to be obviously dependent on thinking abstractly about the world and
on internally representing aspects of it (that it is a bottle of milk, that it is being held by her
caretaker, that the milk’s temperature is 50º C, and so on). In fact, “most animal doings take
the form of sophisticated forms of highly coordinated, motivated activity that falls short of
(...) the forming of explicit intentional and deliberate planning” (Hutto and Myin, 2013, p.
50). Nevertheless, those behaviors are not to be understood as merely mechanical or reflex
reactions, for they arise and are performed by an engaged organism in skillful ways. Radical
Enactive  approaches  to  Cognition  (REC)  then,  as  defined  by  Chemero  (2015),  are  “the
scientific study of perception, cognition, and action as necessarily embodied phenomenon,
using explanatory tools that do not posit mental representations” (Chemero, 2015, p. 29). A
radical approach is thoroughly anti-representationalist (and, hence, non-computationalist as
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well).  Cognition  is  always  interactive  and  dynamic,  and  does  not  involve  employing
representations  which  possess  semantic  contents  retrieved  from  the  external  world  and
processed by the brain. Denying contentful representations as the basic explanatory notion for
cognition, however, does not involve denying that some cognitive beings, notably humans, are
able to fruitfully engage in “contentful, representational modes of thinking and reasoning”
(Hutto and Myin, 2013, p. 14).
Now,  one  might  ask:  what  is  so  problematic  with  mental  contents  and
representations anyway? The problems with mental representation and contents are deep, and
are not denounced only by the radicals. The project of providing a scientific, natural basis for
the  intentionality  and  phenomenality  of  conscious  experience  has  not  been  satisfactorily
fulfilled.  So  far,  cognitive  science’s  best  bet  for  the  naturalization  of  mental  phenomena
appealed  to  the  notion  of  information.  However,  the  notion  of  information  itself  is  very
problematic  (Floridi,  2004)  and  there  is  considerable  controversy  on  whether  the
mathematically  specified  notion  of  information  adequately  fits  the  problems  in  cognitive
science without adaptation.
Natural information, that is, information of the sort that can be found in nature,
does  not  immediately  amount  to  semantic  information  (the  sort  of  information  that  has
semantic  properties,  such as  being true  or  false,  accurate  or  not  and so on – and  that  is
associated  with  cognitive  states).  The  projects  of  developing  a  naturalized  theory  for
intentional content based only on natural information have invariably failed in the face of the
Hard Problem of Content (Hutto and Myin, 2013, chapter 4).
Given the fairly reasonable assumption that a naturalistic perspective is able to
provide an adequate comprehension of  mentality,  the problem is  the following:  if  natural
content  bears  semantic  properties,  then  it  does  not  meet  standard  scientific  constraints.
Alternatively, if it conforms to standard scientific constraints, it is too weak to bear semantic
properties. The most popular solution, that of augmenting it with non-semantic constraints is
not entirely successful. They fail in the very determination of the semantic contents. REC
recommends  abandoning  the  notion  of  semantic  content  as  the  basic  explanatory  posit
altogether. To abandon the notion of content is sometimes taken to be an impossible task from
the start  (for,  as  we have seen, the entertaining of representational  contents by a mind is
frequently  taken  to  be  what  marks  the  properly  cognitive  realm).  The  Hard  Problem of
Content, in sum, consists in the incompatibility of positing semantic notions of content in a
wholly  naturalistic  explanation.  Before  turning  to  the  details  of  the  failure  of  available
strategies, I would like to explore the REC approach a little further. There has been growing
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confidence that it is possible for Cognitive Science to do without the problematic notions of
content and representation. Let us see how an enactive science of mind would be like.
1.3 The Radical Enactive approach to Cognition
The Radical  Enactive approach to Cognition, as promoted by Hutto and Myin
(2013,  2017)  is  an  ongoing  attempt  to  explain  cognition  within  a  naturalistic  framework
without positing inner representational states that carry semantic contents. REC claims that
representationalism  is  untenable  from  a  naturalistic  perspective  and,  at  the  same  time,
unnecessary.  This  section  discusses  two  fundamental  aspects  of  REC:  its  rejection  of
representationalism and its strong adherence to embodiment.
1.3.1 Non-representationalism
As  indicated  earlier,  Enactivism  questions  the  cognitivist  assumptions  that
cognition is representational, computational and neurocentric. It is certainly the case that brain
processes are part  of cognition and that,  at  least  in part,  these processes involve physical
information that comes from sensory organs being affected by the external world. It is indeed
possible to detect the activity of neurons and to describe it in a digital model. Neurons either
fire or not, depending on the character of the input. Excitatory inputs promote the generation
of electrical action potential (measured in mV), and inhibitory inputs preclude it. When the
electrical potential of cell membrane reaches a certain threshold (of approximately -50mV), it
fires a spike which then releases the chemical compounds known as neurotransmitters (so,
synapses  can  be  understood  as  converting  electrical  signals  into  chemical  signals,  the
neurotransmitters). Pioneers in the study of the brain, McCulloch and Pitts (1943), offered a
functional  approach,  though  a  limited  one,  that  models  neuronal  signals  in  terms  of
propositional logic (McCulloch and Pitts, 1943, p. 115).
In  the  absence  of  stronger  theoretical  constraints,  a  very  weak  sense  of
computation  can  be  characterized  in  terms  of  input-output  processes.  A neuronal  system
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satisfies  such  a  weak  definition,  but  that  is  a  trivial  sense  of  computation  (nearly  every
process can be described in terms of inputs and outputs). Such a definition then encompasses
irrelevant  processes  as  well (Floridi, 2004;  Piccinini,  2009,  Piccinini  and  Bahar,  2013).
Philosophers of mind have widely relied on a stronger notion of computation, that of semantic
computation, according to which computation requires representation. So, the existence of
contentful  representations  has  mostly  been  taken  for  granted,  with  the  debates  revolving
around the origins of the semantic content of mental representations, as either externalist, that
is, depending on the external context (like teleological approaches), or internalist, depending
only on internal structures of the subject.
The problem is when one takes for granted the existence of mental representations
with semantic contents. Radical enactivists question precisely the naturalistic legitimacy of
taking  for  granted  or  of  postulating  semantically  contentful  representations.  The  Hard
Problem of Content can be formulated in the following way: semantic content is not a natural
entity, to be found on nature, and it has not been satisfactorily accounted for or reduced to
purely physical terms (in terms of information, for example, as it is discussed in chapter 3).
The hard problem of content emphasizes that there is no strictly naturalistic legitimate account
for semantic mental content and representations. The REC assessment is that there is no need
for cognitive science to endure with those notions; it is perfectly possible to do without them.
The enactivist claim is that there is no need for living beings to be  veridically
connected to their environment, that is, to possess a semantically contentful representation of
their  environment  at  every  moment  and  at  every  cognitive  capacity.  The  capacity  of
representing,  of  attributing  satisfaction  conditions  to  a  state  or  of  performing  contentful
activities, only arises when other conditions are met. These conditions include, for example,
social  developments,  such  as  the  existence  of  collective  and  shared  practices  as  the
scaffolding for sophisticated12 cognitive activities; which include, paradigmatically, the use of
propositional language.
Basic cognitive capacities, on the other hand, do not need to be dependent on the
manipulation  of  representations  with  semantic  content,  or  representational  at  all.  REC
provides  prospects for  understanding cognition in a naturalistic and enactivist  framework.
REC claims that in “a truly radical enactivism” (such as itself),
it  is  possible to explain  a creature’s capacity to perceive,  keep track of,  and act
appropriately  with  respect  to  some  object  or  property  without  positing  internal
structures that function to represent, refer to, or stand for the object or property in
12 The attribution of sophistication to the use of language, for example, is not to be overemphasized. In REC,
basic  cognitive  activities,  as  animal  behavior,  are  considered  to  be  quite  complex.  The  point  is  that
contentful activities depend on a variety of previous capacities.
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question. Our  basic ways of responding to worldly offerings are not semantically
contentful (Hutto and Myin, 2013, p. 82, emphasis added).
It is important to point out that REC is not an eliminativist or nihilist view about semantic
content. In contrast with many assessments, REC is not the really radical claim that there is no
semantic content at all (Hutto and Myin, 2017, p. 130) and that consequently there cannot be
any ambition or claim towards truth in an enactivist theory (as Milkowski (2015) claims, for
example). Attributing semantic content to vehicles such as sentences in natural language is
indeed important. The point is that REC understands content attribution as an  achievement.
Content-involving activities are not biologically natural capacities that unfold independently
of the environmental conditions in which the organism lives, its bodily configuration and its
ontogenetic history. To recall the distinction of the two senses of representation made in the
previous  section  is  helpful.  REC distinguishes  between  contentless  and  content-involving
cognitive capacities. What is emphasized with the distinction of two sorts of cognitive activity
is  that  there  are  fundamental  differences  between the tracking  of  distal  stimuli  and/or  of
registering proximal stimuli in the environment (reaching, grasping, and so on) and activities
which involve satisfaction conditions (the use of language, for example).
Contentless  cognition  is  a  biologically  basic  activity  that  is  shared  by  many
distinct  living  beings.  It  corresponds  to  the  “responding  and  keeping  track  of  covariant
information” (Hutto and Myin, 2017, p. xiii).  It exhibits  ur-intentionality, that is, a form of
non-representational  directedness  to  the  world  that  is  not  contentful  and  should  not  be
accounted  in  terms  of  satisfaction  conditions  whatsoever.  Ur-intentionality  consists  in
contentless  directedness  (Hutto  and Myin,  2017,  p.  51),  that  is,  a  basic  relation  between
organisms and environment that is weaker than full-blown intentionality. Even though it is
directed to the world, it is not a representational relation. The directedness to the world of
many activities does not need to be put in semantic terms. In order for a frog to eat a fly, the
former does not need to represent the latter either as a predator or as a moving dot, or as a
nutritious entity. Many behaviors living beings exhibit are not representational in nature, even
though  they  are  not  blind  to  the  world.  Another  well-known  example  is  that  of  the
magnetotatic bacteria, who have internal magnets that guide them away from water with high
concentration of oxygen (which is toxic for them) by aligning themselves with the magnetic
poles of the earth. The claim that such simple organisms are able of semantic representations
has been disputed. I will come back to this point; for the moment, let us take these cases as
possible examples of contentless cognitive activity: even though they are not representational
they can be directed to the world.
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Content-involving  cognition,  in  turn,  exhibits  full-blown  semantic  properties
usually associated with intentionality, that is, truth and reference. A paradigmatic example
consists in linguistic judgments (but not exclusively). A mature human being, different from
the frog or the bacteria,  is  able to fully conceptualize,  for example,  the varied nutritional
habits of various species, including its own. Importantly, it is to be understood as a rather
sophisticated, or later-arriving process both in ontogenetic and phylogenetic development.
According to REC, then, if  there is  nothing in the world that  pre-theoretically
corresponds to semantic  content that  is  retrieved or  registered by the sensory organs and
informs  a mental  representation,  the  basic  explanatory  resources  of  cognitive  science  are
undermined. The ultimate aim of a science of mind would be to unequivocally determine the
relations between physical brain states and intentional states. If, however, there is no content
to be “carried out” from one level to the other, that project is significantly weakened. The
transformation of contentless basic activities to content-involving activities happens “through
a process of sociocultural scaffolding” (Hutto and Myin, 2017, p. 128). In a sense, content-
involving cognition is not an individual achievement, for it depends on the engagement with
previously established practices.  Content-involving forms of  cognitive  abilities are in fact
contentful, but they depend on both an ontogenetic (at the level of the individual) and on a
phylogenetic (at  the level of the species’ evolutionary history)  prior development of basic
cognition as well as engagement with public and shared normative practices. REC does not
aim to completely eliminate semantic content “all  the way up”, but to emphasize that the
postulation  of  its  existence  as  a  basic  natural  explanatory  resource  is  not  an  appropriate
strategy to describe cognition – basic or not.
1.3.2 Embodiment
REC endorses upon two important theses about cognition:
(1)  The  embodiment  thesis:  to  equate  “basic  cognition  with  concrete  spatio-
temporally extended patterns of dynamic interaction between organisms and their
environments. (…)” (Hutto and Myin, 2013, p. 6);
(2) The developmental-explanatory thesis: that “mentality-constituting interactions
are grounded in, shaped by, and explained by nothing more, or other, than the history
of an organism’s previous interactions.” (Hutto and Myin, 2013, p. 6).
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On the REC approach, the sensorimotor interactions in which the body engages are activities
embedded in a context, which unfold “across time and which essentially involves individuals
engaging with aspects of their environments” (Hutto and Myin, 2013, p. 6). Those aspects are
not pregiven or static properties of the world in any sense. All and any aspects with which an
organism engages are dependent both on its bodily configuration and on its phylogenetic and
ontogenetic history.  The processes which constitute organismic activities are dynamic and
non-linear,  they  continually  feed  on  each  other.  Together,  those  processes  amount  to
cognition. The dynamical aspects apply not only to basic, contentless cognition but also to
contentful  cognition:  even  “for  organisms  capable  of  learning,  it  is  this  [the  variety  of
dynamic interaction patterns between organisms and their environments], and nothing else,
that determines which aspects of their worlds are significant to them.” (Hutto and Myin, 2013,
p. 8).13 Cognition, basic or not, then, unfolds throughout the “prolonged history of interactive
encounters [which] is  the basis of creatures’ current embodied tendencies,  know-how, and
skills” (Hutto and Myin, 2013, p. 9). Thesis (1), then, states the fully embodied aspect of
cognition,  and  its  dependence  on  the  concrete  patterns  that  are  produced  and  unfold
temporally and spatially in the interaction of the organism with its environment. Thesis (2)
states that the development of those processes depends on their history of interaction, which
include  not  only  phylogenetic  and  ontogenetic  aspects,  but  also  a  contextual  and  social
dimension, and nothing else.
The fundamental  enactive and  naturalistic lesson to be learned is  that there is
nothing over and above those interactions: no distinctive mental objects or structures, such as
mental  contents and representations which can be accessed and processed by brains  after
retrieval or extraction from the environment. There is also no sort of pregiven raw object or
property that is retrieved or extracted from the world. All of the features which organisms
attune to depend on their bodily configurations and their biological history of interactions in
their  environmental  niches  (which  as  we have  seen  might  encompass  social  and  cultural
aspects). Again, that concerns not only basic cognition, such as basic perceptual activities that
non-human animals or humans in an early stage of development are able to perform, but the
distinctive content-involving capacities characteristic of mature humans in a social context
too.  Thus,  REC  does  not  deny  “the  existence  and  importance  of  contentful  and
representationally  based  modes  of  thinking;  it  is  just  that  these  should  be  regarded  as
13 Social  and collective aspects  probably confer  to  contentful  cognition a  more  stable  character  than it  is
possible for basic cognition. The stability is provided by normative constraints that are put in practice in
those shared contexts.
43
emerging late in phylogeny and ontogeny, being dependent on immersion in special sorts of
shared practices” (Hutto and Myin, 2013, p. 12).
However, and that can indeed cause confusion, or uneasiness perhaps, REC does
place  content-involving  cognition,  that  is,  cognitive  capacities  that  can  be  regarded  as
semantically  contentful,  on  a  different  scale  than  usual.  Semantic  content,  as  a  natural
objective entity,  does  not  exist  so it  cannot  be used as  a  criterion  to  distinguish  what  is
“mindless,  mechanical,  dispositional,  and  behavioral  and  what  is  properly  mental,
representational, intentional and phenomenal” (Hutto and Myin, 2013, p. 52). It might be the
case that  both humans at  different  stages  and non-human animals  of  different sorts share
capacities in different degrees.  In particular,  the existence of contentful  cognitive abilities
does  not  necessarily  depend  on  language  nor  even  a  very  well-developed  capacity  of
conceptualization.14 What is important, however, is that there are some conditions which need
to be previously established for cognition to be contentful and exhibit semantic properties:
“without appeal to sociocultural practices there is not enough in the natural world to account
for representational content of the kind that is at issue in the debate” (Myin and Hutto, 2015,
p. 69).
In sum, “to understand mentality (…) it  is  necessary to  appreciate how living
beings  dynamically  interact  with  their  environments:  ultimately,  there  is  no  prospect  of
understanding  minds  without  reference  to  interactions  between  organisms  and  their
environments” (Hutto and Myin, 2013, p. 4). This, the proponents of REC argue, is the (only)
path  to  a  perfectly  naturalistic  account  for  cognition  (even  though  it  requires  deeply
reconsidering  some  issues).  It  is  worth  pointing  out  that  an  enactivist  view  takes  each
organism and  its  particular  biological  and  cultural  history,  as  well  as  its  relation  to  the
environment,  to  be  fundamental.  All  of  these  aspects  are  constitutive  of  the  organism’s
cognitive capacities. Hence, it might be difficult to isolate any one of these features, since
they are intertwined in intricate ways. It  is not just a matter of extending our explanatory
concerns to include more than just brains and minds, but to understand how embodiment and
cognition  are  fully  dependent  on  each  other. The  present  section  aimed  at  providing  an
overview of REC and the main tenets that should be kept in mind throughout the reading of
this text so these elements can be contrasted with the more traditional approaches in Cognitive
Science I cover in the next two chapters.
14 Of course, language enables the possibility of articulating such content in a propositional, fine-grained way,
that is not available for basic cognition.
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1.4 Varieties of naturalism
Despite all disagreements issues about mentality might give rise to, one widely
shared expectation in current philosophical and scientific research is that mental phenomena
are eventually going to be explained by a  naturalistic approach. However, there is no easy
agreement on what it means either for an entity or for an explanation to be natural.15 Those
two issues of naturalism, concerning respectively, ontological and methodological aspects, are
the guides for the discussion in the next chapters. There is no unequivocal characterization of
naturalism, but it is safe to say that some versions of it are more strict than others. Let us take
as a starting point the position according to which “everything (e.g., the universe, organic life,
and  human  nature)  can  be  satisfactorily  explained  exclusively  in  terms  of  processes  and
entities amenable to the methods and laws established by the natural sciences” (Rosfort, 2013,
p. 1426). It is possible to identify both ontological and methodological commitments within
this characterization. The two commitments can be put as salient questions which are going to
provide  guidance  for  the  discussion:  what  there  is and  how  to  know  it, respectively,
ontological and methodological issues, to which I now turn to.
Chapter 2 discusses whether the ontological status of the entities that have been
postulated and employed by Cognitive Science in order to explain mentality are legitimately
naturalistic. As it has been already indicated, explaining the notions of mental representation
and  content  in  terms  of  information,  a  fundamental  cornerstone  of  Cognitive  Science,  is
problematic from a naturalistically explanatory perspective. If, as argued, natural notions of
information are not sufficient to explain the semantic properties of intentional states, then we
need to start looking for other insightful venues. That is what enactivist approaches aim to do:
it is not to throw away everything that has been done in cognitive science so far, but rather, to
reflect upon the limits of such projects, its theoretical assumptions, and provide whatever is in
need  of  elucidation  and  complementation.  The  strictly  naturalistic  resources  of  Physics,
Chemistry and Neurology are not enough to explain intentionality (and phenomenality) but
they do play an important role, even if it is not in reducing psychology to physics.
15 It is interesting to point out that there is a variety of strands that label themselves naturalistic and that can
almost be considered to be incompatible (cf. Horst, 2009, p. 219). Even contemporary (property-)dualists
views are supposed to be “naturalizable”, like Chalmers’ “Naturalistic Dualism”, which is claimed to be
“entirely compatible with a contemporary scientific worldview” (Chalmers, 1996, p. 128).
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Chapter  3,  then,  discusses  the  methodological  issues  concerning  the  limits  of
explanation  in  philosophy and  science.  I  argue  that  it  is  fundamental  to  adjust  both  the
explanatory demands as well as the expectations of scientific enterprises. In a sense to be then
discussed, the demands and associated expectations for a science of mind are too requiring
and  stem from an  unrealistic  and  retrograde  philosophical  conception  of  science,  which
assumes that it is possible to develop or achieve a complete physical reduction for mental
states. The achievement of this aim would also establish a, so to say, view of nowhere. That is
deeply misleading: in an approach such as enactivism, there is no such neutral and objective
view. In fact, the attempt of developing a view of nowhere is itself a view from somewhere, a
very specific place that aims to devoid the dynamicity and complexity of life.16
Even so, it should be obvious that acknowledging the limitations of the scientific
enterprise does not undermine its cognitive significance and it does not necessarily entail in
relativistic views of science. I do not at all intend to deny the importance of science, and I
think that it  is  not only reasonable but also desirable for a theory of mind to conform to
scientific research. The point to be emphasized is just that there are limitations on the usual
methods  and  results  that  cognitive  science  can  achieve,  especially  when  it  comes  to
understanding  experience,  whose  peculiarity  needs  to  be  taken  into  account.  Chapter  3
discusses how, even though its  methodological  constraints make scientific research a very
successful enterprise, maybe as successful as we can get, a scientific explanation, however,
does not provide us the ultimate, objective and neutral structure of reality, even though it is an
indispensable tool for understanding ourselves and the world around.
After discussing ontological and methodological naturalism, I identify strict views
of naturalism (associated with reductionism) to be responsible of generating what is known as
the  hard  problem  of  consciousness,  according  to  which  even  if  a  complete  scientific
description of reality is achieved, it would still remain unexplained the fact that some of the
physical processes (supposedly, those that happen in the brain) feel like something for their
subjects.  This  problem  has  permanently  haunted  materialistic  accounts  and  there  is  no
satisfactory answer to it. In a sense, the hard problem is not only hard, but actually impossible
to solve. My ultimate task is to explore what I take to be two under-appreciated assumptions
that,  in  my view,  generate  the  hard  problem.  First,  a  complete  science,  as  employed  by
antimaterialist  arguments,  is  not  going  to  be  achieved.  Even  if  those  arguments  state  a
16 To avoid a more polemical interpretation of this point than I intend to, it should be clear that the issues are
“not about the accomplishments, laudability or moral fiber of the sciences or the scientists, but of the right
metatheoretical characterization to give to explanation within scientific disciplines,  and explanations that
span the boundaries of two or more disciplines” (Horst, 2007, p. 60, author’s emphasis).
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complete science as a mere possibility, its assumption implicitly relies on a strong epistemic
role for scientific reduction, which was previously argued as unrealistic. Second, the distorted
way in which mental phenomena are traditionally characterized beforehand excludes them
from  the  possibility  of  being  amenable  to  explanation  from  the  very  start.  Typical
formulations of the hard problem, for example, have claimed that the phenomenal is precisely
what  is  left  off  a  physicalist  explanation.  Put  that  way,  the  possibility  of  obtaining  an
explanation  seems  to  be  prevented  from the  very  beginning.  Furthermore,  the  traditional
formulations fatally distort the understanding of experience and prevents us from recognizing
and appreciating our place in the natural world.
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2. ONTOLOGICAL NATURALISM
For  dealing  with  the  cases  under  study  here,  namely  intentionality  and
phenomenality,  a  very  popular  venue is  to  take  our  folk  psychology at  face  value.  Folk
psychology, that is, the usual and daily practices of understanding and interpreting both one
and others’ behavior in terms of propositional attitudes, take intentional realism for granted.
Intentional  realism is  the thesis that  behavior  can be  interpreted by ascribing to agents a
variety of  attitudes  which are related to specifiable propositional  contents.  States such as
beliefs, desires, intentions, expectations, preferences, hopes and fears are some of the possible
attitudes one might have concerning a specific content (the proposition “the cat is on the mat”,
for example). One can then believe or expect (different propositional attitudes) that the cat is
on the mat or that the rat is on the mat (different propositional content). Those are intentional
states, for they are about or refer to something, that is, the mental state is about a cat (or a rat)
being on a  mat.  However,  similarly  to  the problem that  will  arise  for  phenomenality  (as
discussed in chapters 3 and 4), the intentionality of mental states, that is, their directedness or
aboutness towards something else, is a vexed issue, especially if we assume a strict naturalist
and  materialist  position  to  include  mental  phenomena.  Among  the  many  difficult  issues
involving intentionality, one peculiar and important feature of intentional states that generates
a conflict is that there might not be a correspondent of the intentional content in the world. So,
one can both believe that there is a cat on the mat (when there actually is none) as well as one
can believe that there is a unicorn on the mat (when there is definitely none). This is one of
the  most  striking  features  of  intentionality:  how  can  a  mental  representation  be  about
something that  does  not  exist?  For Brentano  (1874),  for  example,  the explanation lies  in
claiming that the mind’s directedness, that is, its being about something, is an exclusively
mental phenomena. In fact, it serves as a mark of the mental: all and only mental states are
intentional.  But, at the same time, intentional states have (or at least seem to have) causal
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powers. One believes there is a glass of water in the table in front of her, and desires to end
her thirst, so she moves towards the table to grasp the glass. The effort of materialistically-
oriented  philosophers,  then,  has  been  to  integrate  intentional  categories  into  a  natural,
scientific framework. The fundamental question concerns the relation between the intentional
states of folk psychology and physical states.  The most popular views assume that there is
some  sort  of  natural  (physical  or  biological)  property  or  relation  that  provides  semantic
content to internal states. In these views, the folk psychological concepts of belief, desire,
hope and so on are seen to be “picking out, in a rough and imperfect way, both the kinds of
inner  states  and  the  kinds  of  semantic  properties  that  would  figure  in  the  more  detailed
naturalistic  theory”  (Godfrey-Smith,  2004,  p.  147).  The  project  was  to  vindicate  folk
psychology  within  neurocognitive  research.  Indeed,  naturalization  projects  attempted  to
establish a reductive relation from semantic properties to more basic physical properties. The
notion  of  representational  information would  then  function  as  a  bridge  between  the  two
properties.
So,  it  is  usually  assumed that  there is  an  isomorphism between  psychological
states,  which  can  be  individuated  in  terms  of  propositional  attitudes  and  their  associated
intentional contents, and the representations posited in cognitive science. As Ramsey puts it,
representations are understood “as the scientific analogues for beliefs, desires, ideas, thoughts,
and similar (…) posits of folk psychology” (Ramsey, 2007, p. 38). Representationalism is,
then, the view that our cognitive activities are carried out by representing aspects of the world
in some particular way, say, that there is a gray cat on the blue mat. In this sense, cognitive
activities in general, share a propositional structure similar of that of language: they involve
representations that have contents which have conditions of satisfaction. The general features
of the cognitive science enterprise are summarized by Fodor (1987), according to whom any
psychology which postulates the existence of states (entities, events, and so on) that “(i) are
semantically evaluable, (ii) have causal powers and (iii) serve themselves for true (in most
cases) generalizations” (Fodor, 1987, p. 10) is a folk psychology, that is, it is committed to the
usual, common sense psychology used daily.
Condition (i) states that (at least some) mental states are semantically evaluable in
virtue of a specific relation to the world, which fixes their content. They can then be evaluated
in terms of conditions of satisfaction: “what makes a belief true (or false) is something about
its  relation  to  the  non-psychological  world”  (Fodor,  1987,  p.  11).  Content  and  semantic
evaluability are intimately interconnected: “if you know what the content of a belief is, then
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you know what it is about the world that determines the semantic evaluation of the belief”
(Fodor, 1987, p. 11).
Condition (ii) concerns the possible sorts of mental causation. Fodor distinguishes
three of which: “the causation of behavior by mental states; the causation of mental states by
impinging  ‘environmental  events  (by  ‘proximal  stimulation’,  as  psychologists  sometimes
say); and (...) the causation of mental states by one another” (Fodor, 1987, p. 12). Here, the
crucial (and problematic) issue is to understand how the environmental information registered
by sensory organs turns into the intentional states that are consciously available for the subject
and then, constitute a causally efficacious chain that ultimately cause behavior. That relation,
in the received view, is a causal relation and is generally spelled out in an informational-
theoretic fashion, according to which sensory organs register the incoming information and
start the serial transformations and processes that constitute the cognitive life of the individual
and eventually cause behavior. Informational-theoretical approaches are assumed to be the
best bet for a thoroughly materialistic theory.
Finally,  the  third  condition  assumes  that  cognitive  processes  involving
propositional attitudes and its contents allow for successful generalizations and predictions
concerning  behavior.  Intentional  Realism  seems  in  fact  to  be  a  very successful  folk
psychology: it works remarkably well for understanding the usual behavior of (human) agents
and constitutes the usual  and commonsensical  way humans make sense of  their own and
others’ behavior. Though there are also many reasons to doubt its overall success, as it  is
discussed in what follows, intentional realism does provide a useful  framework. As Fodor
remarks, “we have no reason to doubt – indeed, we have substantial reason to believe – that it
is  possible  to  have  a  scientific  psychology  that  vindicates  common  sense  belief/desire
explanation”  (Fodor,  1987,  p.  16,  author’s  emphasis).  What  is  needed is  an  account  that
explains folk psychology, and his bet is on what he thinks is a “quite probably approximately
true” scientific  account:  Representational  Theory of  Mind (plus  Computational  Theory  of
Mind) (Fodor, 1987, p. 16). Both in a mechanistic way, whereas the Computational Theory
accounts for at least part of mentality where operations on mental states constitute rational
processes, Representational Theory accounts for the nature of those mental states.
In  what  follows,  I  discuss  how  intentional  realism,  spelled  out  in  terms  of
informational  representations,  not  only  remains  influential  but  is  in  fact  a  background
assumption  in  Cognitive  Science.  It  has  not  exactly  been  challenged  by  the  standard
frameworks, though its has been adapted and transformed in order to accommodate scientific
and technological developments. It  turns out that the notion of representation has been so
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deflated that it is not clear whether it retains its explanatory value. Godfrey-Smith’s (2004,
2006) assessment about this issue is interesting. He says: “in the 1980’s the problem of giving
a naturalistic theory of mental content (…) looked like a philosophical problem that was both
fundamental and solvable” (Godfrey-Smith, 2004, p. 147). It seemed to be just a matter of
time until someone would present a framework for connecting psychological and physical
(brain)  states.  However,  it  might  be the case that  the  naturalization project  of  intentional
content has failed to the point that it is possible “that we have been looking for the wrong kind
of theory, in some big sense” (Godfrey-Smith, 2006, p. 42).
At  the  same  time  that  understanding  mind  and  cognition  depends  on  an
understanding of what goes on inside a body (and, obviously, a brain), it is important not to
overlook  the  peculiarities  of  human  interpretative  practices.  Just  as  a  brief  and  initial
statement, the (enactive inspired) view developed in this thesis is that the naturalistic accounts
for content are significantly problematic due to their commitment to cognitivism, that is, the
presupposition that explaining cognition amounts to identifying inner states with determinate
semantic contents and its physical underlying parts – in terms of the information represented
in  brain  states.  I  wish  to  argue,  in  due  time  (chapters  3  and  4),  following  enactivist
considerations, that even though propositional attitudes and contents belong to the realm of
human interpretative practices, that does not make them less naturalistic than brain states.
Furthermore, the failure of naturalization projects is also due to the assumption that only the
strictly  deflationary  resources  of  the  so-called  hard  sciences  could  provide  a  satisfactory
explanation of intentionality and phenomenality and to assume that everything else is out of
the  natural  domain.  Which  brings  us  to  considering  methodological  issues  concerning
naturalism and mind (which are discussed in the next chapter).
The project  of  naturalizing  intentionality  was then,  the  first,  fundamental  step
towards  naturalizing  the  mind,  since  intentionality  is  one  of  the  marks  of  the  mental,
alongside  with  phenomenality.  Phenomenality,  notoriously  dubbed  “the  hard  problem  of
consciousness”, could wait for the developments that naturalizing intentionality could bring.
The aim was to achieve a naturalistic explanation of how internal states come to have their
meanings, that is, how mental states are semantically intentional or have intentional content.
And supposedly, from that basis, it could be extended or modified into phenomenal content.
Intentionality is acknowledged as a real phenomenon, so the attempts do not aim (in general)
to  deny it,  but  to  account  for  it  in  ways that  are  legitimately naturalistic.  The project  of
naturalizing intentionality thus tries to reconcile intentionality with physicalism, that is, the
idea that all natural things are reductively explainable by strict scientific resources. For the
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most part,  such reductive attempts have identified  representational information as the key
building block in a naturalized account of intentionality. Representation seemed to be the best
bet  as  the  connection  between mind  and  world,  especially  with  the  aid  of  the  notion  of
information, which has played a fundamental role in cognitive science. However, both the
notions  of  representation  and  information  are  deeply  problematic.  More  specifically,  any
notion of representation that relies only on deflationary resources from the natural sciences,
such  as  natural  information,  fails  to  satisfactorily  explain  intentionality.  This  fact  is
uncontentious:  there  have  been  many  attempts  to  fix  the  notion  of  representation.
Teleosemantics, for example, is one such attempt: Dretske (1980, 1981) and Millikan (1984)
proposed to take the evolutionary history of the organisms into account in order to explain the
contents  of  representations  in  natural  terms.  Fodor’s  Asymmetric  Dependence  (1987)  is
another  way  to  specify  the  relevant  causes  of  a  mental  content  from  collateral  ones.
Nowadays, one currently popular strategy in the attempt to fix the notion of representation is
to weaken it. Recent developments in Cognitive Science, such as the Predictive Coding (or
Processing) framework, employ a deflationary notion of representation, according to which
inner states represent in a less neutral or objective way (see section 2.3).  Another way to
dispel  the  problems  with  representations  is  by  claiming  that  they  have  a  more  modest,
explanatory, instrumental  or heuristic role in cognitive science,  instead of a causal role in
virtue  of  their  content.  That  is  not  a  very  satisfactory  strategy,  because  this  sort  of
representations loses the advantage of them having a causal role in cognition: since they are
just useful posits, they cannot cause anything. Given the failure of providing the expected
thorough naturalization, it might seem that current projects are significantly limited in relation
to the original project of establishing the relations between physical and intentional states.
However,  anti-representationalism,  in  its  turn,  has  never  been  considered  to  be  a  viable
option.  The  radical  enactivist  approach  aims  precisely  to  develop  the  consequences  of
questioning the assumption that the primary work of cognition is to mentally represent (Hutto
and Myin, 2018, p. 198). Instead of fixing or weakening the notion of representation as a
basic explanatory posit, REC proposes to simply abandon it. Let us see first how things have
developed according to the representationalist assumption.
2.1. Representation and information
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Strictly speaking, explaining representation is difficult even for ordinary physical
items such as photographs, maps, diagrams, road signs and words, for example. It is not clear
what constitute sufficient criteria for a non-mental sort of representation. It has been argued
that those sorts of objects exhibit derived intentionality, that is, they get their representational
powers  from  attributions  performed  by  a  cognitive  agent,  most  likely  a  human  being.
Thoughts (or other cognitive capacities), on the other hand, are provided with an original (or
intrinsic) intentionality.   Peirce  (1940) provided  one  influential  way of  spelling out  non-
mental representations, which has also shaped current cognitive science (see Ramsey, 2007, p.
22). In Peirce’s Semiotics, signs can represent in three ways: by resemblance (icons), causal
or law-like means (indexes) and by convention (symbols). The question then is to explain how
cognition and its representational states can exhibit original intentionality by means of one of
those representation models. All those models have been employed in Cognitive Science (see
section  2.3).  Nowadays,  the  naturalistically  inspired  approaches  exploit  relations  between
physical  states,  especially  those  where  icons  and  indices  participate  (for  their  mode  of
representation  is  dependent  on  the  physical  aspects  of  the  target  objects  –  whereas  a
conventional relation is not). The idea is to provide a scientifically legitimate explanation for
intentionality in terms of the natural information that iconic or indicative relations express.
Unfortunately,  Peirce’s  considerations  cannot  be  taken  literally  in  the  case  of
cognition,  because  they  presuppose  an  interpretant  that  is  not  available  within  cognitive
systems: “representation is always a triadic relation, involving (a) the sign, (b) its object, and
(c) some cognitive state of an interpreter (the “interpretant”)” (Ramsey, 2007, p. 22, 2016, p.
2). If one of those relata is missing, then there is no representation. It can’t be presupposed
that there is some sort of homunculus in the brain that interprets the information provided in
iconic or indicative relations. So, it might be the case that Peirce’s distinctions are a better fit
for items such as ordinary physical objects, for the presence of an interpretant in those cases is
less  problematic.  For  example,  the  number  of  rings  in  a  tree  trunk  does  not  itself  mean
anything but, in the presence of representation-consuming beings, such as cognitively mature
humans, it represents the age of the tree.
The application of a representation-based natural model based in information to
mental states  in  cognitive systems  quickly  runs  into  difficulties.  A  theory  of  mental
representation involves explaining, on one hand, how a mental representation gets its specific
content. On the other hand, it involves explaining the role the mental representation performs
in the cognitive system specifically in virtue of its content. In simpler terms, the problems
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concern what makes a representation have the content it has and what makes it perform a
representational role in the first place. This twofold issue is often referred to in the literature
as the job-description challenge, whose formulation is due to Ramsey (2007). In what follows
I  am  mainly  concerned  with  the  first  question,  that  is,  how  an  inner  state  gets  its
representational content.
The  naturalization  project  consists  in  explaining  semantic  properties  of
propositional attitudes and intentional contents without resorting to semantic or intentional
properties, so the resulting explanation is not circular. The notion of information has been one
important venue for answering the challenge. However, information is as pervasive as it is
ambiguous. It has been massively used in recent developments within different fields, both
within and outside philosophy, and it is very unlikely that a unique characterization fits all of
those uses. It is important to proceed with caution in order to avoid conflating the many ways
in which the notion of information can be characterized. It is clear, though, that the well-
defined mathematical characterization of information as a measure for uncertainty in terms of
probability (Shannon, 1949) falls short of what is required in Cognitive Science to explain
cognition:  “information  and  mathematical  properties  of  informational  amounts  and  their
transmission [are] not the same thing as semantic content or meaning” (Adams, 2003, p. 498).
It  is  fundamental  to  make sure  that  the  notion  of  information  being  employed  does  not
presuppose or carry with it any sort of semantic property, something which has proved to be
far  from an easy task.  The Hard Problem of Content,  as  emphasized by Hutto and Myin
(2013), consists in making explicit the fact  that the available notions of representation, in
terms of informational relations, are either too weak to constitute semantic content or they are
too strong to be strictly naturalistic.
Only after the recent growing influence of Enactivism, the possibility of a non-
representational account of cognition has been taken more seriously, but the major theoretical
frameworks  remain  fully  committed  to  representationalism.  Despite  their  well-known
problems  (section  2.4),  representation  and  information  continue  to  be  fundamental  for
Cognitive  Science,  being  employed  by  virtually  every  available  approach.  The  next  two
sections  show how ubiquitous  the notion of  representation is  in  Cognitive Science.  Even
having  fundamental  differences,  Classical  Cognitivism,  Connectionism  and  Predictive
Processing share the representationalist tenet.
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2.2. Representationalism in Cognitive Science
A major influence to Classical  Cognitivism,  Fodor’s  Modularity view of mind
(1983, 1985) is a representational and computational approach according to which the mind is
functionally divided into distinct mechanisms responsible for different tasks: the transduction
mechanisms, the input systems (or modules) and the central processing system. The function
of these mechanisms is to, respectively, register proximal stimuli, that is, the information that
affects the sensory organs of an organism; to create a distal representation, that is, how things
are in the world based on the previously transduced information, where modules process the
initial  sensory information so “as  to make it  accessible to  thought” (Fodor,  1983, p.  40).
Finally, the central system uses these representations to perform activities such as the guiding
of behavior, thought, imagination and decision processes. A simple action, like grabbing the
cup of coffee on my desk, depends on the creation of a representational model of the location
of the cup based on the sensory information that gets gradually processed by the modules and
that eventually leads to the movement of my arm. In particular, the modular system is “(…)
(inter  alia)  an  informationally  encapsulated  computational  system  –  an  inference-making
mechanism” (Fodor, 1985, p. 3) whose “inferences (...) have as their ‘premises’ transduced
representations of proximal stimulus configurations, and as their ‘conclusions’ representations
of the character and distribution of distal objects” (Fodor, 1983, p. 42). This description can
be thought of  as  a general  account  for  what  is  called Classical  Cognitivism in Cognitive
Science. Fodor’s influential account relies on the assumption that mental representations and
their contents can be modeled in a linguistic/syntactic structure (as the Language of Thought
Hypothesis  states  (Fodor  1975,  see  also  Fodor,  1987  –  appendix),  and  so,  cognitive
representations are literally sentence-like.
An  important  feature  of  classical  cognitivism is  that  a  psychological  account
holds a certain autonomy from the neurobiological details. However, the multiple realizability
argument for cognition (cf. Section 3.3) allows it to be implemented, or realized, in a variety
of  physical  substrata,  without  compromising  the  overall  picture  of  intentional  realism.
Humans (and other living beings, such as mammals) implement cognition in a neurobiological
substratum,  but  that  is  not  constitutive  of  cognition  itself.  Supposing  that  aliens  and
computers could be intelligent, the physical substract on which their cognition is implemented
is  probably  different,  but  their  cognitive  systems  would  still  be  framed  in  terms  of
propositional attitudes.
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The development of neural networks led to the questioning of the folk psychology
(and  classical  cognitivism)  claim  about  multiple  realizability  and  the  possibility  of
understanding cognition independently from its implementation at the neurobiological level.
Furthermore, connectionists question the claim that “propositional attitudes are  functionally
discrete,  semantically  interpretable,  states  that  play  a  causal  role in  the  production  of
behavior” (Ramsey, Stich and Garon, 1990, p. 504). Connectionist frameworks reject the step-
by-step rules and abstract  linguistically structured representation-based account offered by
Classical  Cognitivism  and  argue  that  since  cognitive  phenomena  are  influenced  by  a
multiplicity  of  external  and  internal  events  simultaneously,  the  serial  or  linear  processing
presupposed by modular views is not an adequate model (Rogers and McClelland, 2014, p.
1026).  So, it  might not be possible to identify “particular features or states of the system
which lend themselves to a  straightforward semantic evaluation.” (Ramsey et al., 1990, p.
510, emphasis added). Instead of serial and localized representations, connectionists propose a
parallel and distributed processing (PDP, as it is widely known) for cognitive architecture,
which is often subpersonal, that is, not consciously available to the subject. In a rather sketchy
description, the architecture is composed of
simple units  which, like neurons,  are  at  a  given time, activated to  some degree.
These units, again like neurons, are connected (these connections can be of varying
strengths) to other units so that, depending on their own activations, they can act to
increase  (excite)  or  decrease  (inhibit)  the  activations  of  these  other  units.
Additionally,  in  some  connectionist  systems  these  connections  strengths  can  be
altered as a result of activity in the system so that the effect of one unit can change
over time (Bechtel, 1987, pp. 17-18).
Despite the appeal to a putative more biologically inspired approach to cognition,
influenced by neuroscience, the point at issue here is that the output of the processing is, in
fact, claimed to be a representation. As Rogers and McClelland state,
in the PDP framework active representations in the mind are thought to correspond
to the patterns of activation generated over a set of units. For example, a percept of a
visual input is assumed to be represented as a pattern of activation distributed over
many  neurons  in  several  different  brain  areas,  and  each  neuron  is  thought  to
participate in the representation of many different items. (Rogers and McClelland,
2014, p. 1038)
The  system  provides,  based  on  the  input  information  and  prior  processing  rules,  an
interpretation of the initial informational state which will yield a (distal) representation of the
state of the world (when it concerns the model as applied to cognitive systems). Cognition is
then a matter of how brains themselves represent, without the need of abstract, symbolic and
ontologically independent representations.
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These approaches are considerably different (even though some think they can be
integrated  –  Fodor  and  Pylyshyn (1988)  claim that  it  is  a  matter  of  implementation,  for
example,  whereas  Ramsey,  Garon  and  Stich  (1990)  disagree),  for  they  rely  on  different
notions of content and representation. More specifically, the formats and vehicles in terms of
which those notions are spelled out are quite different: whereas classical cognitivism employs
abstract  symbolic representations,  connectionism emphasizes the neurobiological  substract.
Arguably,  though,  they  share,  the  fundamental  representationalist  presupposition:  the
attribution of semantic properties to the inner structures that function, in cognitive systems, as
truth-functional surrogates of aspects of the world in the cognitive processing of the subject.
The  representations  yielded  in  the  cognitive  processes  are  semantically  contentful:  they
represent aspects of the world (their contents), that is, they take the world to be a certain way
(for example, to be raining, to there being a cup of coffee in my desk, and so on), which
constitute their  satisfaction conditions  (truth or  other  weakened conditions of  satisfaction,
such as accuracy or adequacy), either personally or subpersonally (that is, with or without the
need for the organism to be conscious of it). The assumption that cognition can be understood
in terms of the production, transformation and manipulation of inner  states that  represent
properties of  a specific domain is  often referred to as the fundamental  assumption in  the
cognitivist paradigm (see Ward et al., 2017, p. 365; Steiner, 2014, p. 44, Haugeland, 1981).
While  Classical  Cognitivism  achieved  impressive  results  in  modeling  and
replicating  paradigmatic  cognitive  behaviors,  such  as  playing  chess,  it  also  met  with
significant obstacles, especially when it concerned the understanding of other more flexible
behaviors that living beings are capable of performing. Behaviors such as pattern recognition
and  motor  control  were  more  successfully  handled  by  Connectionist  approaches  and  its
suggestion that intelligent and adaptive behavior emerge from the complex activity of the
neuronal  units  and  their  interconnection,  instead  of  the  production  and  manipulation  of
discrete  representational  states.  Either  way,  one  possible  reason  for  the  shortcomings  of
computational  approaches  in  either  form  is  the  metaphor,  or  the  model,  of  mind  as  a
computational device. As Ward et al. (2017) summarize,
from the  mid-twentieth  century,  the  cleverest  objects  whose  workings  we  could
understand  were  computers  –  systems  that  took  impoverished  inputs  from  their
environment (via key-presses or other sensors), went through a complex sequence of
structured inner states whose unfolding was governed by well-specified algorithms
and principles, and produced some output appropriate to the task for which it had
been programmed. We humans can also do some pretty clever things, and we know
that a staggering complex web of internal states intervenes between our perception
of the environment and our intelligent response to it. Understanding our cognitive
capacities  as  those  of  particularly  fancy,  biologically  realized,  computational
systems seemed (and still seems) like a good bet (Ward et al., 2017, p. 366).
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However,  the  computer  metaphor  is  fundamentally  restricted:  “ignoring  the  body  is  an
obvious consequence  of  taking the brain  to  be a computer  and the mind to  be computer
programs, making it  natural  to  think of  the body as peripherals:  our sensory surfaces  are
analogous to keyboards; our muscles are analogous to monitors and printers” (Silberstein and
Chemero, 2015, p. 188). Acknowledging those limits, and questioning the possibility of a
purely mechanical account for cognition, reflected in the enactivist views that were starting to
receive attention in the early 90s, as a reaction to the representation-centered theories that
dominated  Cognitive  Science.  However,  the  notion  of  representation  seems to  be  a  very
difficult  concept  to  abandon and,  despite  the  problems it  raises,  is  still  considered  to  be
indispensable  by  many.  The  most  recent  and  promising  approach  in  Cognitive  Science,
Predictive  Processing  (sometimes,  Predictive  Coding)  framework  (Friston  2010,  Howhy
2013,  Clark  2013,  2016),  brings  together  brain,  body and  environment  in  the  attempt  to
ground “a unified science of mind, brain and action” (Clark, 2013, p. 200). It  does so by
employing  a  different  sort  of  representation,  action-oriented representations,  that  is,
representations  that  are  not  neutral  models  of  external  aspects,  but  rather,  representations
whose primary aim is to guide action, as it is discussed in the following section.
2.3. Representation nowadays
The basic commitment of the Predictive Processing framework is to regard the
brain as a sort of prediction machine. That is, the brain is thought to perform probabilistic
reasoning in order to produce the cognitive hypotheses that underlie perception and action.
Importantly, the brain implements probabilistic reasoning accurately enough so it is able to
minimize errors by calculating and predicting probabilities. The brain’s task is to “discover
information about the likely causes of an impinging signal without any form of direct access
to its source” (Clark, 2013. p. 183) even though the aim is not to provide a mapping relation
between environmental and inner states. The brain is supposed to infer from the inside what
are  the  worldly  causes  from  the  proximal  informational  input  registered  by  the  sensory
organs.17
17 A main  difference  in  the  cognitive  architecture  of  recent  approaches  concerns  one  main  Predictive
Processing tenet: it allows for the top-down flow of information, instead of only bottom-up (which starts
from the information retrieved by sensory organs which gradually increase their complexity). The top-down
flow of information (that is, the concurrence of complex cognitive reasoning) is part of what constrains the
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Perception and action in this framework are deeply connected in the sense that
they form a system which “reduces prediction error by sculpting and selecting sensory inputs”
(Clark, 2013, p. 183). The main idea is that the brain is constantly generating probabilistic
virtual hypotheses about the states of the world based on the current input and the previous
information it possesses. By being oriented to action, representations and their informational
contents are embodied for they are constrained by sensorimotor aspects. Also, the predictions
the brain calculates  about the distal  causes  and the constraints  that  action and movement
forcefully puts on the incoming signals all serve for the minimizing of error and maintaining
the successful functioning of the organism.
From this initial exposition, it is possible to see that the cognitivist commitment of
attributing semantic properties to inner structures upon which cognition depends is a defining
feature of mainstream Cognitive Science  (even in its more embodied variants, according to
which representations are dependent on bodily skills or vehicles) and probably still stands as
the prevailing hypothesis in research about cognition. The Predictive Processing framework is
explicitly  assumed  to  be  a  thoroughly  representational  view  of  the  mind:  “the  mind  is
essentially a thinking or representing thing” (Clark, 2008, p. 149). The resilience of the notion
of representation in Cognitive Science research has led to the “representation wars” (Clark,
2015).  Interestingly,  peace  is  supposed  to  be  “ecumenical”,  that  is,  to  achieve  an
“understanding of internal representation that can accommodate important insights from the
enactivist  tradition without  renouncing  the  theory’s  representational  credential”  (Williams,
2018, p. 142). The possibility of such an ecumenical solution is, however, denied by (radical)
enactivists, because of the inherent difficulties associated with representational accounts (see
next section).
In spite of the explicit commitment to the existence of representations, it is also
possible  to  observe  a  tendency  to  deflate  the  notion  of  mental  representation,  from  the
propositional  attitude  model  to  other  more  dynamical  and  even  embodied  forms,  as  in
Predictive  Processing.  However,  if  the  inner  states  that  are  involved in  cognition are  not
predictions the brain probabilistically calculates.  What is actually carried from bottom to up is only the
divergences from the expected model. Predictive Processing allows then, for the possibility of the theory-
ladenness of perception, at least to a specific sense. Clark says: “what we perceive depends heavily upon the
set of priors [prior beliefs that constrain the brain’s workings] (…) that the brain brings to bear in its best
attempt to predict the current sensory signal” (Clark, 2013, p. 187). Also, “endogenous activity and the self-
selection of the sensory flow) place PP just about maximally distant from traditional, passive, “feedforward
hierarchy” stories” (Clark, 2015, p. 2). The possibility of the theory-ladenness of perception (or in other
terms, the Cognitive Penetrability of perception), is vehemently denied by Fodor in an interesting debate that
nevertheless presupposes a computational account for cognition. Though this is a very interesting issue of
fundamental importance for the rendering of the cognitive architecture, my aim in this footnote is only to
emphasize the structure of input-processing-output that is present in each view.
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anymore understood in  a  strong,  objective sense,  the  question that  arises  is  how actually
representational are those more updated versions of representation? Recently, in fact, it has
been  argued  that  the  answer  is:  not  so  much.  This  is  because,  according  to  at  least  one
argument, the notion of representation has been adapted and loosened to the point that it is no
longer clear that it continues to serve its original explanatory purpose.18 Debates about what
counts as a mental representation and how internal structures represent, if they do at all, are
the basis of the ongoing “representation wars” (Clark, 2015). A significant part of the debate
concerns  whether  recent  action-oriented  accounts,  construing  representation  in  a  more
distributed and pragmatic guise – such as PP – actually qualify as representational after all.
Clark  (2015)  claims  that  cognitive  activities  employ  action-oriented
representations which “aim to engage the world, rather than to depict it in some action-neutral
fashion” (Clark,  2015, p.  4).  The goal of cognition is  not  to produce a representationally
accurate model of an organism-independent external world; rather, cognition intervenes in the
world,  transforming  the  content  delivered  via  perceptual  processes.  More  specifically,
contents are constrained by aspects such as bodily form, personal history and environmental
niches. Clark himself accepts that it is possible to end the representation wars and achieve
peace  between  representationalism  and  enactivism  (the  non-representationalist  side),  but
insisting that representations are necessary,  even if  they can be biologically frugal (Clark,
2015, p. 4).19 Now, granted that there are representations, they represent something as being in
some particular way. So what is the content and conditions of satisfaction of action-oriented
representations? The complexity and the active and dynamical character of action-oriented
representations might, in a remark that will prove important, concerning the relation between
psychological and physical states, make it
even harder (perhaps impossible) to adequately capture the contents of the cognitive
roles of  many key inner states and processes using the terms and vocabulary  of
ordinary  daily  speech.  That  vocabulary  is  “designed”  for  communication,  and
(perhaps) for various forms of cognitive stimulation (Clark, 2015, p. 5).
What Clark claims here is that the intentional vocabulary does not directly corresponds or
reduces to the vocabulary of the brain states. That tmakes it specially difficult for there to
18 In  an  interesting  remark  that  captures  another  Kuhnian  aspect  of  cognitive  science,  Ramsey  observes,
concerning how concepts are employed in paradigm changes, that “despite losing […] explanatory value,
[previous concepts] nevertheless retain their stature and prominence as even revolutionary thinkers resist
abandoning something central to their basic understanding of the subject. The posit is perhaps transformed
and re-worked as theorists contrive to fit  into a new explanatory work for which it  is ill-suited. Yet its
appearance in the new theory is motivated not by any sort of explanatory necessity, but by a reluctance to
reject familiar ontological commitments” (Ramsey, 2007, p. 1). This consideration applies for the use of the
notion of “representation” in current cognitive science.
19 Clark’s view is that it is possible for representational structures to vary within a representational spectrum.
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exist an intertheoretical, intelligible relation between physical and psychological processes.
So,  the  contents  of  action-oriented  representations  are  difficult  to  capture,  given  its
permanently ongoing aspect and organismic specificity:
The probabilistic generative model […] is designed to engage the world in rolling,
uncertainty-modulated,  cycles  of  perception  and  action. Nonetheless,  high-level
states of the generative model will target large-scale, increasingly invariant patterns
in  space  and  time,  corresponding to  (and  allowing us  to  keep track of)  specific
individuals,  properties,  and events despite large moment-by-moment variations in
the stream of sensory stimulation. Unpacked via cascades of descending prediction,
such higher level states simultaneously inform both perception and action, locking
them into continuous circular causal flows. Instead of simply describing “how the
world is”,  these models – even when considered at those “higher” more abstract
levels – are geared to engaging those aspects of the world that matter to us. They are
delivering a grip on the patterns that matter for the interactions that matter (Clark,
2015, p. 5, first emphasis added).
Given  the  foregoing,  it  is  natural  to  reflect  upon what  it  takes  for  an  inner  structure  to
represent, altogether. One worry is that representation cannot just boil down to responding to
stimuli and causally influencing other states and processes (Ramsey, 2007, p. 4, for example).
An inner structure, in order to be representational, has to meet the job-description challenge:
(i) to refer to something as being in a certain way and then, being subject to conditions of
satisfaction, and (ii) to play a causal role in the cognitive system because of its having that
specific content. One of the problems is that, if the content of a representation cannot be
specified,  as  Clark seems to  imply,  there  is  no way to  account  for  its  causal  role  in  the
cognitive system in virtue of its specific content. Next section discusses this problem as a
principled objection to representational theories based in information.
The ubiquity and indiscriminate use of the notion of representation obscures the
possibility  that  what  mediates  causal  relations  between organisms and their  environments
might not be of a properly representational nature, but rather a much weaker relation, which
REC actually welcomes. Hutto and Myin (2017) in fact agree that Predictive Processing and
Radical Enactivism are compatible, provided that the former is stripped of its commitment to
a robust theory of semantic content (see Hutto and Myin, 2017, ch. 3). In any case, it is fairly
obvious and undeniable,  given current  scientific  understanding,  that  the processing of  the
sensory  signals  in  the  brain  is  part  of  an  account  of  cognition.  The  problem  lies  in
presupposing  either  that  it  would  be  possible  to  determine  semantic  content  from  said
processing alone or that neural states themselves can represent. For example, Clark says that
to naturalize intentionality,  then, “all”  we need do is  display the mechanisms by
which such ongoing (...) engagements are enabled, and make intelligible that such
mechanisms can deliver the rich and varied grip upon the world that we humans
enjoy. This, of course, is exactly what PP sets out to achieve (Clark, 2015, p. 2)
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This implies that the less objective, action-oriented contents are manipulated until they yield
or achieve the status of being intentional. However, it is still not clear how the problem of
naturalization of content is solved, that is, how semantic content arises from purely physical
and dynamical information processing. Even in weak renderings of the notions of content and
representation, the hard problem of content for representationalist approaches “is not what
kinds of properties are represented or how, for example, less than fully objectivist properties
are represented, but in fact the very possibility of representation as such” (Nascimento and
Myin, 2017, p. 127). For, as I discuss in the next section, spelling out semantic content in
terms  of  purely  physical  information,  that  is,  solving  the  Hard  Problem of  Content,  is  a
doomed endeavor from the very start.
2.4 Problems
So far we have seen how committed to representation Cognitive Science is. Brains
or minds are supposed to implement or produce cognition by transforming and manipulating
inner states whose intentional content is responsible for causing the subject’s other mental
representations and overt behavior. Now, how do those representations acquire their content?
If one is to provide a naturalistic answer to intentionality using the notion of representation, it
will face the Hard Problem of Content. According to the proponents of HPC, either the notion
of  content  is  naturalistically  legitimate  (being  limited  to  informational  relations  such  as
covariance and resemblance/structural isomorphism and, at the most, biological history and
proper function of organisms) and then necessarily falls short  of semantic content or it  is
previously contentful (even to a minimum) and then it is not acceptable from a naturalistic
point of view: if something more substantial than covariance or isomorphism is smuggled
within the notion of information,  then it  is  a  circular explanation, for  it  does  not explain
semantic properties, but rather, presupposes it (Hutto and Myin, 2013, p. 67). A naturalistic
account is supposed to start with (and stick to) a strictly deflationary notion of information.20
I do not at all intend to provide definitive reasons to dismiss or to choose for
either way of understanding the informational sensitive role of the inner states that constitute
20 Hutto  and Myin consider a  third option, but I  will  not focus on it.  The alternative would be to posit a
semantically rich notion of information as a metaphysically primitive notion. That would, however, require
expansion or revision of physical principles, a task outside the scope of this research (Hutto and Myin, 2013,
pp. 68-69).
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cognition (whether  the  relation of  inner  states  and the  environment  is  best  spelled out in
covariance or isomorphic terms or in a combination of those (Ramsey, 2016) is at least in part
a question whose answer depends on further empirical research). My aim is to emphasize that
it might be the case that the inner states involved in cognitive activities that are usually taken
as being representational are, in fact, not more than merely sensitivity to physical properties.
The anti-representationalist enactivist alternative takes inner states as being informationally
sensitive,  but  not  as  semantically  representing.  My  aim in  this  section  is  to  present  the
principled problems that prevent a thorough naturalistic account for representation based in
the notion of natural information, though making the way for a non-representationalist theory
of basic cognition.
There  are  two  prominent  ways  according  to  which  informational  theories  of
representation  have  been  recently  developed,  based  on  the  Peircean  distinction:  mental
representations acquire their contents by means of informational relations either in terms of
indication/detection or resemblance/similarity. In a cluster of related shortcomings, however,
informational theories in both guises (or in any guise) fail to satisfactorily solve the Hard
Problem of Content. There seems to be an apparently ineliminable indeterminacy of content,
which entails the impossibility of the fine-grained individuation of the intensional contents of
mental representation; and for the individuation of the proper causes of representations; that
is,  meeting the job-description challenge, all  of which can be captured by the disjunction
problem (Fodor, 1987, 1990, see below). Independently of how the mental representation of
information  is  worked  out  (either  by  indicative  or  iconic  accounts),  it  is  not  possible  to
unequivocally determinate the representational  content. The reason is  that  whereas natural
information  is  coarse-grained,  semantic  content  (or  meaning)  is  fine-grained. The natural
information  provided  either  by  covariance  or  isomorphism  between  states  is  not  easily
transformed  into  the  non-natural  intentional  and  semantic  information  supposed  to  be
possessed by mental states.
That makes explicit the unviability of the reduction of mental representation and
its contents to physical information only. The point is that natural informational relations are
cheap:  neither  mere  indication  nor  similarity  provides  sufficient  resources  for  the
determination  of  semantic  content.  For  folk  psychology  to  be  vindicated  by  a
representationalist cognitive science, they need to have the right sort of properties, namely,
intentional and causal properties that answer to the job-description challenge.
The disjunction problem is fatal for causal-informational theories. Insofar as both
iconic and indicative relations are instances of theories which exploit physical information,
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they  are  both  challenged  by  the  disjunction  problem.  In  Fodor’s  words,  the  disjunction
problem
arises in one or another guise for every causal theory of content that has thus far
been  proposed.  Accordingly,  there  are  various  ideas  for  circumventing  it  in  the
literature in which such theories are espoused. None of these proposals has been
very satisfactory, however; (…) the problem that causal theories have (…) is perhaps
intrinsic and ineliminable. (Fodor, 1987, p. 102).
The disjunction problem can be described as the following (based in Fodor, 1990).
According  to  a  crude causal  theory  of  representation,  a  mental  representation  has  as  its
content whatever reliably has caused it. When one mentally tokens a representational item
“cow”, its content is whatever was caused by the properties of the external object (the cow
itself). The physical story can be told in terms of the proximal stimuli (the information that
hits  the  sensory  organs,  such  as  the  amounts  of  light  that  hit  the  retina),  which  is  then
transformed in order to provide a distal representation of the object. In normal situations, a
tokening of the mental item “cow” is supposed to have been caused by a cow. However, it is
often the case that a tokening of “cow” is not caused by a cow, but rather by a horse-in-the-
dark. Then, not only cows cause “cow”. As defined, according to the causal theory, the mental
item “cow” denotes that which reliably caused it. But if “cow” can be caused by something
else than a cow, that is, not only the properties of a cow cause “cow” but also some horse
properties, what “cow” denotes is not the property of being a cow, but rather the property of
being  a  cow  or  a  horse-on-a-dark-night.  And then  the  instantiation  of  either  one  of  the
conditions of the disjunction makes the tokening of “cow” true. It seems that there is no way
to instantiate  an unveridical  tokening of “cow”, as Fodor puts:  “there can be no thing as
misrepresentation” (Fodor, 1987, p. 101).  A tokening of “cow” can be ultimately caused by
anything (at least in some sort of specific situations that lead to error), and it would not be
possible to determine its meaning.
If a mental state is semantic, it is supposed to have truth conditions: it can be true
or false (or accurate and so on) based on conditions of satisfaction. However, it is impossible
for a state that is in an informational relation with another to carry false information. At the
most, the correlation can be weak or strong, but not false. Whereas it is possible for someone
to be wrong if she holds a belief that is false in virtue of its content, it is not the case that a
thermostat can be wrong about the temperature in a room (if it is properly functioning). Not
every two states that covary or resemble each other are mental states (thermostats register
covariant states, but it is not a case of mental representation – as peculiar as enactivism might
sound, it does not attribute mentality to non-living things).
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The problems presented above are well-known issues that led to the augmenting
of the notion of covariation with other notions. The issue that needs to be dealt with is how to
correctly  identify  which  causes  are  determining  of  content  and  which  are  secondary,  or
collateral  to  it.  As  naturalistic  approaches,  there  are  constraints:  only  natural  causes  and
conditions are allowed. Theories that complemented the mere causal relation were developed
by  Dretske  (1981),  Millikan  (1984),  Fodor  (1987,  1990),  and  include  appeal  to  normal
conditions, natural selection and asymmetries between causal relations. However, the same
problems rise  again:  either  the  augmented  notions  are  too  weak to  account  for  semantic
content (even though they are part of a natural explanation), or they from the start presuppose
semantic properties.
The notions of representation and content are fundamental because they provide a
way of integrating the physical and intentional levels: they bridge the processes that happen in
a physical basic level to the higher personal psychological levels in an intelligible way. As
Gerrans  states:  “there  must  be an explanatory relationship between neuroscience and folk
psychology” (Gerran, 2014, p. 33, emphasis added). Informational representational content is
a sort of structure that makes intentional realism make sense. An intelligible relation would,
inter  alia,  be  useful  for  dismissing  explanatory  gaps  between  psychological  and  physical
processes.
The structures developed in Philosophy of Language can be said to have helped in
the framing of worries about intelligibility between semantical and physical states. It might
have been the case that the notion of propositional content has been carried out from (some
realms of) Philosophy of Language and reproduced in Philosophy of Mind and Philosophy of
Perception without any sort of adaptation. The formal systematicity that linguistics offers for
the  semantics  of  (at  least  parts  of)  language  is  assumed  to  be  the  case  for  mental
representations  as  well.  In  this  sense,  it  is  interesting  to  point  out  that  “the  origins  of
cognitivism [...] overlap with those of a central strand of ‘analytic philosophy’ - the construal
of thought in terms of formal transitions between propositions, and the construal of minds as
fundamentally seats of propositional attitudes” (Ward et al., 2017, p. 367).
Hutto  and  Myin  observe  that  “if  one  focuses  attention  only  on  the  kind  of
intentionality exhibited by beliefs and desires with articulable content it is easy to become
convinced that intentionality must be, always and essentially, bound up with content” (Hutto
and  Myin,  2017,  pp.  96-97).  By  adopting  the  propositionalist/mechanical  framework,
however, philosophy of mind and cognitive science have in fact inherited the same intrinsic
puzzles of philosophy of language.
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So, the urge to provide an account that assumes reduction to intelligibly determine
and integrate physical  and psychological  processes  is  a  “philosophically  motivated  need”
(Hutto  and  Myin,  2017,  p.  169).  It  is  rather,  generated  by  the  assumptions  that  have
underlined  cognitive  science.  It  is  also  interesting  to  point  out  that,  given  appropriate
circumstances  and  explicit  acknowledgment  of  limitations,  “it  is  always  possible to
characterize physical systems using representational language” (Ramsey, 2007, p. 33). The
point is then, not really whether it is possible to describe brain processes in representational
terms (it is), but rather whether that strategy is informative about the way brains really work
and whether it should be taken as the main model for explaining it.
2.5 The enactivist proposal
It has become clearer that the project of explaining intentionality by employing
only  standard  naturalistic  resources  of  causal  relations,  nomic  information,  evolutionary
history and biological-developmental functions still falls short of explaining how the physical
processes that happen in the brain could possibly exhibit semantic properties. The project of
combining a mentalistic psychology with physical information has failed to the point that it is
possible, as Godfrey-Smith puts, “that we have been looking for the wrong kind of theory, in
some big sense.  Naturalistic treatments of semantic  properties have somehow lost  contact
with the phenomena” (Godfrey-Smith, 2006, p. 42).
The solution REC proposes is  to embrace these augmented notions but,  at the
same time, emphasizing that it is impossible to develop a metaphysically robust account for
semantic content out of them. In the REC view, then, states can carry information about each
other, but only on the covariance sense, which is not sufficient to yield semantic properties,
such as truth or reference. In the case of mental states, the covariance with external affairs
does not  mean anything that is subject to satisfaction conditions (Hutto and Myin, 2013, p.
67). Whatever is established in the relation of augmented covariation is not enough to possess
semantic  properties.  REC, however,  does  not  dismiss  the  importance of  the role  that  the
deflationary notions of informational covariance, developmental functions and evolutionary
history, emphasized by teleosemantical and teleofunctional accounts, play in cognition.
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In sum, REC accepts that “on-line sensory signals “carry information” in the co-
variance sense but not that they “pass on” meaning or contentful messages” (Hutto and Myin,
2013, p. 70). The point REC aims to make is that, by avoiding the commitment to developing
a robust  semantic  theory of  mental  content,  what is  provided is  a  characterization of  the
systematic  relations  that  bear  between  the  organism and  the  environmental  features  that
affects it. Such systematic relations also incorporate phylogenetic and ontogenetical traits, that
is, traits developed in the history both of the species and the individual, respectively. Basic
cognition, then, consists in “systems engaging in informationally sensitive interactions with
environmental  offerings”  (Hutto  and  Myin,  2013,  p.  xvi).  Such  informationally  sensitive
interactions do not involve the processing of informational contents in any truth-functional
way.  However,  even though basic relations  exhibited by (augmented) covariance between
external states and brain states are not representational, but rather, informationally sensitive,
they still  play an important  role in basic cognition and in enabling engagements with the
environment  and  collective  practices  that  constitute  sophisticated,  later-arriving  forms  of
cognition.  The principled challenges concerning a naturalistic account for semantic content
discussed above are a main motivation for seriously considering REC. Since none of the
available theories and notions of content satisfactorily explain in naturalistically terms how to
get  from  non-semantic  to  semantic  elements,  the  difficulties  in  providing  a  naturalistic
explanation for cognitive features in representational terms might indicate that the problem is
deeper than initially expected. Despite its ubiquity in philosophical and scientific research
about  the  mind,  the  notion  of  representational  contentful  states  as  the  basic  explanatory
resource for explaining cognition is nothing more than a theoretical posit, with no naturalistic
justification.
Seen through an enactive perspective,  the root problem consists in assuming a
metaphysically robust notion of information, as an “objective commodity” that is traded in
and out of organisms and “whose generation, transmission and reception do not require or in
any way presupposes interpretative processes” (Dretske, 1981, p. vii). More specifically, REC
argues  that  the standard physical  and material  resources  are  too strict  to  account  for  the
emergence and development of semantic properties.
If  it  is  not  possible  to  unequivocally  determine  and  individuate  mental
representation and its contents, should the project of a naturalistic account for intentionality
be abandoned? There might be ways to make it work, but some fundamental assumptions
might need to be re-conceived. Intentionality is usually conceived as the mark of the mental.
That is, whatever attitude or capacity that is minimally intelligent (in the sense of not being
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automatic, reflective behavior) depends on mentally representing something else. If there is
not  anything  that  counts  as  a  mental  contentful  representation,  at  least  as  the  standard
presentations  suppose,  then  it  might  be  the  case  that  there  is  no  (principled)  way  to
unequivocally distinguish between what is cognitive and what it is not.  In chapter 4 I come
back to enactivism to explore reasons to believe that there are interesting continuities between
activities and capacities both humans and non-human living beings perform. The point  at
issue  is  to  question  the  assumption that  intentionality  and  intentional  content  can  be
understood  as  a  unique  phenomenon.  In  addition  to  being  a  unique  phenomenon,
intentionality is supposed to be directly modeled by propositional content, according to which
cognitive states such as beliefs are considered to be “the paradigmatic intentional states and
that all representational states are intentional in the same way that beliefs are” (Muller, 2014,
p. 167). To question that assumption, as pointed out before, is not to deny intentionality, but to
deny  intentionality  as  it  is  usually  understood:  as  equivalent  to  semantically  contentful
representation. As Muller puts it, “it is not the intentionality or aboutness of the mental that is
the problem, it is thinking of that content as specifically propositional content” (Muller, 2014,
p. 158).
REC emphasizes that no strictly naturalistic approach can “account for the origins
of content in the world if they are forced to use nothing but the standard naturalist resources
of informational covariance, even if these are augmented by devices that have the biological
function of responding to that information” (Hutto and Myin, 2013, p. xv). In the REC view,
the  Hard  Problem of Content  derives  from the  consideration that  there  is  nothing  in  the
natural  world  that  fits  the  role  that  semantically  contentful  mental  representations  are
supposed  to  play  in  cognition.  So,  the  notion  of  a  semantically  contentful  mental
representation  is  not  naturalistically  cogent;  rather,  it  is  an  illegitimate  theoretical  posit,
especially  tailored  for  the  needs  of  a  specific  framework  and  its  assumptions.  Hutto  and
Myin’s (2013, 2017) suggestion is to abandon the traditional notion of content and pursue a
different pragmatically oriented sort of approach (see also Hutto and Satne 2015; Cash, 2008;
Muller, 2014; Tomasello and Moll, 2010).
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3. METHODOLOGICAL NATURALISM
In addition to intentionality, the phenomenal aspect of conscious experiences is
another source of uneasiness in research about mind. Phenomenal conscious experiences are
the  most  conspicuous  aspects  of  our  lives.  That  there  are  conscious  experiences  with
phenomenal aspects is not exactly the question; rather, the puzzlement concerns the fact that
they have not yet, despite expectations and efforts, been integrated within the framework of
science as other phenomena have, such as photosynthesis or cell replication, for example.
Even when an explanation of the latter was supposed to be far-fetched, scientific research
developed  not  only  tools  and  techniques  but  also  at  least  some  understanding  of  the
underlying mechanisms. This is not the case for consciousness, which remains an obscure
issue, despite its pervasiveness in ordinary life. The what it is like for an organism to be, that
is,  the  subjective  feel  of  its  own  experience  and  why  this  experience  exists,  remains,
nowadays, unexplained by any of the familiar available scientific accounts. Not only there is
no explanation, but there is also very little consensus on what an answer would look like, or
where and how to find an answer to it.
Nagel had already stated, nearly half a century ago, that “we have at present no
conception of what an explanation of the physical nature of a mental phenomenon would be”
(Nagel, 1974, p. 436). However, it seems perfectly reasonable to expect a natural explanation,
as  an  ordinary  part  of  the  natural  world.  In  fact,  since  Nagel’s  remark,  there  have  been
impressive  and  undeniable  results  in  neuroscientific  research.  So  many  remarkable
contributions for the understanding of the brain have led to the impression that the brain is the
main responsible for consciousness and that it is only a matter of time until a purely physical
account for consciousness appears in terms of the neurobiological processes that happen in the
brain. However, as claims the familiar distinction, there are easy problems of consciousness
(Chalmers,  1996),  that  is,  problems that  concern  the  function,  dynamics  and structure  of
69
consciousness, and which are supposed to be successfully by mainstream research, and the
hard problem  of  consciousness,  that  is,  that  of  explaining  why  and  how  those  physical
processes feel like something (Chalmers, 1996, 2018).
The classic dispute on the hard problem of consciousness can be mapped into
materialist or physicalist positions, in one end, and anti-materialism (dualism and idealism), in
the other end, with positions in between, that attempt to capture advantageous aspects of both
positions. Roughly, materialism claims that consciousness is fully material – and according to
current orthodoxy, a function of the brain – whereas for dualism, consciousness is at least
partly non-material. Both positions seem to capture important dimensions of the phenomenon,
at the same time that they are both problematic. Materialism emphasizes the causal roles that
conscious states are supposed to play in overall  behavior,  that  is, mentality is  not just  an
epiphenomenon, whereas dualism vindicates the deep-seated intuition that consciousness is
not physical – how could mere matter be conscious?
This  chapter  discusses  the  methodological  constraints  that  an  approach  is
supposed to follow in order for it to be naturalistic. I aim to show that, for the majority of
views in research about mind, too strict constraints placed upon theories were claimed to be
naturalistic. As discussed in the previous chapter,  in fact, the standard neurocomputational
methods and representational  approaches cannot account for what can be considered easy
problems, such as discrimination, categorization and reaction to environmental stimuli and the
integration of information by a cognitive system. For the hard problem, that  involves the
phenomenal aspects, the issues are even more elusive. It is quite usual to treat the issues of
intentionality and consciousness in isolation of each other. Usually, elucidating intentionality
has been taken to be an easier task, an answer to which would shed light on phenomenality
(for example, Dretske’s (1995) treatment of qualia as representational). More recent theories
treat phenomenality as the source of intentionality (Phenomenal Intentionality theories, cf.
Kriegel (2013)), but also taking them to be somewhat independent. In the view I develop in
this thesis, consciousness and intentionality are deeply related, and forcefully keeping them
apart is misleading (see next chapter for further details).
My focus in this chapter concerns one shortcoming of traditional ways of thinking
about experience that prevents an adequate understanding of it, namely, a (perhaps implicit)
bias towards reductionism. Section 3.2. discusses the nature of philosophical practice and its
relation  to  science,  claiming  that  the  expectations  held  by  philosophers  concerning  the
problems in the relation between what is material and what is mental are not met even by
other scientific disciplines. Reduction is a very rare achievement in the natural sciences. To
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expect it to be accomplished in philosophy of mind is to spouse a somewhat naive view of the
sciences  and  scientific  research  and  methods.  Before  that,  I  start,  in  section  3.1  with an
overview of research about  mind to  show how it  is  stuck in  the dilemma created by the
reductionist assumption. Phenomenality seems to be a stubborn and elusive issue no matter
what position you take. It might be the case, as I suggest, that its elusiveness stems from the
way traditional questions have been formulated: by asking “what is the relation between mind
and  matter”,  the  problematic  assumption  that  mind  and  matter  are  so  sharply  distinct  is
already assumed from the start. As we have seen before, Enactivism tries to undermine this
very distinction, that leads to searching for a connection between mind and matter. Section 3.3
closes the chapter with the recommendation of a more pluralistic and flexible conception of
naturalism, if we are to have any better comprehension of mental phenomena in scientific
terms.
3.1 Patterns of reasoning in philosophy of mind
What I would like to call  attention at  the moment is  to a recurrent pattern of
reasoning in philosophy of mind, which resembles the following dilemma:
If  a  given  problem  cannot  be  explained  within  this  [naturalistic/materialistic]
framework, only two answers remain viable: either the natural sciences will be able
to  explain  the  problem  in  the  future (when  the  theoretical  and  technological
development  reaches  a  higher  degree  of  maturity),  or  the  problem  simply  falls
outside  the  naturalistic  framework and  can  thus  be  explained  away  as  an
inefficacious  epiphenomenon  or  a  subjective  illusion.  (Rosfort,  2013,  p.  1426,
emphases added).
From the point of view I develop here, neither of these positions is satisfactory. I intend to
show that this dilemma is false: from the shortcomings of explaining phenomenality in purely
natural  terms,  it  is  neither  the  case  that  the problem is  just  a  matter  of  technological  or
theoretical  improvement  of  details  nor  an  in  principle  impossible  to  explain  character  of
phenomenality.  However,  both  materialistic  and  anti-materialistic  arguments  have  been
influential and their considerations raise deep difficulties. As the pattern goes, no matter how
detailed a physical description proposed by materialists is, the hard problem can  always be
asked: why is it  that  these specific  physical  states feel  like something? Why is there any
(visual) feeling at all associated with the activation of a given assemble of neurons in the
region V4? There does not seem to be anything about the chemical or physical functioning of
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a neuron or groups of it that make them specially important to an experience of seeing the
blue sky. They function by emitting electrical signals, but there is nothing about those electric
signals that connect them to the experience of seeing blue.
Given the failure in obtaining an answer to that question, it has been argued that
phenomenal consciousness is then out of the scope of materialism, which makes the latter
false (since it is claims that all there is physical matter). The problem here is that the only
acceptable answer that would settle the question about the relation of mind and matter is a
reductive form of explanation: both materialists,  who keep on an incessant search for the
physical (brain) states that are both necessary and sufficient for mental states, as well as anti-
materialists, for whom anything short of a complete reduction is not an acceptable answer
because “there is something left off the explanation”.
There  seems to  be  no  way out  of  this  stalemate.  In  fact,  when put  this  way,
answering the challenge posed by the hard problem of consciousness is  impossible.  What
gives rise to the dilemma is a specific way of thinking about phenomenality. I show that this
pattern (and the hard problem it generates) has as underlining assumptions the two aspects I
want to draw attention to: first, the reductionism which is misleadingly assumed to be the
norm in sciences and second, the reification of experience and aspects of it that distorts its real
character (developed in chapter 4). I argue that, by attending to these underlying assumptions,
and making the effort of avoiding commitment to them, in an enactivist inspired way, there
might be prospects to overcome some of the explanatory and metaphysical traps that prevent
us from understanding phenomenal consciousness.
3.1.1 Cartesian variations: materialism
A  basic  aspect  of  methodological  naturalism  consists  on  the  emphasis  on
empirical research and the rejection of the existence of distinctive philosophical methods and
problems.21 There can be less or more strict naturalists, in which I follow others in associating
with reductionism (J. Clark, 2016, for example). Strict naturalism “tends to privilege science
in such a way as to downplay or explain away elements of our common understanding of
21 Strict naturalist views also often claim that scientific reasoning is able to “rule out answers to philosophical
questions  that  are  incompatible  with  scientific  findings”  (Rosenberg,  2014,  p.  17).  The  dismissal  of
philosophical reflection is quite common within strict naturalist views.
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human experience” (J. Clark, 2016, p. 4). A strict methodological naturalism presupposes that
there is  a  privileged method, which has  been traditionally taken to be that  of  the natural
sciences.  Not only are natural  sciences,  especially Physics,  the best  method, but the only
method which can achieve legitimate knowledge about reality.  A very influential picture of
the sciences is that of a building: the basis of all science is Physics, to which other levels or
layers are added, in a hierarchical and compound structure: Chemistry, Biology, Behavioral
Sciences, Psychology and Social Sciences and so on, by means of the discovery of the laws of
nature that bridge those levels (which would allow for logical inferences, such as deduction
and generalizations). The possibility of psycho-physical reductionism was a lively expectation
from the mid 20th century on and carried along a further assumption, the thesis of the unity of
science, according to which
it is not absurd to suppose that psychological laws may eventually be explained in
terms  of  the  behavior  of  individual  neurons  in  the  brain;  that  the  behavior  of
individual cells – including neurons – may eventually be explained in terms of their
biochemical constitution; and that the behavior of molecules – including the macro-
molecules  that  make  up living  cells  –  may  eventually  be explained  in  terms of
atomic physics. If this is achieved, then psychological laws will have, in principle,
been reduced to laws of atomic physics (Oppenheim and Putnam, 1958, p. 7).
Such a view still has some bite, at least in some circles. More recently, Bickle
(2006), for example, has argued for a  ruthless reductionism, according to which molecular
neuroscience, along with appropriate bridge principles, will be able to account for all the laws
and facts of psychology and cognitive activities, such as  perception, attention and memory,
and even social  cognition.  The aim is  to  discover  the connections between psychological
concepts and molecular-biological mechanisms. In short, Bickle claims for mind-to-molecule
reduction, as stated by the unity of science thesis. In addition to that, Bickle also tries to evade
the  importance  of  philosophical  reflection,  for  example,  by  suggesting  that  philosophical
reflection is not useful in the understanding of scientific phenomena.
In recent philosophy of science, however, the situation has significantly changed.
It has become clearer in the last 50 years how scientific practice is quite different from the
idealizations that were typical of earlier Logical Empiricism-inspired philosophy of science
that  lent  legitimacy  to  reductionism.  However, it  seems  that  the  lessons  of  more  recent
philosophy of science have not yet been fully appreciated by researchers in philosophy of
mind, who still have as the explanatory goal a reduction that closes the obstinate explanatory
gap between mental and physical processes.
The standard history of the mind-body problem is usually told as beginning with
Descartes’s  sharp  distinction  of  mental  and  physical  properties.  Undoubtedly,  the  mental
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aspects of human experience have always been a central issue for philosophers and lay people
of all times but the Cartesian formulation is paradigmatic for his remarks are still at play in
contemporary arguments. Descartes’s formulation has established the quest for the ontological
relation between mind and matter. In fact, the mind-body problem was not exactly a problem
for Descartes, who actually had a solution to it. The problem is clearly raised by Elizabeth of
Bohemia, when she asks how can an immaterial substance such as the mind affect matter.
Until  the  beginning  of  the  last  century,  there  was  no  relevant  alternative  to
Descartes’s substance dualism, even with his somewhat odd solution. That, however, changed,
when empirical sciences such as Physics, Biology and Chemistry started to provide successful
solutions to a variety of problems that led to the idea that a similar success would be prone to
be achieved concerning the mind.  The existence of a mental substance which is established
through introspection did not fit the new scientific criteria for observation. More specifically,
Papineau (2002) calls attention for the fact that for the first time in the history of science,
there were evidences for the causal closure of the world, that is, the idea that all physical
effects  have  physical  causes.22 So  if  mental  states  have  physical  effects,  they have  to  be
physical.  If  everything  can  be  explained  causally,  then  mind  is  no  different  from  other
instances of matter. Unless mind is part of the physical world, we could not make sense of
how mental  processes  can  have  causal  effects  in  the physical  world. The first  influential
approach to explore such possibility to the fullest was Behaviorism.
According  to  the  new  scientific  standards,  Psychology  is  –  or  should  be  –
objective  and  experimental  (Watson,  1913,  p.  158).  Given  the  intrinsic  inaccessibility  of
mental states from a third-person point of view and the rejection of introspection as a source
of reliable information about the mind, what are the options for the study of mind? In order to
respect scientific standards, the data should be shareable and intersubjectively observable. So,
the study of mind is to be carried out through observable behavior (which includes verbal
reports). Behaviorist views, then, addressed both methodological and metaphysical concerns
for a science of mind. Methodologically, instead of a science of mind itself,  Behaviorism
claims psychology to  be the  science  of  behaviors  and dispositions.  According to  Skinner
(1953/1980), for example, it is not the case that inner states do not exist, but actually that they
are not relevant to the functional analysis of behavior (Skinner, 1980, p. 42). That is the main
tenet of Psychological (also called Radical) Behaviorism, referring to the specific research
22 That there are proper reasons for the change towards a more materialistic view or whether the growing
influence of materialism has been a trend have been disputed. For Lycan (2009), there are no more problems
with dualism than there are with materialism. Both are problematic, and even where there are arguments for
materialism, such as Papineau’s argument for the growing evidence of causal closure of the world, they can
be doubted or are at least compatible with weaker forms of dualism, such as epiphenomenalism.
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program within Psychology, mainly developed by psychologists Pavlov, Watson and Skinner.
According to Psychological  Behaviorism, it  is possible to explain, predict  and control  the
behavior of humans and animals on the basis of external causes: external physical stimuli,
responses,  learning histories and reinforcements.  In a  nutshell,  Psychological  Behaviorism
aims  to  explain  behavior  in  terms  of  how environmental  regularities  control  it  and  how
behavior  itself  can  be  changed  by  the  manipulation  of  those  regularities.  Psychological
Behaviorism was soon widely thought to have been refuted by the Cognitive Revolution, in
which Chomsky (1959) and others claimed that it is not possible to explain human cognitive
capacities, which exhibit recursivity and compositionality, with such deflationary sources (the
story  of  how  cognitive  science  has  been  carried  out,  in  terms  of  inner  rules  and
representations, has been more extensively discussed in chapter 2). The similarities between
Enactivism  and  Psychological  Behaviorism  are  very  often  emphasized  by  critics.  More
specifically,  critics  have  associated  Enactivism  with  Behaviorism  in  a  negative  fashion,
specially  due  to  the  rejection  of  the  postulation  of  inner  states  as  explanatory  causes  of
behavior (I come back to this issue in chapter 4). As we have seen in the previous chapter, the
postulation of contentful representations is precisely the central tenet of mainstream Cognitive
Science. Recent appraisals of Behaviorism have claimed that it cannot be so easily dismissed
(see Barrett, 2019, for example).
Mainly developed by philosophers, most notably, those from the Vienna Circle
(Carnap 1949, 1932/2002, Hempel 1935/1980, for example), Logical Behaviorism proposes a
“physicalist conception of psychology” (Hempel, 1980, p. 18). Logical Behaviorism claims
that the correct understanding and use of psychological concepts will show that the mind-
body problem is a pseudo-problem: “logical behaviorism claims neither that minds, feelings,
inferiority complexes, voluntary actions, etc, do not exist normally or that their existence is in
the least doubtful. It insists that the very question as to whether these psychological constructs
really exist is already a pseudoproblem” (Hempel, 1980, p. 18).  For example, the following
sentence, which contains the psychological concept “pain”, “Paul has a toothache”, has the
same conditions of verification as the following physicalist sentences:
a. Paul weeps and makes gestures of such and such kinds.
b. at the question “what is the matter?” Paul utters the words “I have a toothache”
c. closer examination reveals a decayed tooth with exposed pulp.
d. Paul’s blood pressure, digestive processes, the speed of his reactions, show such
and such changes.
e. Such and such processes occur in Paul’s central nervous system (Hempel, 1980, p.
17)
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So, “has a toothache” is actually, an abbreviation of one or a conjunction of the
sentences above (though that list is not exhaustive). There is no underlying mental event, for
all psychological states are to be understood in terms of the dispositions of an organism to
behave.  A  psychological  state  which  has  no  behavioral  or  observable  effects,  can  be
disregarded as being “metaphysical”, that is, meaningless.
A correct  understanding of phenomena depends on a physicalist  approach, not
only  for  natural  sciences,  but  also  for  the  “sciences  of  mind  and  culture”.  Logical
Behaviorism’s main assumption is that Physics (or physical language) is the basic language
for all sciences, subscribing to the “unity of science” thesis, in which all meaningful sentences
can be shown to be either replaced, eliminated or translated into physical sentences. Hence,
psychological  statements,  insofar  as  they  are  meaningful,  can  be  reduced to  a  statement
containing  only  physicalist  terms  without  change  of  content.  More  generally,  Carnap
(1932/2002) claims that “if the physical language, on the grounds of its universality, were
adopted as the system language of science, all science would become physics” (Carnap, 2002,
p.  39).  Then, there would be no insuperable differences  between Physics  and Psychology
(Hempel,  1980,  p.  16).  The  true  function  of  mental  concepts  and  terms  consists  in
abbreviations, which make “possible the concise and complete description of a state of affairs
the  expression  of  which  would  otherwise  be  very  complicated”  (Hempel,  1980,  p.  17).
According to the view I advocate here, it is possible to say that they were correct in rejecting
the existence of distinctive mental entities, but wrong in the commitment to the reductionism
of psychology to physics as an a priori principle for the ontological legitimacy of phenomena.
Differently from Logical Behaviorism, Identity Theory claimed for the identity
between mental and physical processes to be seen as an empirical thesis, that is, as a working
hypothesis instead of an a priori logical constraint. For identity theorists, psychological states
are not merely correlated with brain states, but actually are identical to brain states. In a sense,
Identity Theory can be understood as a middle-way solution. There are genuine inner mental
states which cannot be identified with behavior or dispositions. But, for identity theorists,
those inner states are not non-physical, but rather, neurophysiological states. Differently from
the a priori identity that holds by means of meaning only, as in the identity of triangles and
trilaterals,  or  pain  and  behavioral  dispositions  (in  Logical  Behaviorism’s  account),  for
example, but similarly to contingent truths discovered empirically, such as the identity of the
morning  star  and  the  evening  star,  psychological  and  physical  processes  are  numerically
identical.  Other  scientific  identities  provided  the standards  for  such  a  view,  for  example,
lightning and electrical discharge, water and H2O, temperature and molecular kinetic energy.
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Exactly as those identities were eventually discovered to be true, the hypothesis is that the
identity of psychological states and brain states is yet to be discovered.
As  the  identity-theorists  themselves  acknowledged,  much  of  their  conviction
rested on somewhat scientificist and mechanicist expectations:
It seems to me that science is increasingly giving us a viewpoint whereby organisms
are  able  to  be  seen  as  physico-chemicals  mechanisms:  it  seems  that  even  the
behavior of man himself will one day be explicable in mechanistic terms (Smart,
1959/2002, p. 61).
As predicted by the usual pattern of reasoning, identity theory shortly ran into difficulties.
One of the main objections concerns the kind of identity that is being asserted, on whether it
is a type or a token identity, a shortcoming that was explored by functionalists (see below).
Token-identity physicalism is the relatively uncontroversial claim that each occurrence of a
mental state is a physical occurrence in the brain. Type-identity physicalism claims that types
of mental states reduce to physical particulars so not only my instantiation of pain is identical
to the activation of C-fibers, but rather, that the mental kind pain is identical to the activation
of C-fibers.  The main problem with type-identity physicalism, the interesting and stronger
type of identity theory, is that it is too restrictive: unless an organism actually possesses C-
fibers, it could not feel pain, something that was objected by Fodor (1968, 1975) and Putnam
(1967/1980, 1975), giving rise to Functionalism.
The main argument  for  Functionalism is that  psychological  states  are,  in fact,
multiply realizable, that is, the specific material of which the individual is constituted is not
supposed to play any difference as long as it plays the adequate function. Many analogies can
be drawn, from money to motor engines, but the most influential metaphor was indeed the
reference to computing machines. Computations can be performed either by digital computers
or  hydraulic  machines,  or  anything  else  really,  provided  that  they  implement  the  same
function.
A Turing-machine  is  a  mechanism  (not  necessarily  physical)  which  exhibits
discrete states according to a finite set of rules: given a finite set of inputs, outputs and states,
a Turing-machine specifies a finite set of conditionals such as “if the machine is on state S1
and receives the inputs Ij,  it  delivers  the output Ok and moves to state S2”.  For Turing-
machines, what is important is not the sort of material in which the machine is implemented,
but rather the function that is performed, which plays a causal role in the system. Then, to be
in a psychological state such as pain does not depend on the activation of C-fibers, but rather
of any state that performs the same function as the C-fibers in humans.
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A main problem with machine functionalism, as opposed to type-identity theories,
is that it is too liberal. Any system that implements the adequate function, then, is said to have
pain. That would include the population of China (Block, 1980), given that they are properly
functionally  organized:  if  the  population  of  China  is  organized  in  a  way  such  as  every
individual  follows instructions just  like in  a  neuronal  system, would this  system undergo
phenomenality? If it is possible for this system not to display phenomenality, it is not the case
that  functional  organization  exhausts  phenomenal  consciousness.  This  leads  us  to  the
influential anti-materialist arguments described below, which rely on the impossibility of the
materialist accounts to explain phenomenality.
3.1.2. Cartesian variations: anti-materialism
Despite  the  permanent  excitement  concerning  the  possibility  of  providing  a
thoroughly materialistic approach to mental phenomena, either in functional or more strict
material terms, antimaterialist arguments have insistently reappeared. Arguments such as the
explanatory gap argument (Levine, 1983), the knowledge argument (Jackson, 1982, 1986), the
modal  argument  (Kripke,  1980)  and  the  conceivability  argument  (Chalmers,  2002),  all
indicate  that  there  is  a  hard  problem of  consciousness (Chalmers,  1996)  which  preclude
materialistic views to be true. Their general strategy is to imply an ontological gap from an
epistemic gap between physical and mental processes. From the fact that the phenomenality
of  mental  processes  has been deeply resistant  to  standard scientific  accounts,  it  has  been
suggested that the nature of the mind is either not reducible or not material at all.
As I have indicated before, it is reasonable to expect that a materialistic scientific
account can be provided for consciousness,  as many other  seemingly difficult  phenomena
have been dealt with by the sciences. However, it is supposed that the natural sciences operate
with  a  notion  of  reductive  explanation,  where  a  high-level  phenomena  is  conceptually
connected (reduced) to a low-level process described in a more basic language. However, as
pointed out by the anti-materialist position, “the mere fact that we can conceive any given
physical  process  without  consciousness  suggests  that  we  cannot  have  a  fully  satisfying
explanation  of  consciousness  in  physical  terms”  (Chalmers,  2002).  An  explanation  is
supposed to conceptually connect two phenomena in the sense that there is no explanatory
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residue left off. If it is possible to conceive of the subject or organism not to have phenomenal
properties, then we are at least in need of confrontation of an explanatory gap, as in Levine’s
(1983) articulation with the aid of  Kripke’s  modal  argument (1979).  I  briefly  present  the
explanatory  gap  and  introduce  the  assumption  that  both  materialistic  and  anti-materialist
arguments exhibit, namely, the reductionism from phenomenality to physical states, similarly
as what supposedly happens to other phenomena in the natural sciences (which we will see
below is not the case).
Following Kripke, Levine (1983) articulates the notion of  explanatory gap,  an
epistemic  limitation  in  our  understanding  of  mind  which  follows  from  Kripke’s  modal
argument against materialism. In  Naming and Necessity (1980), Kripke argues that proper
names and  definite  descriptions  actually  have  distinct  semantic  behaviors,  and  then,  they
cannot be synonymous or equivalent. One of the contexts in which the behavior of these two
kinds  of  expressions  differs  is  in  modal  contexts.  A description  such  as  “the  writer  of
Nicomachean Ethics” can change its reference across different possible worlds. In the actual
world, it refers to Aristotle. On the other hand, proper names such as “Aristotle” refer to the
same object both in the possible worlds where he exists and in the actual world. So, according
to  Kripke,  the  reference  of  proper  names  is  rigidly  designated,  whereas  the  reference  of
definite descriptions may change. Furthermore,  the modal status of true identity sentences
which relate two rigid designators is necessary truth, if true, and necessary falsity, if false,
even though the truth of the identity might be discovered a posteriori. Kripke extends his
considerations about the metaphysical and epistemological behavior of proper names and the
sentences in which they appear to other kinds of expressions. Expressions such as “various
species names, whether they are count nouns such as ‘cat’, ‘tiger’, ‘chunk of gold’, or mass
terms such as ‘gold’, ‘water’, ‘iron pyrites’” and also “certain terms for natural phenomena,
such  as  ‘heat’,  ‘light’,  ‘sound’,  ‘lightning’,  and,  presumably,  suitably  elaborated,  to
corresponding adjectives – ‘hot’, ‘loud’, ‘red’” (Kripke, 1980, p. 134) “have a greater kinship
with proper names than is generally realized” (Kripke, 1980, p. 134).
Sentences like “heat is the motion of molecules” and “pain is the activation of C-
fibers”, then, are expected to behave similarly since, in both cases the expressions that figure
in them, “heat”,  “the motion of molecules”,  “pain” and “activation of C-fibers”,  are rigid
designators.23 Those identity sentences are necessarily true, that is, true in all possible worlds
23 Kripke says: “it should be clear from the previous discussion that ‘pain’ is a rigid designator of the type, or
phenomenon, it designates: if something is a pain it is essentially so, and it seems absurd to suppose that
pain could have been some phenomenon other than the one it  is.  The same holds for the term ‘C-fiber
stimulation’, provided that ‘C-fibers’ is a rigid designator, as I will suppose here” (Kripke, 1980, p. 149)
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where the referred objects exist. To have it otherwise would be to have a logically impossible
world.  However,  these  sentences  exhibit  an  “illusory  contingency”,  that  means,  it  seems
coherent  to  question their  truth.  They  are  conceivably false,  despite  the  analysis  of  their
semantic behavior.
The illusion of contingency can be successfully explained away in the heat case
but not in the pain case. It is possible to conceive a world where there is heat without the
motion of molecules. The illusion arises because when we refer to heat, we can refer to the
objective phenomena which exists independently of our sensations of it. What is contingent is
that  we  feel the  sensation  of  heat  when  there  is  heat.  As  Levine  (1983)  says,  the  real
contingent  sentence involving heat  and the motion of  molecules  is:  “the phenomenon we
experience through the sensations of warmth and cold, which is responsible for the expansion
and contraction of mercury in thermometers, which causes some gases to rise and other to
sink, etc., is the motion of molecules” (Levine, 1983, p. 355).
The same would apply to psychophysical identities, such as “pain is the activation
of C-fibers”. Prima facie, it would seem possible to conceive of pain as occurring without the
activation  of  C-fibers  in  another  world.  However,  if  that  happened,  that  is,  if  we  could
imagine pain without the activation of C-fibers, or imagine C-fibers without the occurrence of
pain, then there would be no phenomena left to refer to.
In the case of heat, it is possible to refer either to “heat” or to the “sensation of
heat”, and the reference would be different. But in the latter case, “pain” and “the sensation of
pain” refer to the same object. As Kripke says “there is no ‘appearance’ beyond the mental
phenomena itself” (Kripke, 1980, p. 154). To put it more sharply, there is no way for pain to
occur without being felt as pain. So, the illusory contingency cannot be explained away in the
case of psycho-physical identification. If the sentence “pain is the activation of C-fibers” is
not  necessarily  true,  then  it  must  be  false.  To Kripke,  these  considerations  show  that
materialism is false.
Levine  (1983)  emphasizes  the  epistemological  consequences  for  materialism,
when Kripke’s considerations are accepted. He argues for a weaker claim: rather than being
false,  as  Kripke  claims,  by  being  conceivably  false/not  necessarily  true,  “psychophysical
identity sentences leave a significant explanatory gap, and as a corollary, that we don’t have
any way of determining exactly which psycho-physical identity statements are true” (Levine,
1983,  p.  354).  Levine  says  that  besides  being  apparently  contingent,  there  is  another
difference between general theoretical and psychophysical identities which actually explains
the illusion of contingency. According to him, whereas the general theoretical identities are
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fully explanatory, psychophysical identities are not. To the first kind of identities, to describe
their causal role is enough: what it causes and how it is caused. So in the case of heat, it
causes the expansion of some gases, for example, and is caused by the motion of molecules.
However, in the case of psychophysical identities, the causal aspects are not enough, because
a  causal  description leaves  out  the crucial  aspect  of  the phenomenon of  pain,  that  is,  its
phenomenal character. These considerations lead to problems not only to mind-brain identity
theory,  but  to  any  theory  that  aims  to  relate  the  mental  to  the  physical,  for  example,
Functionalism. Any materialist description will fail to capture the phenomenal dimension of
experience. In fact, for the causal role to be fulfilled does not even imply in the having of an
experience (as in the China argument). This is the explanatory gap: the impression left by
materialistic  descriptions  that  there is  something left  off the explanation. As Levine says,
“there is more to pain than its causal role, there is its qualitative character, how it feels; and
what is left unexplained by the discover of C-fiber firing is  why pain should feel the way it
does” (Levine, 1983, p. 357, author’s emphasis). So, the connection between material events
and  the  phenomenal  aspects  of  mental  events  is  not  obvious,  not  fully  explanatory  nor
intelligible and, and if it is to hold, as materialists suppose, it needs to be further explained.24
As we can  see,  all  major  views  in  philosophy of  mind take  as  a  background
assumption the explanatory goal of reduction from mental to physical states. They vary in the
degree of the possible achievement of this goal, but all discussions take place against the ideal
that  the only acceptable explanation to close  the gap is  that  the mental  is  reduced to the
physical.  The  underlying  assumption  is  a  reductivist  framework:  that  only  legitimate
explanations are the ones located at the basic level of Physics and that those explanations are
not subject to any epistemic gaps. Reduction is assumed as the ultimate explanatory goal,
when in fact, it has hardly ever been accomplished in the history of science, as discussed in
the next section. Stemming from this unreal explanatory expectation, there arises the view that
mental phenomena are unique in its irreducibility, being a sort of mysterious or unaccountable
phenomena.
I finish this review section by claiming that  the hard problem is stubborn and
resembles  a  sort  of  obsession  instead  of  an  actual  problem.  Unless  there  is  a  complete
reductive relation that explains away the illusion of contingency, it will be insisted that there
is something left out of explanation. In fact, not even a complete scientific account would
24 There have been many moderate attempts that wish to preserve aspects from materialism at the same time as
allowing for the peculiarity of mental phenomena, such as some kinds of non-reductive materialism and
emergentism. I will not discuss them in detail here, but they exhibit the same flaws as the original views, that
is, that there is something “left off” the explanation.
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provide  immunity  to  the  explanatory  gap  and,  defined  this  way,  the  hard  problem  of
consciousness is actually impossible to be naturalistically solved.
Attendance to the history of science should teach both sides of the debate. It is not
the case that reductions are at all common in science. In fact, reductions are rare and, usually,
not a straightforward matter. The fact that the sciences do not work by reduction does not
render its methods and entities unexplainable, or in possession of mysterious properties. So
the source of a supposedly unique puzzlement about consciousness lies somewhere else. As
we will see, it lies in a distorted image of experience that has defined research about mind.
3.2. Philosophy of science
What underlies all the major views is the shared assumption that “intertheoretic
reduction is the norm in the natural sciences, and this assumption motivates both reductionism
and the idea that the explanatory gap poses a unique and disturbing problem” (Horst, 2007, p.
23). Regardless of their disagreements on the outcomes of reductionist projects, the majority
of views in philosophy of mind nevertheless agree that the only intelligible and acceptable
explanation is for psychology to be reduced to a more basic science. Unless a reduction is
carried out successfully, psychological phenomena are regarded as not sufficiently legitimate
scientific phenomena.
One  additional  feature  of  the  very  project  of  naturalizing  consciousness  and
intentionality seems to imply that mental features cannot be in principle natural, or are not
natural enough, and are so in need of being reduced to something more basic. This sense of
“natural”  that  is  required  for  an  explanation  to  be  considered  scientifically  acceptable  is
overly  restricted.  Only  resources  from  a  basic,  lower-level  science,  such  as  Physics,
Chemistry, or Neurobiology even (by being a middle step to the full reduction to Physics)
could provide the right natural account for psychological phenomena. That does not resonate
well with current philosophy of science.
One field that offers interesting insights for various aspects of the problems at
issue here is Biology. Biology seems to defy most formal models of explanation. Biological
phenomena can range from millions of years to few seconds in a time scale and thematize a
single organelle or  a whole biome. Very often,  as in the celebrated case of the gene (see
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below), there is complex entanglement within the levels of explanation that cannot be neatly
captured  by  traditional  theories  in  philosophy  of  science.  Traditional  theories  invoked
mechanistic explanations and/or generalization of laws, according to which a phenomenon
can  be  explained  in  terms  of  decomposing and  localizing  its  parts  and establishing  their
functioning in terms of general laws. However, the peculiarity of biological phenomena led to
the augmenting of models of scientific explanation, turning away from those models in favor
of more nuanced ones.
For example, after the discovery of the DNA molecules (Watson and Crick, 1953),
the  widespread  expectation  was  that  Molecular  Biology  would  soon  provide  a  reductive
explanation of the functioning of organisms in terms of entities and functional structures in
the  cell.  The  combined  efforts  of  physicists,  chemists  and  biologists  made  possible  the
discovery  of  the  mechanisms  responsible  for  genetic  inheritance,  known  since  Mendel’s
research. In theory,  it  would be possible for Classical  Genetics  and even other  biological
fields,  for  example,  Evolution  and  Developmental  theories,  to  be  reduced  to  molecular
mechanisms.  However, the quick discovery of growing complexity on how genes work cast
significant doubts upon whether DNA alone could be responsible for the entirety of biological
processes. Discovery of overlapping genes, split genes and alternative splicing indicated that
there was no direct mapping from the traits studies by classical genetics to the biochemical
mechanisms of DNA.
It has also become clearer that explanation in terms of derivation from laws of
nature,  as  the  philosophy  of  science  modeled  by  physics  expected,  was  not  suitable  for
biological  phenomena.  Biological  phenomena  cannot  be  accommodated  within  the  more
traditional models of Physics that involved generalization and natural laws, for its phenomena
are very different from those of Physics. The dynamism and the influence that contingent
factors  put  upon biological  phenomena make it  very  difficult  for  generalizations  to  hold.
Biological explanations  admit exceptions, are limited to certain specific time and space and
do not support counterfactuals (that is, changing a variable does not necessarily change the
outcome of the process). The failure of the traditional models for Biology reinforced the need
for  developing  more  nuanced  and  complex  models  for  scientific  explanation.  Many
researchers suggested that the understanding of biological models demanded an approach that
integrates different working properties and entities (often at different levels) that operate in
different  times  (Darden,  2005).  As  argued  in  what  follows,  that  does  not  undermine
naturalistic  attempts  to  understand  biological  phenomena.  Taking  those  complexities  as
problematic only harms those who hold too strict constraints for explanation in science.
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The existence  of  gaps  in  other  fields  should  tranquilize  philosophers  of  mind
because  explanatory  gaps  are,  in  fact,  the  norm  in  the  sciences.  The  point  is  that  “if
reducibility  is  a  criterion  for  ontological  legitimacy,  it  is  not  only  intentionality  and
phenomenality  that  are  threatened,  but  phenomena  of  other  sciences  as  well,  such  as
organisms, species, metabolic processes and molecules” (Horst, 2007, p. 80), which would
then turn out to be equally ontologically suspicious as mental terms are. That does not entail
that biological concepts are illegitimate or stem from an illusion.
Let us consider again the case of Molecular Biology. Following the discovery of
the  DNA molecule,  attention  turned  away  from developmental,  historical  and  ecological
relations between organisms and environment because genes were considered to be the self-
reproducing unit that determines a particular trait in an organism. According to a widespread
expectation expressed by the Molecular Biology community,  the clarification of the DNA
mechanisms would allow one, by having a “large enough computer” and the DNA sequence
of an organism, to “compute” the organism. However,  as stated by Lewontin, “organisms
don’t  even  compute  themselves  from their  own  DNA”  (quoted  by  Callebaut,  1993).  An
organism is, rather, and this is a fundamental point, a “consequence of the unique interaction
between what it has inherited and the environment in which it is developing (…) which is
even more complex because  the environment  is  itself  changed in the consequence of  the
development of the organism (Lewontin, as interviewed by Callebaut, 1993). It turns out that
genes do not actually solely determine any of the traits an organisms exhibits: “every trait is a
product  of  a  combination  of  genetic  inheritance  and  environmental  influence  through
development” (Horst, 2007, p. 52, emphasis added).
Then, what the developments in Biology require for adequately understanding the
complexity of intertwining processes of different levels is to acknowledge the organism as a
whole  in  its  relation  to  its  environmental  niche:  “both  the  theory  of  evolution  and
developmental biology require us to view living organisms historically (over evolutionary and
developmental time frames) and as systems that are open to their environments. (…)” (Horst,
2007, p. 52). This way of putting things makes a significant difference on the issues I discuss
here.  I  have only quickly described how the gene cannot be understood as the biological
mechanistic unit, and I have taken this specific example for its relevance in showing both that
expectations  for  scientific  reduction  are  usually  wrong  and  that  organisms  need  to  be
understood as  a  whole in  the dynamic interactions  they develop with their environmental
niches.
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The goal of achieving a complete reduction from special to more basic sciences
has been mostly abandoned because it  is  simply not feasible. Full reduction has not been
carried out for any special  science,  and it  does not seem very likely to be carried out for
psychology.  But  that  does  not  mean  that  psychological  phenomena  cannot  be  given  a
(relaxed) naturalistic account.  As Horst puts it, “to hold the sciences of the mind to such a
standard would be to hold them to a much higher standard than we hold the other special
sciences” (Horst, 2007, p. 71).
3.3 The disunity of science
In fact, it is to the disunity of science that researchers have more recently turned
attention. The increasing complexity of methods and approaches not only in life sciences, but
in  other  domains  as  well,  including  Physics,  has  transformed  the  principles  that  guide
scientific research. Instead of the traditional claim of providing a logical structure of science,
scientific  explanations  are  currently  understood  in  terms  of  their  disunity.  Cat  (2017)
summarizes the new attitude:
against  essentialism,  there  is  always  a  plurality  of  classifications  of  reality  into
kinds; against reductionism, there exists equal reality and causal efficacy of systems
at different levels of description, that is,  the microlevel is not causally complete,
leaving room for downward causation; and against epistemological monism, there is
no single methodology that supports a single criterion of scientificity, nor a universal
domain of its applicability, only a plurality of epistemic and non-epistemic virtues
(Cat, 2017).
Recent  philosophy of  science  shows a  very different  picture  of  how the  special  sciences
function and how they are related to other scientific fields. At least since the 1970’s, “the
prevailing view is that the special sciences are autonomous and not in need of vindication by
proving  their  reducibility  to  physics”  (Horst,  2007,  p.  47).  The  axiomatic,  derivative  or
deductive model that was supposed to have been successfully applied from Classical Physics
to other fields is inconsistent with how scientific disciplines have evolved and how they relate
to each other. The take away message is that “if post-reductionist philosophy of science has it
right, then philosophers of mind need to do some fundamental rethinking” (Horst, 2007, p. 6).
Many might rush to think that these shortcomings of traditional views on science
undermine their epistemological relevance and significance. There is fear that without some
sort of reduction, epistemic relativism gains force (as in the cartesian anxiety, referred to in
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chapter 1, and identified by Varela et al., 1991). In fact, the problem is exactly the opposite: to
assume that  it  is  possible  to  develop  a  view that  is  completely  neutral  and  objective,  a
supposed view “from nowhere”. Such a view is indeed not only a view, but a view that takes
one very specific perspective: one which assumes that it is possible to disembody human and
living being activities.  In  a  more  general  sense,  the problem is  to  suppose  that  scientific
explanations and theories can unequivocally capture essential properties of the world without
any influence of the pragmatic contexts in and for which scientific theories are developed for.
One fundamental caveat, then, depends on the acknowledgment that the pragmatic
aspects of science do not undermine its cognitive value. It is not the case that science is just a
set of beliefs with no epistemic importance. Even with the epistemological limitations I am
discussing here, specially in relation to the unrealistic expectations of complete neutrality and
objectivity, the fact is that scientific theories are still the best we have for an understanding of
the world. Being fallible and dependent on a variety of pragmatic aspects does not entail that
it is relativistic or not aiming for truth. Actually, I emphasize it again, it is thinking otherwise
that prevents an adequate understanding of natural phenomena, as the case for phenomenality
informs  us.  To  think otherwise is  to  posit  aprioristic  constraints  that  go  against  the  very
principle  of  methodological  naturalism,  according  to  which  philosophy  and  the  sciences
reciprocally inform each other. The application of extrascientific normative standards of unity
or reducibility is what contrasts with properly naturalistic criteria in consonance with real
scientific practices. The upshot is that, “insofar as we want our understanding of the mind to
be informed by the best  understanding of  the sciences  available today,  we need to move
beyond the reductionist view of science to do so” (Horst, 2007, p. 62).
So, how mental phenomena are supposed to be treated within science? In contrast
with a naturalism that allows only for the strict scientificist tools and methods of Physics to
play a legitimate role in explanation, “to fully understand certain features of the natural world
– features that include our own understanding of our own human practices and activities –
requires  synthesizing  findings  from,  inter  alia,  anthropology,  developmental  psychology,
comparative psychology, cognitive archaeology and neuroscience” (Hutto, forthcoming). The
challenge,  in  understanding  the  phenomenal  aspects  of  experience,  requires  taking  the
varieties of scientific fields in a complementary, non-competing way (Hutto, forthcoming).
The terms of the specific debate of mental phenomena need to be rethought in order to avoid
misconceptions.  So,  instead  of  disavowing  the  importance  of  philosophical  reflection,  an
adequate understanding of mental  phenomena is  in need of it.  Very often,  especially in a
naturalistic framework, philosophical reflection is considered to be somewhat secondary, as
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an aid for scientists, who do the real explanatory work, that of establishing (or discovering)
“the theories, models, findings, observations, experiments” (Rosenberg, 2018, p. 4). As the
more recent philosophy of science has showed, those theories, models and so on, are not held
without a great deal of background presuppositions. This lesson applies to ordinary objects,
and it is critical for philosophical concepts such as phenomenality, to which I now turn to, in
chapter 4.
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4. WHAT IT IS LIKE TO BE AN ENACTIVIST
As discussed throughout this thesis, radical enactivism’s main tenets are its anti-
representationalism about basic cognition, that is, that not all cognitive activity is necessarily
dependent on contentful representations, and the strong embodiment thesis, that is, the idea
that  cognition  is  constituted  and  shaped  by  the  patterns  of  interaction  of  an  organism,
dependent both on biological aspects and (in some cases) involvement with cultural and social
content-involving  practices.  Based  on  these  two  tenets,  (radical)  Enactivism  then
distinguishes  between  two  kinds  of  cognition,  basic  contentless  cognition  and  content-
involving cognition. Basic, contentless capacities are such that organisms are able to act on
the  world,  but  without  the  need  of  representing  it  in  semantic  ways.  The  capacity  of
representing  the  world  in  truth-functional  ways  is  to  be  considered  as  an  achievement,
dependent  on the establishment  of  shared  and public  practices,  on  which  basic  cognition
scaffolds.  In sum, cognitive systems do not pick up or  take in (or register,  or encode, or
retrieve,  as there are many variants of this assumption) any informational contents simply
because “there are no informational contents out there in the world, independent of system, to
pick up and take in” (Hutto and Myin, 2014, p. 252).
As  discussed  before,  Enactivism  takes  seriously  the  claim  that  there  is  no
ontological distinction between mind and body and, more specifically, that there is no special
entity or property in a living system that marks a difference from what is mental or cognitive
and what it is not. Instead of being in need of a reduction to a more basic level, property or
entity, enactivists take some capacities to be biologically basic and spanning throughout the
whole spectrum of living organisms. Seemingly disparate organisms, such as bacteria  and
human beings, are seen as sharing some features that add up to cognition concerning their
biological  relation to the environment.  One shared feature is  the directed behavior  to the
environment that constitutes a basic autonomy. The basic autonomy unfolds within a dynamic
88
and  ever  changing  context,  with  which  organisms  exchange  matter  and  energy.  Some
enactivist  researchers  have  emphasized  the  basic  situation  of  living  organisms  as  in
permanently precarious and fragile, where organisms need to find an optimal self-regulatory
situation (Di Paolo et  al.,  2017).  The dynamic relation with the environment  requires  the
development of flexible and adaptive behaviors in order to achieve systemic cohesion and
self-preservation. That way of putting things is captured by the notion of autopoiesis, one of
the  bases  for  understanding  the  continuities  between  mind,  life  and  experience.  The
suggestion is that it  would be possible to provide a different starting point for explaining
phenomenality and intentionality in terms of these basic capacities. The traditional aim of
naturalizing mentality by forcefully assigning a place for it in the natural world is misguided.
The  key  point  for  an  enactive  perspective  is  to  take  the  dynamical  character  of  living
organisms as fundamental, instead of taking living organisms as mechanistic, predefined and
static entities which irreflectively respond to physical causes. There is no way to overstate the
importance of taking the nature of livings systems as non-mechanistic entities The idea is to
avoid the tempting tendency to distinguish between mental and physical processes that lead
directly  into  the  epistemological  and  explanatory  traps  of  asking  how can  mere  physical
systems feel like something.
But then, how can problems concerning phenomenality be satisfactorily answered
in a radical  enactivist account? Are its antirepresentationalism and its  strong adherence to
embodiment sufficient to dismiss the pull of the hard problem of consciousness? It is possible
that even though some of the issues can be in fact left behind in an enactivist framework,
there is still room for asking the hard problems of consciousness. That might be due to the
fact that, usually, characterizing of the notion of experience incurs in a very narrow-minded or
theory-laden  description  of  it.  The  way  problems  about  consciousness  are  traditionally
formulated are not neutral or naive, because they presuppose certain views about experience
and  its  objects.  Too much attention  has  been  given  to  the  ways  philosophers  have  been
considering the mind-body problem: by trying to isolate properties of experience, it has been
often the case that  the notion of  experience at  debate is  formulated through a process of
reification,  that  is,  a  process  of  taking abstracted  features  of  experience to  be the  causes
themselves of cognitive capacities.
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4.1 REC’s proposal
We have so far considered reasons not to expect that a full reduction from both
psychological  states  and  semantic  contents  to  physical  states  is  going  to  be  successfully
carried out. Does this result prevent the possibility of developing a naturalistic account for
mind and cognition? Is  there a way to deal  with the hard problem without abandoning a
naturalistic, scientific account for mind?
The question of where does phenomenality fit in the enactivist story is pressing.
Hutto and Myin (2013, ch. 8) have claimed that, differently from other enactivists, to solve
the hard problems of consciousness it is not enough to extend the supervenience basis of mind
to  include  the  rest  of  the  body  and  the  environment.  As  Prinz  (2006)  have  put,  that
phenomenality is associated with bodies and environment is as baffling as it being a function
of the brain. So, an externalist basis is not enough to solve the hard problem of consciousness;
an externalist  view would be subject  to the same shortcomings as the more neurocentrist
positions, that is, the problem of intelligibly relating mental with physical states. Hutto and
Myin claim that it is possible, or at least an “open question”, that phenomenality is brain-
bounded.
Hutto and Myin discuss metaphysical and epistemic issues. While it is (possibly)
the case that internal neural states are sufficient for phenomenality (at least some level of it),
explaining the epistemic gap necessarily involves the strategy of “going wide”, that is, the
appeal  to  external  explanatory  resources.  Hutto  and  Myin  claim  that  it  is  possible  for
phenomenality to happen only in narrow terms, that is, in terms of the brain alone. However,
that would allow for a limited account of phenomenality: “focusing entirely on internal brain-
bound  activity  may  be  appropriate  if  one  is  interested  only  in  producing  or  replicating
phenomenality by limited or minimal means” (Hutto and Myin, 2013, p. 163). If, however,
“we want to understand the place of phenomenality in nature – how it originally came to be,
and why it has the features it has – we are likewise forced to widen our scope” (Hutto and
Myin, 2013, p. 163).
What they argue for is the possibility that it is possible to have some sort of basic
phenomenality to occur without the need of external factors. That is evidenced in arguments
such as swamp men, direct neural manipulations of brains in vats and dreaming, for example.
Those arguments indicate that it would be possible for phenomenality to happen without a
proper or normal interaction with the environment. However, they also point out that these
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sorts of cases would allow only for a very limited phenomenality. So, even if it is possible that
subjects in these conditions can indeed experience phenomenality, it is not clear what kind of
experience they would have and how it would compare with regular experiences. For, if REC
is  correct,  there is  no distinctive property  or  entity  to  guarantee  or  evaluate sameness  or
difference in experiences (the notion of content, for example, is not available to play such a
role). Since REC takes experiences as the particular and dynamics interactions over time and
space of subjects and the environment, it  would be specially difficult to adequately assess
those experiences.
In any case, it is fundamental to reject the view according to which phenomenality
involves any other sorts of special properties, such as ineffability, for example.  Famously,
Dennett (1991) has questioned the coherence of the notion of qualia, as the properties that
conscious experiences possess which are supposed to account for their qualitative aspects.
According to him, the notion of qualia, traditionally characterized as properties of experience
being ineffable, intrinsic, private and directly or immediately apprehensible does not refer to
any phenomena at all. It is important to emphasize that Dennett (as do the enactivists) does
not  deny  that  experiences  are  felt  as  such  by  the  subjects,  or  that  experiences  can  have
properties, but rather, that experiences exhibit those specific properties. It is the attribution of
those specific properties to experience that make them impossible to be intelligibly explained.
The mistake assumed in many debates about experience is to presume “that we can isolate
qualia from everything else that is going on” (Dennett, 1991, p. 383). Talking about qualia,
raw feels, phenomenal, subjective and qualitative properties of experience are all misleading
formulations that entail the idea that experience is specially difficult to understand because of
those  properties.  Thinking  about  experience  in  terms of  its  supposed  properties  of  being
ineffable, intrinsic, private and directly and immediately apprehensible  is elusive for those
notions, when pushed to the limits, make no actual sense.  The central issue is the supposed
need to keep a core that guarantees some sameness of experience throughout time or change
of subjects. But since this core is fully private and ineffable, it cannot be addressed in any
third-person or objective perspective.  Familiar skeptic scenarios of interpersonal and even
intrapersonal experience arise when experience is assigned those properties. For example, it
makes it coherent to ask the question of how do one knows whether her and another subject
have the same color experience. There is a (philosophical) need of establishing a core that
remains more or less the same so it would enable communication.  In the case of REC, as
discussed before, there is nothing other than the dynamic patterns of interaction in explaining
91
cognition, including phenomenality, even though it is possible that those patterns are, for at
least some limited cases or aspects of phenomenality, fully brain-bounded.
REC  proponents,  in  fact,  take  experience  to  be  strictly  identical  to  those
interactive, organism-involving patterns. Note that the strict identity of experience is not with
brain states only, as the older identity-theory held. It is instead an embodied identity theory, in
which experiences are identical to bodily patterns. According to this idea, what is needed to
explain away explanatory gaps is why we should believe that identity, and not why not the
identity holds. The difference between usual identities and psychophysical identities is that
experience can be lived in, “encountered in” different ways: “it can be enacted, or embodied,
by the subject of the experience, but it can also be encountered objectively, for example, when
it is observed by another subject” (Myin and Zahnoun, 2018). One of the baffling issues of
problem  of  phenomenality  is  that  brain  and  phenomenal  properties  are  nothing  alike.
According to Myin and Zahnoun, an embodied identity theory that identifies experience and
bodily  patterns  would  fare  better  in  explaining  the  explanatory  gap.  Particular  bodily
experiences and organismic activities are perspectival, subjective and affect-laden and would,
then, be of a better fit for identity (Myin and Zahnoun, 2018).
As  to  the  supposedly  objective  part  of  the  identity,  it  takes  the  further
acknowledgment that one descriptive, neutral or objective stance is also an experience. As
indicated  before,  an  objective  description  does  not  give  a  fully  transparent  access  to  the
properties of the phenomena. This is especially so when the very notion of experience and its
varieties  are  at  issue.  REC  proponents  embrace  that  experience  can  be  enacted  through
different means, such as in a lived, first-hand experience or in a descriptive or third-hand
observation way, which make them still limited in providing insight and that, definitely, do
not provide the transparent descriptions that is sometimes expected.
It  is  also  possible,  within  that  perspective,  to  dismiss  the  multiple  realization
argument, as discussed before, the standard objection to identity theories. To recall, multiple
realization arguments object to identity theories in terms of the possibility of mental types
being realized in different physical substracts. So, pain is a mental type that can be multiply
realized in diverse systems, instead of the activation of  C-fibers,  which is  specific of  the
human brain. However, as Myin and Zahnoun argue, “the idea that one and the same type can
actually  be shared by different creatures  is  (...)  the expression of  a  specific  metaphysical
assumption, namely the assumption that the occurrence of a certain mental event needs to be
ontologically understood in relation to types” (Myin and Zahnoun, 2018). In the view they
present, types should not be reified as individual things on their own, in a non-spatiotemporal
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existence. Types would be better thought of as the categories accepted by a certain community
and structured by specific needs to answer to specific purposes.
So, REC emphasizes the importance of setting realistic expectations concerning
explanations of  phenomenality.  The standard goal  of  providing systematic and intelligible
connections  between  first-person  and  third-person  data,  that  is,  phenomenal  and  physical
processes,  is,  in  fact,  unreachable  and  arises  from misleading  assumptions.  In  sum,  hard
problems could be avoided by recognizing the distinctive epistemological aspects of different
modes of experience, through first, personal and embodied forms or third-person, oriented
towards objectivity but never fully neutral stances.
4.2 Thinking about experience
I am aware that the position described above might not be completely satisfactory,
even for those who are open to enactivist considerations. In addition to requiring some deep
reconceivings of many and diverse issues in an active and effortful way, it still can leave room
for the same questions to arise over and over again. In this section I will briefly discuss how
the stubborn and obsessive reappearance of hard problems can have its origins in the standard
ways experience and cognitive activities are conceived. Dualistic intuitions, such as the idea
that it is not possible to explain consciousness in physical terms, seem to be very widespread,
but there are some reasons to consider them not to be as universal or immediate as thought.
For example, Chalmers claims that  “it is easy to get ordinary people to express puzzlement
about  how consciousness  could  be  explained  in  terms  of  brain  processes,  and  there  is  a
significant body of psychological data on the ‘intuitive dualist’s judgments of both children
and adults’” (Chalmers, 2018, p. 7). However those dualistic intuitions are, in line with an
enactivist take, not actually natural, but rather a result of the development of the content-
involving, later arriving activities that REC proposes.
Perhaps  less  influentially,  some  researchers  have  emphasized  the  more
conventional  aspects  of  our  cognitive  lives,  and  how  those  derive  from aspects  such  as
involvement  in  cultural  practices.  The  very  conception of  mentality  might  be  a  result  of
inherited  cultural  practices.  Eliminativists,  for  example,  who  have  been  skeptical  of  the
adequacy  of  folk  psychology as  an  empirical  theory,  have  emphasized  how introspective
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judgments  can  be  false,  or  at  least,  that  they  do  not  show  any  special  transparency  or
accessibility status of the subject. For example, it can be
just an instance of an acquired habit of conceptual response to one’s internal states,
and the integrity of any particular response is always contingent on the integrity of
the  acquired  conceptual  framework  (theory)  in  which  the  response  is  framed.
Accordingly, one’s introspective certainty that one’s mind is the seat of beliefs and
desires may be as badly misplaced as was the classical man’s visual certainty that
the star-flecked sphere of the heavens turns daily (Churchland, 1981, p. 70).
Churchland  argues  that  a  wide  variety  of  cognitive  aspects such  as  mental
illnesses, dreams, memory, learning and, importantly, consciousness, are either not adequately
addressed or even completely ignored by folk psychology. Material  eliminativists, such as
Churchland, claims that the folk psychology that is spelled out in terms of intentional realism
is wrong because it is not vindicated within a (completed) neuroscience. Even so, he argues
that  it  is  possible  for  a  better  folk  psychology  theory  to  be  developed,  in  terms  of
neuroscience. But that is precisely one of the problematic issues: to assume that psychological
categories  are  in  need  to  be  vindicated  by  strict  natural  sciences  to  be  legitimate.  The
enactivist take is that sociocultural, collective and shared practices
introduce something genuinely new and qualitatively distinct into the cognitive mix.
Through  their  acquaintance  with  culture,  some  cognitive  creatures  acquire  the
capacity to think about the world in wholly new ways. Through mastering what are
them novel practices, they become capable of new forms of thinking of a unique
kind (Hutto and Myin, 2017, p. 138).
Social  collective  forms  of  collaboration  provide  a  stabilization  through
collaborative practices that yield in ways that make the organism’s engagement with their
environment distinct. As it was indicated before, REC’s rejection of representational views for
cognition is  dependent  on the acknowledgment  that  intentional  representation,  that  is,  the
capacity of referring to aspects and of thinking about the world in truth-functional ways, is
one sort of cognitive capacity, and as fruitful and impressive it is, it is not a biologically basic
activity, but rather it  flourishes in the presence of the adequate conditions. Again,  human
experience  is  impressively  rich,  but  some  of  its  features  “belong  only  to  enculturated,
scaffolded  minds  that  are  built  atop  of  them”  (Hutto  and  Myin,  2013,  p.  ix).  And
fundamentally, despite its complexity, there is nothing non-naturalistic about such a story.
It is quite possible that the more traditional ways in which we are compelled to
think about our own experiences bring in and actually create the very problems we struggle to
understand.  In  fact,  there  are  reasons  that  suggest  that  some cognitive  capacities  can  be
significantly misunderstood when framed in representational terms. For example, the usual
formulation of the hard problem of conscious experience is in terms of special properties that
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experiences possess. For example, the usual talk and reflection of the “redness of red” and
expressions alike already shows the reification processes I would like to call attention to. As
pointed out by some enactivists, in their ordinary daily life, people do not normally talk about
those abstract properties. They seem to only arise in some specific, philosophical contexts.
The usual way according to which the question is formulated encourages a “reification of
properties of experiences, in an “act-object” view of perceptual experience” (Godfrey-Smith,
2019).
Not attending to this leads us to feeding the tendency of reification, that is, the
tendency “to take a characteristic of an ongoing process for the source of that process (van
Dijk, 2016, p. 994). Scientific/cognitive psychology is deeply committed to reification as the
ontological  structure  of  cognitive processes.  Reification empties  the  dynamical  aspects  of
cognitive processes and activities by abstracting properties that are then posited as the real
causal responsibles of the cognitive capacity at issue, and taken to be a pre-existing source of
that process. The overall process of reification can be described in three steps: abstraction,
inversion and causation (van Dijk, 2016, p. 995). In the step of abstraction, it is possible to
abstract  form  a  variety  of  experiences,  a  common  feature  that  underlines  all  of  them.
Abstraction,  obviously,  is  not  necessarily  a  problem.  In  fact,  abstraction  is  an  important
cognitive capacity. The important point is to avoid granting the abstracted properties “any
metaphysical significance beyond what they help describe and bring forth (van Dijk, 2016, p.
995). Then, in the next step, the relation of “the ongoing concrete situations that showed this
feature and the feature itself is  inverted” (p. 995): “the abstract property is taken to be (…)
ontologically  prior  to  any  behavioral  manifestation  and,  therefore,  prior  to  any  human
activity”  (van  Dijk,  2016,  p.  995).  Finally,  that  feature  is  taken  to  be  not  only  as  an
ontologically more basic property, but in fact, as the causal source of the cognitive behavior or
capacity. The famous motto of enactivists’ “laying down a path in walking” illustrates the
issue:
a beaten track, say through a grassy field, is carved out of the surroundings as people
walk. But in thus laying down the path, the path is a continuous outcome that also
constrains other people’s walking. It would be an obvious mistake to conceptualize
the path as a pre-existing thing that causes people to walk there (van Dijk, 2016, p.
995, author’s emphasis).
Representationalism in general  is faulty in this very same way: “an attempt to
break with representationalism (...) requires a break with [the] ontological  commitment to
look  for  explanation  beyond  human  involvement  and  the  dynamics  of  each  particular
situation” (van Dijk, 2016, p. 993). This results then in the establishment of a misleading
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account of cognitive capacities, in which those internal entities turn to have explanatory roles.
Psychological  behaviorist  Skinner  (1977)  puts  the  issue  as,  due  to  the  complexity  and
multitude of experiences, the behavior that is the real cause of cognitive life is very hard to be
observed:  “because  controlling  circumstances  which  lie  in  an  organism’s  history  of
reinforcement are obscure, the mental surrogate gets its chance.” (Skinner, 1977, p. 4). That is
not only damaging for cognitive science itself, but also for the understanding of experience in
general, because it takes for granted the idea that there is an underlying independent structure
that can be isolated from the dynamical and unique flow of practices and behaviors. In fact, as
discussed  earlier,  the  reification  processes  distorts  the  cognitive capacities  at  issue,  in  an
attempt to disembody it.
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5. FINAL REMARKS
This  thesis  had  the  aim  of  approaching  the  debate  about  consciousness  and
phenomenality in a way that tries to avoid the problems associated with the traditional debate
in  which materialist  and  dualist  theories  both  face  insuperable  shortcomings.  It  has  been
argued that a radically enactive approach is a productive venue for leaving some stalemates
behind.  Chapter  1  provided an initial  framework of  the origins of  enactivism and how it
should be understood. As I take it, the main lesson from radical enactivist approaches is that
there is nothing over and above the patterns of interactions with which an organism engages
to the world through its body.  I hope to have shown how Enactivism can be understood in
thoroughly  naturalistic  terms  in  the  relevant  ontological  and  methodological  senses.  All
elements involved in cognition are natural processes understood in a metaphysically monist
inventory  which  needs  to  be,  nevertheless,  addressed  by  a  variety  of  interdisciplinary
pluralistic scientific efforts, for there is no epistemologically absolute and privileged method.
Basic, contentless and nonrepresentational activities are transformed by the arising of public
and  social  practices,  in  what  allows  for  content-involving  cognition,  but  it  is  a  “special
achievement” (Hutto and Myin, 2017, p. 90), notably exhibited by humans. The paradigmatic
cognitive ability of linguistic judgment in terms of truth conditions is such an achievement.
This kind of contentful cognition depends on the “development, maintenance and stabilization
of  practices  involving  the  use  of  public  artifacts”  (Hutto  and  Myin,  2017,  p.  145).  In  a
nutshell, content is not a naturally basic notion, that is, “it doesn’t exist independently from
and  prior  to  the  existence  of  certain  social  practices”  (Hutto  and  Myin,  2017,  p.  xv).
Accordingly, it is unlikely that the story can be told as a linear unfolding. It is a very complex
story to tell,  but it  should be in principle possible to offer a REC account for any of the
cognitive capacities living beings perform.  In an enactivist view, one key aspect to explain
mentality  lies  in  the  diverse  and  flexible  naturalistic  resources.  Whereas  explanatory
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naturalism “seek[s]  to  naturalize content by using only the resources  of  the hard,  natural
sciences  (causation,  informational  covariance,  biological  functionality)  and  nothing more”
(Hutto and Myin, 2017, p. 125), that is, a restricted naturalism, a relaxed naturalism should be
pursued  instead.  Not  only  Cognitive  Neuroscience,  Biology  and  Physics,  but  also,  other
disciplines  such  as  Cognitive Archaeology,  Anthropology and  Developmental  Psychology,
have an important role to play in understanding content and its natural origins. Thus, with the
appeal to those resources, it would be “possible, in principle, to explain the origins of content-
involving cognition in a scientifically respectable” (Hutto and Myin, 2017, p. 122) in a way
that does not give rise to gaps and hard problems.
Despite the initial strangeness thinking about the environment, the body and its
cultural  and  biological  history  as  materially  constituting  cognition  might  generate,  what
should be clear is that there is absolutely nothing magical, mysterious, mystical, supernatural
or in principle unexplainable within the (radical) enactivist view. Chapter 2 argued that the
projects of naturalization of mental phenomena in terms of informational representation are
limited,  and need to  be complemented by resources  other  than  the ones  strict  naturalism
offers.  Chapter  3  discussed  the principled challenges  that  have been repeatedly stated  by
philosophers, when they argue that the resources it uses to explain mental phenomena go way
beyond the discovery of the mechanical parts that constitutes its machinery. However, those
very philosophers also sometimes make the mistake of assuming that the shortcomings of
reductive materialism entail some sort of dualism.  Chapter 3 then provided reasons to relax
the explanatory demands of a full reduction from psychology to a more basic science since,
because as other scientific fields show, those sorts of reduction are practically nonexistent.
This  fact,  however,  does  not  turn scientific  categories,  for  example,  biological  ones,  into
illegitimate  scientific  categories.  Furthermore,  that  conclusion,  does  not  preclude  the
possibility of achieving real and relevant knowledge about cognitive activities. In addition to
the  problems  of  implicit  reductionism  in  research  about  mind,  the  way  experience  is
addressed is also a significant source of problems. Chapter 4 argued that “natural” views of
experience  are  usually  laden  with  unquestioned  commitments,  that  most  often  are  the
commitments  of  the  mainstream views  of  mind,  which  presuppose  that  cognition  can  be
understood as disembodied. Instead of asking “why and how physical processes in the brain
give rise to conscious experience?” (Chalmers, 2018, p. 6), what should be asked is actually
why do we think of the problem of consciousness as being hard.
By questioning the fundamental notions of mental content and representation in
an  explanation  of  cognition,  a  different  way of  conceiving  it  is  promoted,  having  as  the
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starting point basic non-representational activities performed by the organism in its dynamical
relations to the environment. Explaining cognitive phenomena depends on explaining how an
embodied organism, who has as ontogenetic and phylogenetic history, systematically interacts
with  the  environment  in  ways  that  are,  sometimes,  transformed  by  the  establishment  of
cultural and social practices. If REC turns out to be correct, it might indeed be the case of a
revolutionary change in the sense that key commitments concerning representationalism in
Cognitive Science research need to be deeply revised. That,  of course,  is still  a matter of
debate concerning not only empirical  but also philosophical  aspects for,  as we have seen,
despite well-known difficulties, the standard representationalist views are still at play in many
ways in the debate. It is not completely clear to what extent cognitive sciences are actually on
the imminence of a “scientific revolution”, but there seems to be sufficient reasons to consider
the contributions of what are, as REC at the moment, still alternative approaches.
Enactivist approaches are arguably transformative of Cognitive Science research
landscape because they are able to provide a middle way between “a disembodied eye looking
objectively” and a kind of “subjectivism in which the mind on its own ‘constructs’ the world”
(Varela  et  al.,  1991, p.  4).  It  is  possible that  there is  a fundamental  circularity  in  human
experience that  prevents the possibility of a “view of nowhere”.  Varela et  al.  (1991) also
emphasize that precisely the attempt to achieve such a neutral standpoint is what “leads to
having a view from a very specific, theoretically confined, preconceptually entrapped” view
(Varela et al., 1991, p. 27). However, it is not the case that experience is entirely physically
unconstrained, depending solely on cultural  matters, as a strong form of relativism would
claim.
It is important to keep in mind that both cognition and experience is dynamic and
has biological roots that need to be acknowledged as fundamental for the understanding of it.
These aspects are commonly understood as a “stumbling block, an error or an explanatory
residue”  (Maturana  and  Varela,  1987,  p.  27)  that  can  be  eradicated  or  abstracted  away.
However,  as  Maturana  and  Varela  (1987)  remind  us,  the  structural  coupling  between
organisms and environment is, instead of an obstacle, in fact, the very key to understanding
life and cognition.
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